People v. Morey

• Decision Date: 22 December 1999
• Docket Number: Docket No. 112623, Calendar No. 3.
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sherry Ann MOREY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

603 N.W.2d 250

461 Mich. 325

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sherry Ann MOREY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 112623, Calendar No. 3.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued October 12, 1999.

Decided December 22, 1999.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, William A. Forsyth, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy K. McMorrow, Chief Appellate Attorney, and Vicki L. Seidl, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Grand Rapids, MI, for the people.

Jeanice Dagher-Margosian, Ann Arbor, MI, for the defendant-appellee.

Opinion

MARKMAN, J.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of pandering, M.C.L. § 750.455; MSA 28.710, and accepting the earnings of a prostitute, M.C.L. § 750.457; MSA 28.712. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for accepting the earnings of a prostitute,¹ but reversed the pandering conviction on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. We granted leave to consider whether sufficient evidence was presented to support defendant's conviction for pandering, 459 Mich. 949, 590 N.W.2d 569 (1999), and conclude that it was not.

The facts of this case were accurately set forth in the published decision of the Court of Appeals:

A Grand Rapids police officer, taking part in an undercover operation designed to curtail prostitution, called defendant's massage service from a hotel room and made an appointment for a massage at a cost of $75 an hour. Defendant agreed to send over a blonde in her mid-twenties with a nice figure. Shortly thereafter, a masseuse calling herself "Heather" and later identified as Christine Hanlon arrived at the hotel room. Hanlon had the officer disrobe and proceeded to give him a nonsexual massage. After twenty minutes, the officer asked if there were any "extras" available; after negotiations, Hanlon agreed to have sexual intercourse with him for an additional $100. When Hanlon completely undressed and crawled into bed with him, he gave a signal and his fellow officers rushed in from an adjoining room and arrested Hanlon for soliciting for prostitution. [MCL 750.448; MSA 28.703.]

Hanlon agreed to cooperate with the police by telephoning defendant and asking her to send a second masseuse to the room under the pretext that the officer wished to have sex with two women. Hanlon specifically used the word "sex" twice in her conversations with defendant, making it clear that the customer was interested in sex for money. Defendant replied that she would send a masseuse named Patti Jo Carlton.

When Carlton arrived, she had the officer lie on the bed and gave him a brief massage. She then reached for his penis as if to masturbate him. He stopped her by asking what else was available. Carlton stated that she would perform oral sex on him for $100. He agreed, and Carlton started to perform the act. She was then arrested. Shortly thereafter, a female police officer drove Hanlon and Carlton to a local restaurant parking lot to meet with defendant. Hanlon handed defendant $300, of which $150 was for time she and Carlton spent in the hotel room, and $150 was attributable to other "calls" the two had made. Defendant was then arrested. [230 Mich.App. 152, 154-155, 583 N.W.2d 907 (1998).]

The pandering statute, M.C.L. § 750.455; MSA 28.710, sets forth eight activities for which a defendant may be charged:

Any person [1] who shall procure a female inmate for a house of prostitution; or [2] who shall induce, persuade, encourage, inveigle or entice a female person to become a prostitute; or [3] who by promises, threats, violence or by any device or scheme, shall cause, induce, persuade, encourage, take, place, harbor, inveigle or entice a female person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution or assignation place, or any place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed; or [4] any person who shall, by promises, threats, violence or by any device or scheme, cause, induce, persuade, encourage, inveigle or entice an inmate of a house of prostitution or place of assignation to remain therein as such inmate; or [5] any person who by promises, threats, violence, by any device or scheme, by fraud or artifice, or by duress of person or goods, or by abuse of any position of confidence or authority, or having legal charge, shall take, place, harbor, inveigle, entice, persuade, encourage or procure any female person to enter any place within this state in which prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed, for the purpose of prostitution; or [6] who shall inveigle, entice, persuade, encourage, or procure any female person to come into this state or to leave this state for the purpose of prostitution; or [7] who upon the pretense of marriage takes or detains a female person for the purpose of sexual intercourse; or [8] who shall receive or give or agree to receive or give any money or thing of value for procuring or attempting to procure any female person to become a prostitute or to come into this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 20 years. [Numerals added for ease of reference.]

Defendant was charged under the second clause, to "induce, persuade, encourage, inveigle or entice a female person to become a prostitute...." The Court of Appeals, relying on People v. Cook, 96 Mich. 368, 370, 55 N.W. 980 (1893), concluded that this section of the statute was created to penalize individuals who induce females who have not already engaged in prostitution to begin doing so. 230 Mich. App. at 158, 583 N.W.2d 907.

The clear dispute in this case is with respect to the phrase "to become a prostitute." The prosecutor contends that any time a defendant induces a female² to perform an act of prostitution—whether it be her first act of prostitution or a subsequent act —the defendant has induced her "to become a prostitute"; accordingly, a defendant could be charged under this section of the statute an unlimited number of times with respect to the same female. Defendant, on the other hand, makes a reasonable argument that once a female has performed an act of prostitution she is a prostitute and can no longer be enticed to become what she already is; she can only be enticed to continue being a prostitute. Thus, the narrow question is whether the word "prostitute" signifies a status, that is, does it describe a person with respect to her chosen livelihood, or does "prostitute" merely signify a choice to engage in an activity, that is, one is a prostitute while engaging in an act of prostitution, but ceases to be a prostitute when the act ceases.

We review questions of statutory construction de novo. McAuley v. General Motors Corp., 457 Mich. 513, 518, 578 N.W.2d 282 (1998). In doing so, our purpose is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Murphy v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 447 Mich. 93, 98, 523 N.W.2d 310 (1994). We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). We must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning, and only where the statutory language is ambiguous may we look outside the statute to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 27, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995); Luttrell v. Dep't of Corrections, 421 Mich. 93, 365 N.W.2d 74 (1984).

In determining the plain meaning of the phrase, "to become a prostitute," we consider not only the meaning of the phrase itself, but also "its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). "The fair and natural import of the terms employed, in view of the subject matter of the law, is what should govern," People ex rel Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 168 (1865)(COOLEY, J.), and as far as possible, effect must be given to every word, phrase, and clause in the statute. Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535, 542, 510 N.W.2d 900 (1994). Where, as here, the Legislature has not expressly defined terms used within a statute, we may turn to dictionary definitions to aid our goal of construing those terms in accordance with their ordinary and generally accepted meanings. Oakland Co. Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm'rs v. Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich. 590, 604, 575 N.W.2d 751 (1998).

The word "become" means "to come, change, or grow to be (as specified): to become tired "or"to come into being; develop or progress into: She became a ballerina." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997), p. 121. A "prostitute" is "a woman who engages in sexual intercourse for money; whore; harlot." Id., p. 1084. Thus, "to become a prostitute" means to change, grow to be, or develop into a woman who engages in sexual intercourse for money.

We begin by examining People v. Cook, supra, a case with more than one hundred years of precedential value, in which this Court considered the language, "to solicit or in any manner induce a female to enter [a house of ill fame] for the purpose of becoming a prostitute...." 96 Mich. at 371, 55 N.W. 980. The trial court in Cook had instructed the jury that the Legislature could not have intended to "forgive the person whose business it was to solicit women of pronounced bad character from one house of ill fame to another," id. at 372, 55 N.W. 980, but this Court disagreed, pointing out that the next clause of the statute distinguished (1) procuring a female to enter a house of ill fame "for the purpose of prostitution" from (2) procuring a female for the purpose "of becoming a prostitute." Thus, this Court concluded that the Legislature recognized a difference between performing acts of prostitution and the status of...