Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 27 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-1243,88-1243
• Citation: 544 N.E.2d 651,45 Ohio St.3d 356
• Parties: , 56 Ed. Law Rep. 289 ROSSFORD EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellant, et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 356

45 Ohio St.3d 356

544 N.E.2d 651, 56 Ed. Law Rep. 289

ROSSFORD EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellant, et al.

No. 88-1243.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 10, 1989.

Decided Sept. 27, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

An appeal may be taken to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 119.12 from an order of the State Board of Education resulting from a hearing or adjudication pursuant to a request for transfer of territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.24.

In February 1986, the three owners of a parcel of property situated within the Rossford Exempted Village School District, ¹ Wood County ("Rossford"), and bordering, in part, on the Perrysburg Exempted Village School District, Wood County ("Perrysburg"), requested that their property be transferred from the Rossford to the Perrysburg School District pursuant to R.C. 3311.24. The Rossford Board of Education adopted a resolution rejecting the requested transfer and transmitted both the request for transfer and the board's resolution of disapproval to the State Department of Education. The Rossford board recommended that the transfer be disapproved.

The Secretary of the State Board of Education notified both school districts that in accordance with the provisions of R.C. 119.07, the state board intended to consider the transfer and that pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119 the parties were entitled to a hearing. Pursuant to that notice, Rossford requested a hearing.

The matter was heard by a referee, who, following a hearing, recommended that the State Board of Education approve the request for transfer. Rossford filed objections to the referee's recommendation. However, at a September 8, 1986 meeting, the State Board of Education overruled the objections and approved the transfer of territory. Rossford appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, naming the State Board of Education and the property owners as defendants.

The property owners filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that an order of the State Board of Education approving a transfer of property pursuant to R.C. 3311.24 is a legislative act which is not appealable pursuant to R.C. 119.12. The State Board of Education also filed a motion to dismiss, alleging "lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." The trial court agreed that the State Board of Education's decision was a legislative act and dismissed the appeal.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court, holding that a village board of education has a right, pursuant to R.C. 119.12, to appeal the state board's decision in an R.C. 3311.24 proceeding.

This cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Kolb, Kolb & Kolb and Matt Kolb, Toledo, for appellee.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Lauren M. Ross, Columbus, for appellant.

Means, Bichimer, Burkholder & Baker Co., L.P.A., Robert T. Baker and Kimball H. Carey, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio School Boards Ass'n.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

The issue in this case is whether an order issued by the State Board of Education approving the transfer of certain school district territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.24 may be appealed to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 119.12. For the reasons that follow, we hold that such an order may be appealed.

Sections 3 and 4, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution give the General Assembly authority to create a public school system, boards of education, and the State Board of Education. See State, ex rel. Core, v. Green (1953), 160 Ohio St. 175, 51 O.O. 442, 115 N.E.2d 157. Pursuant to this authority, the General Assembly enacted R.C. Chapter 3301, establishing the Department of Education and defining the department's scope of duties and guidelines for managing the public education system in Ohio.

Unlike some other state agencies, ² pursuant to R.C. 3301.13, the Department of Education is expressly included among the agencies that must comply with R.C. Chapter 119. This section provides in relevant part that "[t]he department of education shall be subject to all provisions of law pertaining to departments, offices, or institutions established for the exercise of any function of the state government * * *. In the exercise of any of its functions or powers, including the power to make rules and regulations and to prescribe minimum standards[,] the department of education, and any officer or agency therein, shall be subject to Chapter 119. of the Revised Code. * * * " This language is consistent with the definition of "agency" found in R.C. 119.01(A): " 'Agency' means * * * the functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission of the government of the state specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code * * *."

Among the powers delegated by the General Assembly to the state board is the authority to issue an order approving or disapproving the transfer of territory from one school district to another school district. In determining the appealability of an order approving a transfer of territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.24, we will review the mechanism involved in such approvals, as well as the method used to transfer territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.06.

At the heart of this question is the distinction between the reviewability of proceedings that are quasi-judicial in nature as opposed to agency action which is quasi-legislative in nature. In M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 150, 61 O.O.2d 394, 290 N.E.2d 562, at paragraph one of the syllabus, we stated: "The review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies, authorized by Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, ³ contemplates quasi-judicial proceedings only, and administrative actions of administrative officers and agencies not resulting from quasi-judicial proceedings are not appealable to the Court of Common Pleas under provisions of R.C. 2506.01. (Fortner v Thomas [1970], 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 51 O.O.2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 371, approved and followed.)" (Footnote added.) Similarly, in Fortner v. Thomas, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus, the court found that R.C. 119.11 ⁴ may not be used to obtain judicial review of quasi-legislative proceedings of administrative officers and agencies.

Permitting appeal from a quasi-judicial proceeding is based on the premise that an adjudication has been made by the agency which determines the rights or duties of parties with conflicting interests--in other words, there is a justiciable dispute requiring evaluation and resolution. Implicit in this concept is the exercise of discretion. In Englewood v. Daily (1965), 158 Colo. 356, 361, 407 P.2d 325, 327, the court stated that in deciding whether an act by an administrative agency is quasi-judicial, the " * * * most common test is to determine whether the function under consideration involves the exercise of discretion and requires notice and hearing," all elements being required to constitute a quasi-judicial act. See, also, Gross v. Kenton Structural & Ornamental Ironworks, Inc. (S.D.Ohio 1984), 581 F.Supp. 390.

R.C. 119.01(D) provides: " 'Adjudication' means the determination by the highest or ultimate authority of an agency of the rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a specified person, but does not include the issuance of a license in response to an application with respect to which no question is raised, nor other acts of a ministerial nature."

R.C. 119.06 provides in part: " * * * No adjudication order shall be valid unless an opportunity for a hearing is afforded in accordance with sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code. * * * "

With these well-established principles before us, we now review this court's previous pronouncements regarding the reviewability of orders issued by the State Board of Education approving transfers of school district territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 and 3311.24.

We will first review the case law regarding R.C. 3311.06 in an attempt to clarify the law on the subject.

Transfers of territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 ⁵ occur when a political subdivision of the state, such as a city or village, annexes through legislative action territory that contains all or part of another municipality's school district. See Grandview Hts. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 117, 74 O.O.2d 215, 341 N.E.2d 589. In Grandview, this court upheld the constitutionality of R.C 3311.06 in light of the 1955 amendment to the statute (126 Ohio Laws 302) which added a provision that the transfer of a portion of a school district territory would "take effect" only upon approval by the State Board of Education, whereas the prior version of the statute provided for automatic transfer of school district territory when the territory was annexed by a municipality. The Grandview Heights Board of Education challenged the State Board of Education's authority to approve property transfers pursuant to this amendment as being violative of the General Assembly's power to delegate authority since no standards or guidelines were given for the approval process. We upheld the constitutionality of the statute as amended, stating: "R.C. 3311.06 gives the [state] board no guides or standards to use in approving or disapproving the transfer of territory from one school district to another following a partial annexation for municipal purposes. Therefore, the act of the [state] board in approving a transfer of territory pursuant to R.C. 3311.06 is itself a legislative act, which 'takes effect' upon the approval of some other authority than the General Assembly." Grandview, supra, at 120, 74 O.O.2d at 217, 341 N.E.2d at 592.

In Marion Bd. of Edn. v. Elgin Bd. of Edn. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 152, 20 O.O.3d 165,...