People v. Goedecke

• Decision Date: 23 February 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 8767
• Citation: 423 P.2d 777,65 Cal.2d 850,56 Cal.Rptr. 625
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 423 P.2d 777, 22 A.L.R.3d 1213 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Raymond Henry GOEDECKE, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank

Page 625

56 Cal.Rptr. 625

65 Cal.2d 850, 423 P.2d 777, 22 A.L.R.3d 1213

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Raymond Henry GOEDECKE, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 8767.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Feb. 23, 1967.

E. Stanley Conant, San Diego, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and S. Clark Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

BURKE, Justice.

Raymond Henry Goedecke was indicted for the murder of his father, mother, brother, and sister. The jury found him guilty of first degree murder of his father and second degree murder of the other victims, determined that he was sane when he killed his father and insane when he committed the other killings and fixed the penalty at death for the murder of his father. Motions for a new trial and for reduction of the sentence were denied. The court found Goedecke presently sane and entered judgment sentencing him to death. His appeal is before us automatically under subdivision (b) of section 1239 of the Penal Code.

Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict that the murder of his father was of the first, rather than the second, degree; that the erroneous admission of evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice; that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct; and that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of sanity. We have concluded that the latter three contentions are without merit but that the judgment should be reduced to murder of the second degree.

About 6:15 a.m. on August 15, 1964, defendant, who was then 18, left a church camp to return to his home, a distance of about 50 miles. He had driven to the camp the night before accompanied by two young friends, both girls. The girls left the camp with him, and, after taking the first girl home, defendant and the second girl (Christine) drove to his home, arriving about 7:30 a.m.

When they entered the house no one was about. Defendant called out, 'Get up you lazy bones,' and went down the hallway toward the bedrooms. Christine, who had remained in the kitchen, heard defendant make a loud noise and say something to the effect that they were dead. She went back to the bedrooms and saw the bodies of defendant's 8-year-old brother, Mark, and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Goedecke. The body of defendant's 15-year-old sister, Ellen, was latter found in her bedroom. All Ellen, was later found in her bedroom. All times with an iron rod, and the father had been stabbed repeatedly. According to the autopsy surgeon, the father's death was due to multiple stab wounds, skull and facial fractures, and contusions of the brain.

Christine telephone the police, and she and defendant waited until the police arrived a few minutes later. After looking in the house, and talking to defendant and Christine, the police drove them to the police station to obtain statements from them as material witnesses.

Following a conversation with defendant at the station the police, upon inspection of his person, saw what appeared to be blood in his hair and a fleck of blood on his ear. They asked him to remove his clothing and after he did so they observed numerous stains. An analysis revealed that several of the substances on his person were human blood, and an examination of shirts found in his car disclosed faint bloodstains. On August 16, 1964, the police made lifts of fingerprints in defendant's house. Bloody prints on a sink and a door molding were identified as defendant's.

Persons who attended the church camp gave testimony from which it could be inferred that defendant left the camp during the night of August 14, 1964, and an attendant for a service station in defendant's home city testified that defendant stopped at the station sometime between 2 and 4 a.m. on August 15, 1964, and used the restroom. A towel in the restroom was found to have human blood on it.

Evidence was introduced that a few days before the killings defendant and his father had an argument about his moving out of the home, that defendant said to his father, '* * * you have taken advantage of me for six and a half years and I can't take it any more,' and that defendant told a friend that he did not want a hatred to grow between himself and his father and intended to leave home but would continue to work for his father.

Defendant took the stand in his own behalf and admitted killing his parents and brother and sister but said that he did not know why he killed them. He gave the following version of the events on the night in question: After attending a religious program at the church camp, he slept in his car. He awoke during the night and went for a drive. After driving awhile, he decided to go home for some coffee. He parked across the street from his house, and as he passed through his garage he kicked an iron bar and picked it up. He wrapped a towel around the bar, and he removed his shoes and socks in the kitchen, a habit he acquired when new carpeting was laid in his home. He then went into his parents' bedroom and struck his father several times with the bar and then hit his mother a number of times. His father began to sit up, and defendant again struck him repeatedly. He then hit his mother some more. Afterwards he went into the bedrooms of his sister and brother and struck them many times. He washed up in the bathroom and then returned to his parent's bedroom and saw his father attempting to crawl towards the door. Defendant smoked a cigarette as he watched his father struggle for awhile. On seeing his father's hunting knife on a chest he thought, 'Maybe this will finish him off.' He then stabbed his father a number of times. As he left the house, his thought was, 'Raymond, get out of here.' He did not know what was in his mind during the episode except the two quoted thoughts.

The defense introduced evidence that defendant had a good relationship with his father and other members of his family. Psychiatric testimony concerning defendant's mental condition on the night of the killings was also introduced by both parties and is summarized later herein.

The jury returned verdicts of first degree murder as to the killing of defendant's father and second degree murder as to the other victims.

At the sanity trial it was stipulated that all evidence received during the trial on guilt be admitted. The prosecution also introduced testimony by psychiatrists that defendant was legally sane when he committed the murders. Defense psychiatrists testified to the contrary.

The jury found that defendant was sane at the time of the murder of his father and insane at the time of the other killings.

In considering the question of the degree of murder committed we refer first to what was said by this court in People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 795, 818--819, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 286, 394 P.2d 959, 974, 'This problem * * * (whether the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that the murder was of the first, rather than the second, degree) is by no means new to us. In dealing with it we recognize that every relevant and tenable presumption is to be indulged in favor of sustaining the judgment of the trial court; but when a proper case appears (Pen.Code, § 1181, subd. 6) we do not hesitate to modify the judgment to murder of the second degree and affirm it as modified.'

In the instant case defendant's defense was that of 'diminished responsibility,' more accurately designated as 'diminished capacity' (see People v. Anderson, 63 Cal.2d 351, 364, 46 Cal.Rptr. 763, 406 P.2d 43), in that mental impairment prevented him from acting with deliberation and premeditation. In support of this defense he produced expert and nonexpert testimony. With respect to the defense the court stated in People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 490--491, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 82, 386 P.2d 677, 682:

'It can no longer be doubted that the defense of mental illness not amounting to legal insanity is a 'significant issue' in any case in which it is raised by substantial evidence. Its purpose and effect are to ameliorate the law governing criminal responsibility prescribed by the M'Naughton rule. (See Lindman & McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (1961) 355--356.) Under that rule a defendant is not insane in the eyes of the law if at the time of the crime he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished responsibility even though a defendant be legally sane according to the M'Naughton test, if he was suffering from a mental illness that prevented his acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation, he cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree. This policy is now firmly established in the law of California (People v. Gorshen, supra, (51 Cal.2d 716, 336 P.2d 492); People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 569--571, 268 P.2d 705; People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522, 526--529, 219 P.2d 9; People v. Wells, supra, (33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53); People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683--684) * * *.'

What was said with reference to premeditation in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 822, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 288, 394 P.2d 959, 976, is pertinent here: 'Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample Time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon his contemplated act and to arrive at a cold, deliberated and premeditated conclusion. He did this in a sense--and apparently to the full extent of which he was capable. But, indisputably on the record, this defendant was not and is not a fully normal or mature, mentally well person. He knew the difference between right and wrong; he knew that the intended act was wrong and nevertheless carried it out. But the extent of his understanding, reflection upon it and its consequences, with realization of the enormity of the evil, appears to have been materially--as relevant to appraising...