Tresemer v. Barke
Citation | 86 Cal.App.3d 656,150 Cal.Rptr. 384 |
Parties | , 12 A.L.R.4th 27 Donna Sue TRESEMER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Morton BARKE, M. D., Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 52298. |
Decision Date | 22 November 1978 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Kanarek & Berlin and Sheldon Berlin, Van Nuys, for plaintiff and appellant.
Bonne, Jones, Bridges, Mueller & O'Keefe, a Professional Corp., and Joel Bruce Douglas, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
This is an appeal by plaintiff Donna Sue Tresemer from the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Morton Barke, M.D. The action, filed on April 12, 1976, is for damages allegedly sustained by plaintiff from a Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. Plaintiff's third amended complaint charges Dr. Barke, who inserted the device in August 1972, with willful misconduct (count one) and medical malpractice (count two). Mario De Lara, M.D., who attempted to remove the device on April 17, 1975, 1 is charged with willful misconduct (count three) and medical negligence (count four), and A. H. Robbins Company is charged with the manufacture and distribution of harmful contraceptive intrauterine devices (count five).
After demurrers had been sustained to three separate complaints, Dr. Barke (hereinafter defendant) responded to the third amended complaint by a demurrer and motion to strike along with a motion for a summary judgment. Plaintiff filed no written opposition to the motions. The motion to strike and demurrer were placed off calendar and the motion for summary judgment was granted, predicated on the grounds that the statute of limitations (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 340.5 and 340, subd. 3) barred the action, the action was without merit, and plaintiff had presented no triable issue of fact. We conclude defendant's moving papers do not show that plaintiff's action is barred by time limitations and do not rebut all elements of defendant's liability.
,2] Inasmuch as this case reaches us on appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant, we need only determine whether there is a reasonable Possibility that plaintiff may be able to establish its case. When the moving party is the defendant, he must conclusively negate a necessary element of plaintiff's case or establish a complete defense, and thereby demonstrate that under no hypothesis is there a material factual issue which requires the process of a trial. (Frazier, Dame, Doherty, Parrish & Hanawalt v. Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 331, 338-339, 138 Cal.Rptr. 670.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c provides in pertinent part:
(Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 111, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 99, 443 P.2d 561, 563.)
In the instant case, plaintiff filed no opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, and made no formal request that the trial court take judicial notice of any document, declaration or affidavit. However, defendant's moving papers are insufficient to establish his defense that plaintiff's causes of action against him were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. (Cf. Butcher v. Okmar Oil Co. (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 972, 975-976, 135 Cal.Rptr. 713.)
3] Although generally a personal injury claim accrues and the period of limitations commences when the wrongful act takes place, an exception is presented when the pathological effect occurs without perceptible trauma and the victim is "blamelessly ignorant" of the cause of injury. In such case the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the person knows or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the cause of injury. (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 25, 122 Cal.Rptr. 218.) Personal injury actions based upon allegations of willful misconduct are governed by the one-year period of limitations prescribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision 3.
Medical negligence claims are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. Before the advent of section 340.5 in 1970, such malpractice actions were also governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision 3, supra, and judicial decisions had firmly established the principle that the one-year limitations period commences to run when the plaintiff discovers the injury and its negligent cause, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it. (Larcher v. Wanless (1976) 18 Cal.3d 646, 654, 135 Cal.Rptr. 75, 557 P.2d 507.) The 1970 version of section 340.5 preserved the one-year "discovery" rule, but circumscribed it with an outer limit of four years. (Id., at p. 658.)
In 1975 section 340.5 2 was amended. The amended section was in effect when the present suit was filed and is controlling as to the causes of action alleging medical negligence. The Legislature retained the one-year "discovery" limitations period in the 1975 version of section 340.5, reduced the four-year maximum limitation to three years and provided that " '(i)n no event shall the time for commencement of legal action Exceed three years . . . .' " unless affected by one of its three specific tolling provisions. The "time for the commencement of action" applicable to the three-year limitation period is triggered by the plaintiff's "injury." (Code, Civ.Proc., § 340.5.)
4] Lest it appear that it is the same event which causes both the one-year and three-year limitation periods to begin, we reiterate that the one-year period commences not merely upon discovery of the harm caused by the alleged wrongful act, but requires also "discovery of the malpractice." (Martinez v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 242, 245, 144 Cal.Rptr. 123.)
5] Inasmuch as one of the grounds upon which the summary judgment herein was granted was that the action was "barred by the Statute of Limitations as set forth in Sections 340(3) and 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure . . .," the court apparently mistakenly reasoned that the relevant date which set the limitations periods in motion is August 1972, the date when defendant inserted the Dalkon Shield. However, in Larcher the Supreme Court differentiated between the "injury" and the "alleged wrongful act." It stated that the word "injury," as used in the 1970 version of section 340.5 to denote the start of the four-year limitation period, was a "word of art" which clearly referred to the "damaging effect" of the "alleged wrongful act" and not to the act itself. (Id., at pp. 655-656, and fn. 11 on p. 656, 135 Cal.Rptr. 75, 557 P.2d 507.) Likewise, in the 1975 amended version of section 340.5, it is the "injury" which sets in motion the three-year limitation period. "For our purposes here, the key holding of both Sanchez and Larcher is that 'injury' is not synonymous with 'wrongful act.' " (Bispo v. Burton (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 824, 830, 147 Cal.Rptr. 442, 445.)
6] At bench, plaintiff's third amended complaint alleges that not until May 5, 1975, the date on...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Becker v. IRM Corp.
...that the action is without merit; a factual showing negating all causes of action on all theories is required. (Tresemer v. Barke (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 656, 666, 150 Cal.Rptr. 384; Harris, supra, at p. 647, 127 Cal.Rptr. 695.) "If he fails in that burden, summary judgment must be denied desp......
-
Becker v. Irm Corp.
...action is without merit; a factual showing negating all causes of action on all theories is required. (Tresemer v. Barke (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 656, 666, 150 Cal.Rptr. 384, 12 A.L.R.4th 27; Harris, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 647, 127 Cal.Rptr. 695.) "If he fails in that burden, summary judgme......
-
Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento
...the action is without merit; a factual showing negating all causes of action upon all theories is required. (Tresemer v. Barke (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 656, 666, 150 Cal.Rptr. 384.) Summary judgment raises only questions of law, which are reviewed independently. Our review tracks the same, thre......
-
Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc.
...not rely on the pleadings. (Cornelison v. Kornbluth (1975) 15 Cal.3d 590, 596, 125 Cal.Rptr. 557, 542 P.2d 981; Tresemer v. Barke (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 656, 668, 150 Cal.Rptr. 384.) The court must consider presumptions and draw inferences from the facts adduced where the inference is the onl......
-
GENETIC DUTIES.
...policy."). (195.) See infra Part III.A.1. (196.) See, e.g., Scopulous & Segal, supra note 190, at 427. (197.) Tresemer v. Barke, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). This proposition stems from a law review article authored by Professor Prosser and recently has been repeatedly ......