City of Hartshorne v. Marathon Oil Co.
Decision Date | 03 April 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 50105,50105 |
Citation | 593 P.2d 97 |
Parties | CITY OF HARTSHORNE, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee, v. MARATHON OIL COMPANY and Amoco Production Company, Appellants. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Pittsburgh County; James R. Martin, Trial Judge.
An appeal from a declaratory judgment action wherein trial court found valid a provision in a city ordinance requiring assignment to city of 1/16 override of the 7/8 working interest of all oil and gas leases within city limits. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Layden & Layden, McAlester, for appellee.
McAfee, Taft, Mark, Bond, Rucks & Woodruff, by Judson S. Woodruff and Philip D. Hart, Oklahoma City, for appellant, Marathon Oil Co.
Crowe, Dunlevy, Thweatt, Swinford, Johnson & Burdick, by C. Harold Thweatt, Oklahoma City, for appellant, Amoco Production Co.
The City of Hartshorne (City) enacted ordinance 412 dated October 5, 1970. Section 2(a) of this ordinance provides:
Marathon Oil Company and Amoco Oil Company, appellants herein, operate wells within the city limits of Hartshorne. Marathon refused to pay the over-ride required by this ordinance. Amoco paid under protest on one well and refused to pay on another. 1
City filed the present action seeking a declaratory judgment 2 as to the validity of the required over-ride. Both defendants answered, claiming above provision was invalid and unenforceable. 3 Amoco further cross-petitioned for recovery of the sums it had already paid to City under this provision.
After hearing the trial court found the ordinance to be valid and constitutional, reasonable and necessary for the protection of property and citizens of City. On this basis it denied Amoco's cross-petition. Marathon and Amoco appeal.
A city has no inherent power or authority; it possesses and can exercise only those powers expressly granted, or incidental to powers expressly granted, by the state. 4 Appellants argue City is explicitly denied the power to exact the over-ride required by the ordinances claiming it is a tax for revenue producing purposes and citing 68 O.S. 1971 § 1001. Section 1001(f) specifically provides the gross production tax therein levied by the state:
". . . shall be in full, and in lieu of all taxes by the state, counties, cities, towns, school districts and other municipalities upon any property rights attached to or inherent in the right to said minerals, . . . or for petroleum or other crude oil or other mineral oil, or for natural gas and/or casinghead gas, upon the mineral rights and privileges for the minerals aforesaid belonging or appertaining to land . . ."
They further submit City's license taxing powers are limited to those businesses specified in 11 O.S.1971 § 651. Oil and gas operations are not among those so listed.
City counters by suggesting the ordinance is not meant to be revenue producing but rather is a regulatory provision pursuant to a valid exercise of its police power.
There is no doubt a city, under its police power, may enact ordinances regulating the drilling of oil and gas wells within its city limits. 5 But to be valid, any ordinance must bear a reasonable relation to public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 6 A reasonable connection to these objectives may include the payment of a permit fee as a prerequisite to the drilling of the well. 7 The amount of such permit or license fee exacted for the purpose of regulation must...
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...can exercise only those powers expressly or impliedly granted by the state. City of Hartshorne v. Marathon Oil Co. , 1979 OK 48, ¶ 4, 593 P.2d 97, 99 ; Ex parte Holmes , 1933 OK 62, ¶ 11, 162 Okla. 30, 18 P.2d 1053, 1054 ; see In re De-Annexation of Certain Real Prop. from City of Seminole ......
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...it is levied. In Re Skelton Lead & Zinc Company's Gross Production Tax for 1919, supra. See also, City of Hartshorne v. Marathon Oil Co. (Amoco Production Co.), 593 P.2d 97 (Okl.1979). Where an ordinance is merely a regulatory enactment under the police power serving the purpose of protecti......
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