Pitts v. State

• Decision Date: 17 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–3388.,10–3388.
• Citation: 646 F.3d 151
• Parties: Courtland C. PITTS, Appellantv.State of DELAWARE; Ruth Ann Minner; Renee Hrivnak; State of Delaware Police; Lt. Col. Aaron Chaffinch; Lt. Mark Daniels; Gregory Spence; M. Jane Brady.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

646 F.3d 151

Courtland C. PITTS, Appellant

v.State of DELAWARE; Ruth Ann Minner; Renee Hrivnak; State of Delaware Police; Lt. Col. Aaron Chaffinch; Lt. Mark Daniels; Gregory Spence; M. Jane Brady.

No. 10–3388.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued April 25, 2011.Filed June 17, 2011.

Karen E. Keller (Argued), John W. Shaw, Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, DE, for Appellant.Ralph K. Durstein, III (Argued), Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for Appellees.Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges and POLLAK, ^* District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

It is only on rare instances that a jury's verdict in a civil case should be overturned. This appeal presents the question whether this is such a case.

Courtland Pitts filed a Complaint against Corporal Gregory Spence of the Delaware State Police, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. After a trial, a jury found in favor of Pitts on two of his four claims. The District Court granted Spence's subsequent motion for judgment as matter of law, made pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Pitts, we conclude that the District Court erred.

I.

Pitts' Complaint against Spence alleged that Spence falsely arrested, illegally seized, and maliciously prosecuted him, as well as deprived him of equal protection under the law. At trial, Pitts testified that his claims arose out of events occurring when Pitts, who is African American, went to Mitchem's Auto Body Shop and conversed with its owner, James Mitchem, Jr., who is Caucasian, about Pitts' displeasure with work Mitchem had done on Pitts' car. A verbal dispute between the men arose, which quickly escalated into a physical altercation. At some point, Mitchem “promised” to “[o]pen up a can of whoop ass” on Pitts, which Mitchem conceded was intended to convey a physical threat. App. at 328–29. The men brawled and Pitts knocked Mitchem to the ground by punching him after Mitchem lost his balance.

After Mitchem fell, Daniel Wykpisz, a shop employee who had witnessed the altercation and who is Caucasian, grabbed an aluminum baseball bat from the shop and chased Pitts from the area. During the chase, Pitts came across a board, which he picked up to defend himself. Wykpisz then stopped giving chase, turned around, and walked back to the shop.

Pitts testified that he walked back to his car, which he had parked in the common parking lot shared by the numerous industrial shops in the area, and discovered that his car windshield and hood had sustained fresh damage. Mitchem later admitted responsibility for causing the damage. While Pitts was near his car, Mitchem threatened him by saying “[y]ou better get the F out of here or I'll get my gun.” App. at 252. Pitts dialed 9–1–1 several times, conveying to the dispatcher that he had been chased with a baseball bat and that Mitchem had threatened him with a gun. Wykpisz and Mitchem testified they had also called 9–1–1. At least two officers responded to the calls, including Spence, who is Caucasian, and another officer, Corporal Helen Dane.

Although the exact sequence of events is unclear, Pitts testified that when Pitts saw Spence's patrol car, he started waving his arms to identify himself as the person who called for assistance. Spence, who had received a report that there might be a gun at the scene, acknowledged Pitts by rolling down his window slightly and yelling, “[g]et back, get back.” App. at 255. Pitts accused Spence of treating him unfairly, exclaiming “[i]f I was a white guy, you would have been out of that car, and I would have been treated differently.” Id. According to Pitts, Spence then jumped out of his patrol car, got in Pitts' face, and when Pitts asked for Spence's badge number and supervisor's name, told Pitts to “[s]hut the fuck up.” App. at 256.

Pitts and Spence hollered at each other and Spence eventually told Pitts that “[i]f you don't shut the fuck up, I'm going to arrest you.” App. at 257. Pitts put his hands behind his back and told Spence that he was not going to resist. Spence handcuffed Pitts and placed him in the backseat of the patrol car, but did not read Pitts his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Pitts testified that he was unable to tell Spence about Mitchem's threats or that Wykpisz chased him with a bat because Spence “never gave [Pitts] a chance” and “didn't want to hear anything [Pitts] had to say.” App. at 276. Pitts declined to give a statement but Spence continued his investigation by speaking with Mitchem and Wykpisz, who gave a narrative of the events and informed Spence that Pitts had made the gun threat. Pitts did not see Spence question any of the numerous witnesses who had gathered at the scene.

After speaking with Mitchem and Wykpisz, Spence drove Pitts to the police station where Pitts' Miranda rights were read to him and he was informed of the charges against him. Spence charged Pitts with aggravated menacing, two counts of terroristic threatening, assault in the third degree, disorderly conduct, and criminal trespass. Spence charged Mitchem with disorderly conduct, offensive touching, and criminal mischief. Dane also arrested Mitchem and brought him to the station.

Spence towed and conducted an inventory search of Pitts' car. The inventory search produced nothing incriminating. Spence did not report finding a weapon.

The parties' briefs do not discuss the state court trial based on the charges against Pitts on one hand and Mitchem on the other. Pitts was acquitted of all the charges brought against him. Pitts asserts that Mitchem pled no contest to two of the charges against him, and that the third was dropped pursuant to a plea agreement.

Following the state court proceedings, the District Court proceeded to hear the instant suit, which Pitts had filed against Spence. The jury returned a verdict, pursuant to a general verdict form, finding in favor of Pitts on his illegal seizure and equal protection claims, and in favor of Spence on Pitts' false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. The jury awarded Pitts $80,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. Spence filed a motion for judgment as matter of law, which the District Court granted.

In granting the motion, the District Court noted that the parties' agreed-upon instructions presented the jury with two possible scenarios that could support Pitts' claim of illegal seizure: (1) when Spence handcuffed and placed Pitts in the back of the patrol car; and (2) when Spence towed and conducted an inventory search of Pitts' car.¹ The District Court first considered whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's illegal seizure verdict insofar as it was based on Pitts' detention. Citing investigatory detention jurisprudence under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court concluded that “based on the facts available to Corporal Spence at the time he handcuffed Mr. Pitts, the detention of Mr. Pitts was reasonable in that Corporal Spence had an articulable suspicion that Mr. Pitts had been involved in a fight at Mitchem's Auto Body Shop, and that Corporal Spence's personal safety or the safety of others at the scene could be in danger.” Pitts v. Spence, 722 F.Supp.2d 476, 483 (D.Del.2010). The Court therefore held that Spence's detention of Pitts was reasonable as a matter of law and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict to the extent it was based on this conduct.

The Court next considered whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's illegal seizure verdict insofar as it was based on the search and seizure of Pitts' car. The Court concluded that Spence's testimony at trial established “that the towing of [Pitts'] vehicle was required both to prevent harm to the vehicle and to prevent the possibility of another altercation.” Id. at 484. Based on this testimony, and Spence's assertion that he conducted the search in accordance with standard procedure, the Court held that the search and seizure was reasonable as a matter of law and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict in Pitts' favor. The Court rejected Pitts' argument that the evidence suggested that the search of the car was pretextual. It also rejected Pitts' contention that Spence's admission that he lacked probable cause to search Pitts' car rendered the inventory search unreasonable. In finding this argument unpersuasive, the Court cited inventory search jurisprudence and reasoned that “the concept of probable cause is not implicated in an inventory search.” Id.

Turning to the jury's verdict in favor of Pitts on his equal protection claim, the Court was not persuaded that Spence's failure to properly document or investigate the incident could support the jury's verdict, reasoning that “any gaps in the police report concerning Mr. Pitts' point of view are attributable to [Pitts'] own lack of cooperation” in declining to give a statement to Spence after Spence attempted to interview him. Id. at 487. The Court rejected Pitts' other arguments, concluding that there was “no evidence” that Spence acted with discriminatory purpose or that his actions were in any way motivated by racial animus. Id. at 486. The Court therefore granted Spence judgment as a matter of law on Pitts' equal protection claim.

Having overturned both of the jury's verdicts in favor of Pitts, the Court denied the motions of Pitts' current and former counsel made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for attorneys' fees and expenses, on the basis that Pitts was no longer a prevailing party. Pitts appeals.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and this court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's decision to grant judgment as a...