Schneider v. Kings Highway Hosp. Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1986
• Citation: 67 N.Y.2d 743,490 N.E.2d 1221,500 N.Y.S.2d 95
• Parties: , 490 N.E.2d 1221 Rhoda SCHNEIDER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Bertha Rosenthal, et al., Appellants, v. KINGS HIGHWAY HOSPITAL CENTER, INC., Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 95

500 N.Y.S.2d 95

67 N.Y.2d 743, 490 N.E.2d 1221

Rhoda SCHNEIDER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Bertha Rosenthal, et al., Appellants, v. KINGS HIGHWAY HOSPITAL CENTER, INC., Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 19, 1986.

Murray Weitman and Morgan Kennedy, New York City, for appellants.

Robert R. MacDonnell, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 113 A.D.2d 837, 493 N.Y.S.2d 583, should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.

To establish a prima facie case of negligence based wholly on circumstantial evidence, "[i]t is enough that [plaintiff] shows facts and conditions from which the negligence of the defendant and the causation of the accident by that negligence may be reasonably inferred" (Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank, 278 N.Y. 1, 7, 14 N.E.2d 828). The law does not require that plaintiff's proof "positively exclude every other possible cause" of the accident but defendant's negligence (ibid. [quoting Rosenberg v. Schwartz, 260 N.Y. 162, 166, 183 N.E. 282] ). Rather, her proof must render those other causes sufficiently "remote" or "technical" to enable the jury to reach its verdict based not upon speculation, but upon the logical inferences to be drawn from the evidence (see, e.g., Spett v. President Monroe Bldg. & Mfg. Corp., 19 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 278 N.Y.S.2d 826, 225 N.E.2d 527; Markel v. Spencer, 5 N.Y.2d 958, 184 N.Y.S.2d 835, 157 N.E.2d 713, affg without opn. 5 A.D.2d 400, 171 N.Y.S.2d 770).

Although plaintiff may in her attempt to meet that burden include proof tending to negate the significance of other possible causes (see, Spett v. President Monroe Bldg. & Mfg. Corp., 19 N.Y.2d, at pp. 204-205, 278 N.Y.S.2d 826, 225 N.E.2d 527, supra ), we have on numerous occasions upheld or reinstated a jury's verdict where the logic of common experience itself, as applied to the circumstances shown by the evidence, led to the conclusion that defendant's negligence was the cause of plaintiff's injury. Thus, in Betzag v. Gulf Oil Corp., 298 N.Y. 358, 83 N.E.2d 833, althou it was possible that plaintiff lost his balance while kneeling atop an oil tanker and pulling taut a frayed rope, common sense made it more likely that he fell when the rope suddenly snapped, or so the jury could find, and in Maresca v. Lake Motors, 25 N.Y.2d 716, 307 N.Y.S.2d 222, 255 N.E.2d 562, affg. without opn. 32 A.D.2d 533, 299 N.Y.S.2d 727, it was for the jury to say whether defendant's car, traveling in a lane parallel with the truck driven by plaintiff's decedent, collided with the truck because defendant crossed into its lane or because decedent's truck veered into defendant's car. This is such a case.

Here, as in Haber v. Cross County Hosp., 37 N.Y.2d 888, 889, 378 N.Y.S.2d 369, 340 N.E.2d 734, on remand 50 A.D.2d 885, 377 N.Y.S.2d 168, appeal dismissed 38 N.Y.2d 1001, 384 N.Y.S.2d 440, 348 N.E.2d 916, plaintiff established her prima...