Roland v. State, 94-KP-00139-SCT
| Decision Date | 30 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-KP-00139-SCT,94-KP-00139-SCT |
| Citation | 666 So.2d 747 |
| Parties | Parco ROLAND a/k/a Antonio Parco Roland a/k/a Tony A. Roland a/k/a "Parco-Poco" a/k/a Antonio Roland v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Parco Roland, Leakesville, pro se.
Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, DeWitt T. Allred, III, Sp Ass't Attorney General, Jackson, for appellee.
Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and PITTMAN, JJ.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 10, 1992, Parco Roland pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery and was sentenced to fifteen years on one count and thirty years on the other, the sentences to run consecutively.
On September 27, 1993, Roland filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County, alleging that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into, that he was coerced by his attorney into making the guilty plea and that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
The petition for post-conviction relief was denied on January 21, 1994, and a notice of appeal was filed on February 3, 1994.
In the order denying the motion for post-conviction collateral relief, the circuit judge in a nine-page opinion set out Roland's factual and legal claims and then made detailed findings as to why these claims were without merit. The court based its decision on the contents of the court files on Roland, including the transcript of the plea hearing in this case.
The court found that Roland had admitted committing the two armed robberies and that he had not been misadvised that he could receive a life sentence without parole if convicted of the crimes. The court also noted that the State had agreed to drop other charges against him which would have made the possible sentences even stronger.
On appeal, Roland states his issues as follows:
I. Trial court committed enormous error in denying Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief due to the fact that:
1. Roland's guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
2. Roland's attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. The trial court erred in denying petitioner(s) Motion(s) for order compelling discovery.
III. The trial court erred in denying petitioner(s) Motion(s) for an evidentiary hearing.
In addition to the present appeal Roland also sought to appeal the lower court's denial of his motion to correct the transcript of the plea hearing. Roland argues that a portion of the guilty plea transcript was omitted. His contention is that lines 25 and 26 on page 13 should read, "My attorney told me in order for me to get a plea I would have to say that I did this." instead of "In order for me to get the plea out I would have to said that I did this."
Roland filed a complaint with the Mississippi Ethics Commission against the official court reporter, Cindy C. Gibson, contending that she did not completely transcribe the guilty plea hearing. The Commission on August 26, 1994, unanimously voted to dismiss the complaint.
Roland then filed a motion to correct transcript in the trial court. On April 10, 1995, Circuit Judge Larry Roberts denied the motion and held that the motion was without merit and frivolous.
On April 20, 1995, Roland filed a complaint with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance against the judge. The Commission dismissed the complaint on May 16, 1995.
On June 2, 1995, Roland filed his Motion for Out of Time Appeal with this Court seeking to appeal from the order denying his motion to correct the transcript. This Court denied the motion.
Roland argues that his guilty plea was not freely, voluntarily and intelligently entered because of ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that the record (plea transcript) affirmatively reflects that he only pled guilty because of his attorney; that he was coerced by his attorney to enter a plea of guilty; that his attorney did not discuss fully potential strategies and tactical choices with Roland; that the attorney refused to conduct any meaningful factual or legal investigations or research on the case; that the attorney refused to assert Roland's defense; that the attorney did not advise petitioner of his rights and did not take all actions necessary to preserve them; and that the attorney did not confer with his client without delay and as often as necessary to elicit matters of defense.
As already stated, Roland argues that the plea transcript at page 13 lines 25 and 26 should have included "My attorney told me" before the "[i]n order for me to get the plea out I would have to say that I did this." The court reporter and the judge have not agreed with Roland and the transcript has not been changed. Without this change in the transcript Roland's argument that his attorney coerced him is not supported by the transcript as he claims. The transcript also does not support Roland's other arguments about his counsel's conduct.
Roland also argues that the State could not prove the armed robbery charges, although one of the persons he was accused of robbing was present at the plea hearing, and the statement of the witness regarding the other robbery clearly supported the State's case.
Roland contends that his attorney lead him to believe that he would get a life sentence. As set out in the court's opinion, this was correct advice and counsel was not deficient in this area. The court stated:
This Court takes judicial notice of the law that had the defendant been convicted by the jury of armed robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced as an habitual offender under Section 99-19-81, the Court would have been required to sentence the defendant to the maximum term provided by law, i.e. life, without eligibility for parole or early release. The Court takes judicial notice also that on that date, August 10, 1992, there was pending against this defendant Cause No. 049-92, 528-91, and 459-91 all being indictments charging the offense of grand larceny as habitual offender. Therefore, on August 10, 1992, the defendant was facing a possibility if convicted on all indictments presently A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is judged by the standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The two inquires under that standard are "(1) whether counsel's performance was deficient, and, if so, (2) whether the deficient performance was prejudicial to the defendant in the sense that our confidence in the correctness of the outcome is undermined." Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1987). This standard is also applicable to the entry of a guilty plea. Schmitt v. State, 560 So.2d 148, 154 (Miss.1990).
pending against him to mandatory sentences of two life sentences, the possibility of the sentences running consecutively, and that all sentences would be without eligibility of parole or early release.
In analyzing whether counsel was ineffective and whether there was any indication that the plea was not voluntary, the lower court went through the plea proceedings transcript pointing out where Roland had sworn under oath contrary to his assertions in his petition for post-conviction relief. The court stated:
All this leads the Court to the inescapable conclusion that the Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief is patently and plainly without any merit and is frivolous. This Court is convinced beyond any reasonable doubt having presided over numerous cases involving this defendant including the lengthy guilty plea process on the date of his trial, that the defendant entered an absolutely free, voluntary and intelligent guilty plea in exchange for a plea bargain agreement of fifteen years to serve for armed robbery on count I and thirty years to serve for armed robbery on count II, same being consecutive sentences, but the sentences not being as an habitual offender. It is remarkable to this Court that the Petitioner would attempt to withdraw his guilty pleas and stand the possibility, if convicted by a jury, of receiving two consecutive life sentences as an habitual offender without eligibility of parole whatever. It is this Court's considered opinion that if the Petitioner were successful in having his sentences set aside that the District Attorney could pursue both armed robbery counts and all three grand larceny counts as habitual offenders and seek the maximum sentences without parole eligibility against the defendant.
In addition to his attorney's advice prior to the hearing, the court's questions to Roland at the hearing also indicate that the plea was voluntary. In Gardner v. State, 531 So.2d 805, 809-810 (Miss.1988), this Court stated:
Here, as in Sanders [v. State, 440 So.2d 278 (Miss.1983) ], the thoroughness with which Gardner was interrogated by the lower court at the time his plea was tendered is the most significant evidence of all. For, without regard to the advice or instructions Gardner may have been given by his attorney, the lower court's questioning and explanations to Gardner of his rights and of the consequences of his plea were sufficient to render the plea voluntary. Sanders at 288.
"Solemn declarations in open court [by a defendant] carry a strong presumption of verity." Baker v. State, 358 So.2d 401, 403 (Miss.1978) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed. [2d] 136 (1977).
The court also noted that Roland had prior experience in dealing with felony charges and...
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