Whitfield v. United States

• Decision Date: 11 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-1293.,03-1293.
• Citation: 543 U.S. 209
• Parties: WHITFIELD v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

543 U.S. 209

WHITFIELD v. UNITED STATES

No. 03-1293.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued November 30, 2004.

Decided January 11, 2005.^*

Petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1956(h) after the District Court denied their request to instruct the jury that the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the co-conspirators had committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding, in relevant part, that the jury instructions were proper because § 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt act.

Held: Conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of § 1956(h), does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Pp. 212-219.

(a) Section 1956(h) provides: "Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in [§ 1956] or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy." In United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, this Court held that the nearly identical language of the drug conspiracy statute, 21 U. S. C. § 846, does not require proof of an overt act. The Shabani Court found instructive the distinction between § 846 and the general conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. § 371, which supersedes the common law rule by expressly including an overt-act requirement. Shabani distilled the governing rule for conspiracy statutes: Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, and Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338, "`give Congress a formulary: by choosing a text modeled on § 371, it gets an overt-act requirement; by choosing a text modeled on the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1 [which, like 21 U. S. C. § 846, omits any express overt-act requirement], it dispenses with such a requirement.'" 513 U. S., at 14. This rule dictates the outcome here as well: Because § 1956(h)'s text does not expressly make the commission of an overt act an element of the conspiracy offense, the Government need not prove an overt act to obtain a conviction. Pp. 212-214.

(b) Petitioners' argument that Shabani is inapplicable because § 1956(h) does not establish a new conspiracy offense, but merely increases the penalty for conviction of a money laundering conspiracy under § 371, is untenable for two reasons: Section 1956(h)'s text is sufficient to establish an offense and fails to provide any cross-reference to § 371. Had Congress intended to create the scheme petitioners envision, it would have done so in clearer terms. Because § 1956(h)'s text is plain and unambiguous, the Court need not consider petitioners' argument that the provision's legislative history supports their construction by virtue of its failure to indicate that Congress meant to create a new offense or to eliminate § 371's overt-act requirement for money laundering conspiracies. In any event, mere silence in the legislative history cannot justify reading an overt-act requirement into § 1956(h). See, e. g., United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 496-497. Petitioners' legislative history argument is particularly inapt here because Congress is presumed to have had knowledge of Nash and Singer when it enacted § 1956(h). Petitioners' arguments as to § 1956's text and structure as a whole — (1) that had Congress intended § 1956(h) to create a new conspiracy offense, it would have placed that offense with the three substantive money laundering offenses set forth in § 1956(a); and (2) that by providing that "[a] prosecution for [a money laundering] conspiracy offense ... may be brought in the district where venue would lie for the completed offense under [§ 1956(i)(1)], or in any other district where an act in furtherance of the ... conspiracy took place," § 1956(i)(2), Congress confirmed that proof of an overt act was required under § 1956(h) — are not persuasive. Pp. 214-218.

349 F. 3d 1320, affirmed.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT.

Sharon C. Samek, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 985, argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With her on the briefs were Thomas C. Goldstein, Amy Howe, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard Ware Levitt.

Jonathan L. Marcus argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wray, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Kirby A. Heller.^†

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases present the question whether conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1956(h), requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. We hold that it does not.

I

In March 1999, a federal grand jury returned a 20-count indictment against petitioners and five codefendants. As relevant here, Count II of the indictment charged petitioners with conspiracy to launder money, in violation of § 1956(h). The indictment described, in general terms, the "manner and means" used to accomplish the objects of the money laundering conspiracy, but it did not charge the defendants with the commission of any overt act in furtherance thereof.

At trial, the Government presented evidence that petitioners were members of the executive board of an entity known as Greater Ministries International Church (GMIC). GMIC operated a "gifting" program that took in more than $400 million between 1996 and 1999. Under that program, petitioners and others induced unwary investors to give money to GMIC with promises that investors would receive double their money back within a year and a half. Petitioners marketed the program throughout the country, claiming that GMIC would generate returns on investors' "gifts" through overseas investments in gold and diamond mining, commodities, and offshore banks. Investors were told that GMIC would use some of the profits for philanthropic purposes. Most of these claims were false. GMIC made none of the promised investments, had no assets, and gave virtually nothing to charity. Many participants in GMIC's program received little or no return on their money, and their investments indeed largely turned out to be "gifts" to GMIC representatives. Petitioners together allegedly received more than $1.2 million in commissions on the money they solicited.

At the close of the evidence, petitioners asked the District Court to instruct the jury that the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the co-conspirators had committed an overt act in furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy. The court denied that request, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the money laundering conspiracy charge.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed petitioners' convictions, holding, in relevant part, that the jury instructions approved by the District Court were proper because § 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt act. 349 F. 3d 1320, 1324 (2003). The Court of Appeals noted that some of its sister Circuits had taken the opposite position. Id., at 1323 (citing United States v. Wilson, 249 F. 3d 366, 379 (CA5 2001); United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F. 3d 756, 762 (CA8 1998)). It concluded, however, that those decisions were erroneously based on case law interpreting the general conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. § 371, which, unlike § 1956(h), expressly includes an overt-act requirement. 349 F. 3d, at 1323. The Eleventh Circuit instead relied upon United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10 (1994), where we held that the drug conspiracy statute, 21 U. S. C. § 846, does not require proof of an overt act. Because the language of 18 U. S. C. § 1956(h) and 21 U. S. C. § 846 is "nearly identical," the Eleventh Circuit found itself compelled to follow the reasoning of Shabani in holding that § 1956(h), too, requires no proof of an overt act. 349 F. 3d, at 1323-1324. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the question presented, 542 U. S. 918 (2004), and we now affirm the decision below.

II

Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. §§ 1956 and 1957 (2000 ed. and Supp. II) as part of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18. Section 1956 penalizes the knowing and intentional transportation or transfer of monetary proceeds from specified unlawful activities while § 1957 addresses transactions involving criminally derived property exceeding $10,000 in value. As originally enacted, neither section included a conspiracy provision. Accordingly, the Government relied on the general conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. § 371, to prosecute conspiracies to commit the offenses set forth in §§ 1956 and 1957. In 1992, however, Congress enacted the money laundering conspiracy provision at issue in these cases, now codified at 18 U. S. C. § 1956(h). See Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. 102-550, § 1530, 106 Stat. 4066. Section 1956(h) provides: "Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in [§ 1956] or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy."

In Shabani, we addressed whether the nearly identical language of the drug conspiracy statute, 21 U. S. C. § 846, requires proof of an overt act. See ibid. ("Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy"). We held that it does not, relying principally upon our earlier decisions in Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913), and Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338 (1945). See Shabani, supra, at 13-14. In each of those cases, the Court held that, where Congress had omitted from the relevant conspiracy provision any language expressly...