Green v. Ralee Engineering Co

Decision Date27 February 1997
Docket NumberNo. B091398,B091398
Citation52 Cal.App.4th 1534,61 Cal.Rptr.2d 352
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesPreviously published at 52 Cal.App.4th 1534 52 Cal.App.4th 1534, 12 IER Cases 1737, 12 IER Cases 940, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1496, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2204 Richard GREEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RALEE ENGINEERING COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

Oshman, Brownfield & Smith and George E. Brownfield, N. Hollywood, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Nemecek & Cole, Jonathan B. Cole, Scott C. Pape, and Craig G. Staub, Sherman Oaks, for Defendant and Respondent.

JOHNSON, Associate Justice.

In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment against a veteran aircraft inspector who claimed he was discharged for repeatedly complaining his employer, a manufacturer of components for passenger aircraft, was shipping defective parts and altering inspection records. Contrary to the trial court, we conclude the public interest in safe air travel and properly manufactured passenger aircraft finds a firm basis in statutory and regulatory provisions. Thus, the employee's actions furthered public policy and there is a triable issue whether he was wrongfully terminated despite his status as an at will employee. Accordingly, we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Since this appeal arises out of a summary judgment, we state the facts and draw the inferences most favorable to the party against whom the trial court granted judgment. (Heredia v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1345, 1353-1354, 279 Cal.Rptr. 511; Stratton v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1083, 258 Cal.Rptr. 721, Eisenberg, Horvitz &amp Respondent Ralee Engineering Company (Ralee) manufactures fuselage and wing components for military and civilian aircraft. It supplied parts for major airline assembly companies such as Boeing and for major warplane assembly companies such as Northrop. Ralee first hired appellant Richard Green (Green) as a quality control inspector at Ralee in 1968. By the early 1990's, he was in his mid-fifties and working the night shift as part of a four-member team inspecting all parts before they were shipped to Boeing, Northrop, and others in the aviation industry.

                Wiener, Cal.Practice Guide, Civil Appeals and Writs, § 8:115, pp. 8-46-8-47 [review on appeal from summary judgment presumes truth of allegations or evidence favorable to appellant].)  We emphasize the evidence if and when weighed at trial may tell a very different story, one exonerating the employer completely of the conduct the employee alleges and which remains a triable issue at this stage of the proceedings.  But the employer essentially chose to base its summary judgment motion on a single ground--assuming it had done everything the employee claimed it had, this conduct did not violate any public policy embodied in a statutory provision. 1  Consequently, the employer argues, the employee's discharge could not qualify as a wrongful termination justifying a damage claim.  The trial court, in turn, based its order granting summary judgment on this single ground.  Accordingly, we recite the facts as we must assume they exist for purposes of this appeal
                

Starting in 1990, Green noticed Ralee was beginning to ship parts even though they failed the inspections his team was performing. On a number of occasions over the next two years, he objected about this practice to supervisory and management personnel, including repeated protests to the general manager and even the company president. He also began using colored markers to highlight the deficiencies he had found during these inspections. Green further objected to the use of pencils rather than pens to complete inspection reports on parts shipped to Northrop, a military aircraft manufacturer, a practice inconsistent with Northrop's contractual requirements.

Evidently Ralee eventually corrected its practice of using pencil rather than pen, at least on inspection documents for parts shipped to Northrop. According to Ralee's president the firm did so after a complaint from a Northrop official. Nonetheless, despite Green's many complaints, it continued the practice of shipping parts to Boeing which had failed inspection. Finally, in order to protect himself and other members of the inspection team from charges they personally approved those defective parts, he began photocopying the inspection reports.

In March 1991, Ralee shut down its night shift, citing a downturn in orders for the parts it produced. Using this as an excuse, Ralee discharged Green despite his 23 years of experience as an inspector at the firm. At the same time, Ralee retained several other employees from the night shift including other inspectors on that shift, some with only three or four years on the job. Green claims the real reason for his termination was retaliation for his on-going complaints about Ralee's shipping of defective parts, especially those destined for inclusion in airliners assembled by Boeing.

While working at his next job, Green saw a Boeing representative and mentioned Ralee's practice of shipping parts which had not passed inspection and related irregularities. Boeing officials asked him to meet with them. He showed them the photocopies of those On February 24, 1994, Green filed a wrongful termination cause of action against Ralee. He alleged Ralee discharged him in retaliation for his constant and loud complaints about their practice of shipping defective parts to aircraft assembly companies. He further claimed the conduct for which he was fired, in turn, served the public policy in favor of aviation safety and thus entitled Green to damages even as an "at will" employee.

deficient inspection reports. A short time later, in February 1992, Boeing officials paid an unannounced visit to Ralee and audited its inspection operation. Boeing confirmed Green's charges, documenting numerous violations of record-making and record-keeping requirements including alterations to conceal discovered defects and improper disposition of discrepant parts. On that basis, Boeing canceled it contract with Ralee and removed the company from its list of approved suppliers. Over two years later, in July 1994, at the time of the deposition of Ralee's CEO, Boeing still refused to deal with Ralee.

On October 25, 1994, Ralee filed a summary judgment motion. It based this motion on two alternate grounds: (1) It was entitled to discharge Green, even assuming it did so because he objected to its shipping of defective parts which failed inspections, because the practice about which he complained did not violate a public policy embodied in statutory or constitutional provisions, or (2) it was entitled to discharge him for an independent after-acquired reason, Green's earlier unauthorized photocopying of inspection reports about which Ralee did not learn until discovery but which would have led to this employee's immediate and justifiable dismissal. 2

In December 1994, the trial court heard the summary judgment motion. During the hearing, the court expressed its view Green was merely an at will employee who continually griped about how his employer was carrying on its business. As such, the employer had a clear right to fire him. It ordered Ralee to prepare an order granting summary judgment which respondent did. The trial court signed the judgment and it was entered January 10, 1995.

Green filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

A motion for summary judgment is appropriately granted when all the papers submitted show there is "no triable issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant may meet his burden of showing a cause of action has no merit by showing one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or, in the alternative, by establishing a complete defense to the action. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).)

"Since a summary judgment motion raises only questions of law regarding the construction and effect of the supporting and opposing papers, we independently review them on appeal, applying the same three-step analysis required of the trial court. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c; LaRosa v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 741, 744-745, 176 Cal.Rptr. 224; Bonus-Bilt, Inc. v. United Grocers, Ltd. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 429, 432, 186 Cal.Rptr. 357.) First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond by establishing a complete defense or otherwise showing there is no factual basis for relief on any theory reasonably contemplated by the opponent's pleading. (Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 132, 148-149, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889; Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co. (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 44, 50, 46 Cal.Rptr. 552; Tresemer v. Barke (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 656, 666, 150 Cal.Rptr. 384.)

"Secondly, we determine whether the moving party's showing has established facts which negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment in movant's favor. (Gardenswartz v. Equitable etc. Soc. (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d Supp. 745, 751, 753-754, 68 P.2d 322; Kimber v. Jones (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 914, 919, 265 P.2d 922; Rowland v. Christian "When a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue...." (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker Nat. Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064-1065, 225 Cal.Rptr. 203.)

(1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 111, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, and cases cited.) ...

An appellate court also conducts "an independent review of the trial court's determination of questions of law. We are not bound by the trial court's stated reasons, if any, supporting its ruling; we review the...

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  • Green v. Ralee Engineering Co.
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 11 Junio 1997
    ...Appellant, v. RALEE ENGINEERING COMPANY, Respondent. No. S060370. Supreme Court of California. June 11, 1997. Prior report: Cal.App., 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 352. Respondent's petition for review GEORGE, C.J., and KENNARD, BAXTER, CHIN and BROWN, JJ., concur. ...
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