Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 26 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 06–1595.,06–1595.
• Citation: 555 U.S. 271,129 S.Ct. 846,172 L.Ed.2d 650,77 USLW 4093
• Parties: Vicky S. CRAWFORD, Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

555 U.S. 271

129 S.Ct. 846

172 L.Ed.2d 650

77 USLW 4093

Vicky S. CRAWFORD, Petitioner,

v.METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE.

No. 06–1595.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 8, 2008.

Decided Jan. 26, 2009.

Syllabus^*

In response to questions from an official of respondent local government (Metro) during an internal investigation into rumors of sexual harassment by the Metro School District employee relations director (Hughes), petitioner Crawford, a 30–year employee, reported that Hughes had sexually harassed her. Metro took no action against Hughes, but soon fired Crawford, alleging embezzlement. She filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that Metro was retaliating for her report of Hughes's behavior, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a), which makes it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any ... employe[e]” who (1) “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter” (opposition clause), or (2) “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter” (participation clause). The court granted Metro summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the opposition clause demanded “active, consistent” opposing activities, whereas Crawford had not initiated any complaint prior to the investigation, and finding that the participation clause did not cover Metro's internal investigation because it was not conducted pursuant to a Title VII charge pending with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Held: The antiretaliation provision's protection extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer's internal investigation. Because “oppose” is undefined by statute, it carries its ordinary dictionary meaning of resisting or contending against. Crawford's statement is thus covered by the opposition clause, as an ostensibly disapproving account of Hughes's sexually obnoxious behavior toward her. “Oppose” goes beyond “active, consistent” behavior in ordinary discourse, and may be used to speak of someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it. Thus, a person can “oppose” by responding to someone else's questions just as surely as by provoking the discussion. Nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words when asked a question. Metro unconvincingly argues for the Sixth Circuit's active, consistent opposition rule, claiming that employers will be less likely to raise questions about possible discrimination if a retaliation charge is easy to raise when things go badly for an employee who responded to enquiries. Employers, however, have a strong inducement to ferret out and put a stop to discriminatory activity in their operations because Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633, and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662, hold “[a]n employer ... subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with ... authority over the employee.” The Circuit's rule could undermine the Ellerth–Faragher scheme, along with the statute's “ ‘primary objective’ ” of “avoid[ing] harm” to employees, Faragher, supra, at806, 118 S.Ct. 2275, for if an employee reporting discrimination in answer to an employer's questions could be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses. Because Crawford's conduct is covered by the opposition clause, this Court does not reach her argument that the Sixth Circuit also misread the participation clause. Metro's other defenses to the retaliation claim were never reached by the District Court, and thus remain open on remand. Pp. 851 – 853.

211 Fed.Appx. 373, reversed and remanded.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Eric Schnapper, Seattle, WA, for petitioner.

Lisa S. Blatt, for United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner.

Francis H. Young, Nashville, Tennessee, for respondent.

Eric Schnapper, Seattle, WA, Ann Buntin Steiner, Counsel of Record, Steiner & Sterner, Nashville, TN, for Petitioner.

James L. Charles, Francis H. Young, Counsel of Record, Nashville, Tennessee, for Respondent.

Justice SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), forbids retaliation by employers against employees who report workplace race or gender discrimination. The question here is whether this protection extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer's internal investigation. We hold that it does.

I

In 2002, respondent Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (Metro), began looking into rumors of sexual harassment by the Metro School District's employee relations director, Gene Hughes. ¹211 Fed.Appx. 373, 374 (C.A.6 2006). When Veronica Frazier, a Metro human resources officer, asked petitioner Vicky Crawford, a 30–year Metro employee, whether she had witnessed “inappropriate behavior” on the part of Hughes, id., at 374–375, Crawford described several instances of sexually harassing behavior: once, Hughes had answered her greeting, “ ‘Hey Dr. Hughes, what's up?,’ ” by grabbing his crotch and saying “ ‘[Y]ou know what's up’ ”; he had repeatedly “ ‘put his crotch up to [her] window’ ”; and on one occasion he had entered her office and “ ‘grabbed her head and pulled it to his crotch,’ ” id., at 375, and n. 1. Two other employees also reported being sexually harassed by Hughes. Id., at 375. Although Metro took no action against Hughes, it did fire Crawford and the two other accusers soon after finishing the investigation, saying in Crawford's case that it was for embezzlement. Ibid. Crawford claimed Metro was retaliating for her report of Hughes's behavior and filed a charge of a Title VII violation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), followed by this suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Ibid.

The Title VII antiretaliation provision has two clauses, making it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... [1] because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or [2] because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). The one is known as the “opposition clause,” the other as the “participation clause,” and Crawford accused Metro of violating both.

The District Court granted summary judgment for Metro. It held that Crawford could not satisfy the opposition clause because she had not “ instigated or initiated any complaint,” but had “merely answered questions by investigators in an already-pending internal investigation, initiated by someone else.” Memorandum Opinion, No. 3:03–cv–0996 (MD Tenn., Jan. 6, 2005), App. C to Pet. for Cert. 16a–17a. It concluded that her claim also failed under the participation clause, which Sixth Circuit precedent confined to protecting “ ‘an employee's participation in an employer's internal investigation ... where that investigation occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC charge’ ” (not the case here). Id., at 15a (emphasis deleted) (quoting Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 543 (C.A.6 2003)).

The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds, holding that the opposition clause “ ‘demands active, consistent “opposing” activities to warrant ... protection against retaliation,’ ” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376 (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed.Appx. 607, 610 (C.A.6 2004)), whereas Crawford did “not claim to have instigated or initiated any complaint prior to her participation in the investigation, nor did she take any further action following the investigation and prior to her firing.” 211 Fed. Appx., at 376. Again like the trial judge, the Court of Appeals understood that Crawford could show no violation of the participation clause because her “ ‘employer's internal investigation’ ” was not conducted “ ‘pursuant to a pending EEOC charge.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Abbott,supra, at543).

Because the Sixth Circuit's decision conflicts with those of other Circuits, particularly as to the opposition clause, see, e.g.,McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (C.A.7 1996), we granted Crawford's petition for certiorari. 552 U.S. 1162, 128 S.Ct. 1118, 169 L.Ed.2d 846 (2008). We now reverse and remand for further proceedings.

II

The opposition clause makes it “unlawful ... for an employer to discriminate against any ... employe[e] ... because he has opposed any practice made ... unlawful ... by this subchapter.” § 2000e–3(a). The term “oppose,” being left undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning, Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979): “to resist or antagonize ...; to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand,” Webster's New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed.1958). Although these actions entail varying expenditures of energy, “resist frequently implies more active striving than oppose.” Ibid.; see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1359 (2d ed.1987) (defining “oppose” as “to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion”).

The...