Law and Information Services, Inc. v. City of Riviera Beach, 94-2972

• Decision Date: 21 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-2972,94-2972
• Citation: 670 So.2d 1014
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly D480 LAW AND INFORMATION SERVICES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. The CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1014

670 So.2d 1014

21 Fla. L. Weekly D480

LAW AND INFORMATION SERVICES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. The CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, Appellee.

No. 94-2972.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Feb. 21, 1996.

Rehearing, Certification and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 17, 1996.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County; John J. Hoy, Judge.

Frank A. Kreidler, Lake Worth, for appellant.

Glen J. Torcivia of Law Offices of Glen J. Torcivia, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

STONE, Judge.

We affirm a final order dismissing a complaint alleging that the appellee/city violated the government in the sunshine law incident to hiring a city manager.

According to the complaint, the city sought applicants for the position of city manager and announced that it would interview the top five candidates between April 20 and April 26, 1994. Nevertheless, at its regular meeting on April 20, the city council voted to hire applicant Gerald Adams, who had been employed by the city as a deputy, and acting, city manager. The complaint alleges that there was no advance notice that the council would vote at the April 20 meeting to select a city manager.

It is undisputed that there was notice of the meeting itself, as well as a written agenda, but the agenda did not include this item.

The city's motion to dismiss asserted that the complaint fails to state a cause of action because the sunshine law does not require that specific matters that may be resolved at a public meeting be listed on an agenda, that the public had no right to actively participate as to this item, and that any technical violation of the law, in the event any council members had met unlawfully, was corrected by the later public decision.

Section 286.011(1), Florida Statutes (1993), the "Government in the Sunshine Law," provides that

All meetings of any board or commission of any ... municipal corporation ..., except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting.

In addition, article I, section 24(b), of the Florida Constitution, adopted in 1992, making the sunshine law part of the constitution, also requires that all meetings of governmental bodies be "open and noticed to the public."

We note that only two Florida appellate cases deal with the absence of meeting agendas, both of which hold that there is no requirement in the sunshine law that specific matters to be addressed by a public body be listed in advance of the meeting on an agenda.

In Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So.2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), the court recognized that for a public meeting to be public, reasonable notice is mandatory, but that the act does not "contemplate" that an item must be placed on an agenda before it can be considered, stating:

Although the drawing up of an agenda is a matter related to a noticed public meeting, it essentially is an integral part of the actual mechanics and procedures for conducting that meeting and, therefore, aptly relegated to local practice and procedure as prescribed by city charters and ordinances.

Id. at 291.

The First District cited Hough in Yarbrough v. Young, 462 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), in reversing a trial court's order declaring that the actions of the Perry city council violated the sunshine law. There, the city had announced on October 25 that contemplated utility improvements of $1.3 million would be on the agenda of a meeting October 28. However, an updated report set the cost at $8.8 million, an amount never mentioned at a public meeting until October 28, at which time the council adopted the report.

In Yarbrough, the trial court concluded that the council should have postponed its deliberations until the public received notice that the council was considering the significantly higher amount. The appellate court disagreed. Although a meeting notice...