Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 08–1314.,08–1314.
• Citation: 131 S.Ct. 1131,562 U.S. 323,179 L.Ed.2d 75
• Parties: Delbert WILLIAMSON, et al., Petitioners, v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

562 U.S. 323

131 S.Ct. 1131

179 L.Ed.2d 75

Delbert WILLIAMSON, et al., Petitioners,

v.MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., et al.

No. 08–1314.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 3, 2010.

Decided Feb. 23, 2011.

Martin N. Buchanan, San Diego, CA, for petitioners.

William M. Jay, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioners.

Gregory G. Garre, Washington, DC, for respondents.

Justice Kagan recused.

Martin N. Buchanan, Counsel of Record, Niddrie, Fish & Buchanan, San Diego, CA, David J. Bennion, Law Offices of David J. Bennion, San Jose, CA, David R. Lira, Girardi Keese, Los Angeles, CA, Allison M. Zieve, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.

Shawn W. Murphy, Charles S. Kim, Irvine, CA, Erika Z. Jones, Dan Himmelfarb, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, Gregory G. Garre, Counsel of Record, Maureen E. Mahoney, J. Scott Ballenger, Jessica E. Phillips, Michael E. Bern, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, Mark V. Berry, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Gardena, CA, Malcolm E. Wheeler, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell, LLP, Denver, CO, for respondents.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (1989 version) requires, among other things, that auto manufacturers install seatbelts on the rear seats of passenger vehicles. They must install lap-and-shoulder belts on seats next to a vehicle's doors or frames. But they have a choice about what to install on rear inner seats (say, middle seats or those next to a minivan's aisle). There they can install either (1) simple lap belts or (2) lap-and-shoulder belts. 54 Fed.Reg. 46257–46258 (1989) ; 49 CFR § 571.208 (1993), promulgated pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966(Act), 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1988 ed.) (recodified without substantive change at 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. (2006 ed.) ).

The question presented here is whether this federal regulation pre-empts a state tort suit that, if successful, would deny manufacturers a choice of belts for rear inner seats by imposing tort liability upon those who choose to install a simple lap belt. We conclude that providing manufacturers with this seatbelt choice is not a significant objective of the federal regulation. Consequently, the regulation does not pre-empt the state tort suit.

I

In 2002, the Williamson family, riding in their 1993 Mazda minivan, was struck head on by another vehicle. Thanh Williamson was sitting in a rear aisle seat, wearing a lap belt; she died in the accident. Delbert and Alexa Williamson were wearing lap-and-shoulder belts; they survived. They, along with Thanh's estate, subsequently brought this California tort suit against Mazda. They claimed that Mazda should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts on rear aisle seats, and that Thanh died because Mazda equipped her seat with a lap belt instead.

The California trial court dismissed this tort claim on the basis of the pleadings. And the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The appeals court noted that in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000), this Court considered whether a different portion of (an older version of) Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208)—a portion that required installation of passive restraint devices—pre-empted a state tort suit that sought to hold an auto manufacturer liable for failure to install a particular kind of passive restraint, namely, airbags. We found that the federal regulation intended to assure manufacturers that they would retain a choice of installing any of several different passive restraint devices. And the regulation sought to assure them that they would not have to exercise this choice in favor of airbags. For that reason we thought that the federal regulation pre-empted a state tort suit that, by premising tort liability on a failure to install airbags, would have deprived the manufacturers of the choice that the federal regulation had assured them. Id., at 874–875, 120 S.Ct. 1913.

The court saw considerable similarity between this case and Geier. The federal regulation at issue here gives manufacturers a choice among two different kinds of seatbelts for rear inner seats. And a state lawsuit that premises tort liability on a failure to install a particular kind of seatbelt, namely, lap-and-shoulder belts, would in effect deprive the manufacturer of that choice. The court concluded that, as in Geier, the federal regulation pre-empts the state tort suit. 167 Cal.App.4th 905, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 545 (2008).

The Williamsons sought certiorari. And we granted certiorari in light of the fact that several courts have interpreted Geier as indicating that FMVSS 208 pre-empts state tort suits claiming that manufacturers should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts, not lap belts, on rear inner seats. Carden v. General Motors Corp., 509 F.3d 227 (C.A.5 2007) ; Roland v. General Motors Corp., 881 N.E.2d 722 (Ind.App.2008) ; Heinricher v. Volvo Car Corp., 61 Mass.App. 313, 809 N.E.2d 1094 (2004).

II

In Geier, we considered a portion of an earlier (1984) version of FMVSS 208. That regulation required manufacturers to equip their vehicles with passive restraint systems, thereby providing occupants with automatic accident protection. 49 Fed.Reg. 28983 (1984). But that regulation also gave manufacturers a choice among several different passive restraint systems, including airbags and automatic seatbelts. Id., at 28996. The question before the Court was whether the Act, together with the regulation, pre-empted a state tort suit that would have held a manufacturer liable for not installing airbags. 529 U.S., at 865, 120 S.Ct. 1913. By requiring manufacturers to install airbags (in order to avoid tort liability) the tort suit would have deprived the manufacturers of the choice among passive restraint systems that the federal regulation gave them. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) ("[S]tate laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes").

We divided this basic pre-emption question into three subsidiary questions. 529 U.S., at 867, 120 S.Ct. 1913. First, we asked whether the statute's express pre-emption provision preempted the state tort suit. That statutory clause says that "no State" may "establish, or ... continue in effect ... any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance" of a motor vehicle or item of equipment "which is not identical to the Federal standard." 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988 ed.) (emphasis added). We had previously held that a word somewhat similar to "standard," namely, "requirements" (found in a similar statute) included within its scope state "common-law duties," such as duties created by state tort law. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 502–503, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (plurality opinion); id., at 503–505, 116 S.Ct. 2240 ( BREYER , J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 509–512, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But we nonetheless held that the state tort suit in question fell outside the scope of this particular pre-emption clause. That is primarily because the statute also contains a saving clause, which says that " [c]ompliance with" a federal safety standard "does not exempt any person from any liability under common law ." 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (emphasis added). Since tort law is ordinarily "common law," we held that "the presence of the saving clause," makes clear that Congress intended state tort suits to fall outside the scope of the express pre-emption clause. Geier, 529 U.S., at 868, 120 S.Ct. 1913.

Second, we asked the converse question: The saving clause at least removes tort actions from the scope of the express pre-emption clause. Id., at 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913. But does it do more? Does it foreclose or limit "the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles insofar as those principles instruct us to read" federal statutes as pre-empting state laws (including state common-law standards) that "actually conflict" with the federal statutes (or related regulations)? Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that the saving clause does not foreclose or limit the operation of "ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded in longstanding precedent." Id., at 874, 120 S.Ct. 1913.

These two holdings apply directly to the case before us. We here consider (1) the same statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. ; (2) a later version of the same regulation, FMVSS 208; and (3) a somewhat similar claim that a state tort action conflicts with the federal regulation. In light of Geier, the statute's express pre-emption clause cannot pre-empt the common-law tort action; but neither can the statute's saving clause foreclose or limit the operation of ordinary conflict pre-emption principles. We consequently turn our attention to Geier' s third subsidiary question, whether, in fact, the state tort action conflicts with the federal regulation.

III

Under ordinary conflict pre-emption principles a state law that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of a federal law is pre-empted. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). See ibid. (federal statute can pre-empt a state statute); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (federal statute can pre-empt a state tort suit); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (federal regulation can pre-empt a state statute); Geier,supra (federal regulation can pre-empt a state tort suit). In Geier we found that the state law stood as an " ‘obstacle’ to the accomplishment" of a significant federal regulatory objective, namely, the maintenance of manufacturer choice. 529 U.S., at 886, 120...