State v. Paradis

• Decision Date: 19 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 14565,14565
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Donald M. PARADIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 31

676 P.2d 31

106 Idaho 117

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Donald M. PARADIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14565.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 19, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 14, 1984.

William V. Brown, Coeur d'Alene, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Larry K. Harvey, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

BAKES, Justice.

Appellant appeals his conviction for first degree murder and the sentence of death imposed upon that conviction. Our review is in response to his appeal, and, in addition, we review this case pursuant to our duty to automatically review capital cases. I.C. § 19-2827.

In June of 1980, Scott Currier arrived in Spokane, Washington, with his fiancee. Sometime during that month they became acquainted with members of a Spokane motorcycle gang, including appellant, through a chance meeting in a Spokane park. Currier and the deceased, Kimberly Palmer, had known each other for five years and previously dated. On June 19, 1980, Palmer and Currier left Palmer's Spokane residence to go to Idaho on a camping trip, driving a blue and white van owned by Currier's fiancee. The next evening, Friday, June 20, Currier and Palmer checked into a motel located around the corner from appellant's Spokane residence. After checking in, they were observed looking for something in the rear of the van. Currier then went back to the motel clerk and asked for a return of his money, indicating several guns had been stolen, he knew who did it, and he was going to retrieve them. Currier and Palmer then left the motel.

On Saturday morning, June 21, at approximately 6:30 a.m., a blue and white van was observed driving up a steep, sparsely populated mountain road south of Post Falls, Idaho. In the van were two or three men, one wearing a gray cap. Thirty minutes later, three men were observed on foot, coming down the same steep mountain road. Witnesses later identified these three men as Donald Paradis, appellant here, Thomas Gibson and Larry Evans. Within the next thirty minutes, these same three men were seen at various locations in Post Falls. One was carrying what some observers believed to be a rifle rolled up in a blanket. Post Falls police received a report of a man with a gun, and upon investigation made contact with the three men outside a drive-in restaurant. From identification cards shown to police, the three were positively identified as appellant, Gibson and Evans.

On Sunday morning, June 22, Post Falls police received a report of a one-car rollover on the aforementioned mountain road. Upon investigation, they discovered the van, overturned, with various items scattered around it. Upon closer inspection an officer discovered Kimberly Palmer's body lying face down in a creek 70 to 80 feet away from the van. Later, Scott Currier's body was found near the van stuffed into a sleeping bag tied with a small piece of terry cloth. Currier's belt was also in the bag, with a distinctive brass buckle missing, apparently cut off the belt. Lying under Palmer was a distinctive light blue Levi cap, identified as belonging to Larry Evans. Currier had been beaten severely around the head. Palmer had been manually strangled. There was evidence at trial suggesting that Palmer was still alive when she was placed in the stream bed.

Early Sunday morning, June 22, between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m., appellant's residence in Spokane, Washington, was severely damaged by an arson fire. An investigator, who was on the scene to determine the cause of the fire, observed a rolled-up rug, in the basement of the house, surrounded by a reddish fluid. In the rug were Currier's missing brass belt buckle, a blue colored lawn dart with traces of blood on the end, and a piece of blue terry cloth. The lawn dart closely matched puncture wounds in Currier's back. The piece of blue terry cloth matched the piece of terry cloth used to tie up the sleeping bag where Currier's body was found. Testimony placed appellant at the residence in the early morning hours before the fire began.

Appellant was arrested on Monday, June 23, at an abandoned gas station where he had been staying since the fire. Recovered from appellant's vehicle was a blue blanket previously left in the van by Currier's fiancee.

An autopsy was performed upon both victims. A major issue at trial concerned jurisdiction over the crime because, although strong physical evidence indicated that Currier was battered and probably killed at appellant's house in Washington, other evidence indicated that Palmer was most likely killed in Idaho. A major part of the autopsy dealt with the differences that existed between the two bodies. Currier's body had decomposed significantly by the time of the autopsy. Palmer's body had not decomposed. This indicated to the medical examiner that Currier had been killed some hours before Palmer. Another difference between the two bodies was that Palmer's lungs were half filled with water. The medical examiner hypothesized that this was because Palmer lay face down in the creek while still gasping for breath. Based on this evidence, the prosecution theorized that Palmer, a witness to Currier's murder, was still alive when the van was driven to Idaho and was killed to prevent her from identifying the persons who killed Currier.

Appellant was charged in Washington with the murder of Scott Currier. After a trial, he was acquitted. He was then extradited to Idaho for trial in the murder of Kimberly Palmer.

Initially, appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence concerning the death of Scott Currier. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the evidence was admissible to portray a "rational and cohesive scenario." Evidence of Currier's death was introduced in the Idaho trial over the continuing objection of appellant.

I.

A.

First, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in not giving a certain instruction to the jury. Appellant alleges that under Idaho law, where a criminal case rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the jury must be instructed to find the defendant guilty only if the facts are entirely consistent with his guilt. See State v. Davis, 69 Idaho 270, 206 P.2d 271 (1949); State v. McLennan, 40 Idaho 286, 231 P. 718 (1925); State v. Marcoe, 33 Idaho 284, 193 P. 80 (1920).

In State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 594 P.2d 639 (1979), we reversed a defendant's conviction for failure to give the following requested instruction:

"You are not permitted to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged against him based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion and each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

"Also, if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to the defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt." 100 Idaho at 132, 594 P.2d 639.

The trial judge in Holder had given an instruction which merely distinguished between circumstantial and direct evidence and did not explain the effect of a circumstantial case. Appellant here contends that the trial court erred in the same manner, in that he gave insufficient instructions on the effect of a circumstantial case. However, unlike in Holder, the trial judge here gave the following instruction at the beginning of appellant's trial:

"To convict the defendant, the evidence must, to your minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant. If after consideration of all the evidence in the case, you may reasonably explain the facts given in evidence on any reasonable ground other than the guilt of the defendant, you must acquit."

This instruction, which was not objected to, sufficiently informed the jury that it could not convict the appellant unless all the facts were consistent with guilt, and excluded any reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. This is in effect the same type of instruction we indicated should have been given in State v. Holder, supra. It informs the jury of its duty in a case involving only circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, there was no error in failing to give any further instructions on that issue. ¹

B.

Appellant also contends that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to convict him of the crime charged. He argues that only circumstantial evidence connects him to the scene, and that to be convicted of the principal offense it must be shown that an aider and abettor possessed the same intent as the principal. Appellant argues that the proof at trial failed in this respect, and that on the evidence presented no reasonable jury could have convicted appellant. He also argues that the prosecution did not sufficiently prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in Kootenai County. Appellant's reliance upon these arguments is misplaced since a defendant can be convicted solely on circumstantial evidence. State v. Chapple, 98 Idaho 475, 567 P.2d 20 (1977); State v. Ponthier, 92 Idaho 704, 449 P.2d 364 (1969). The state presented a strong circumstantial case against appellant. He was placed at or near the scene where the victim's body was found, in the company of a person, Larry Evans, who was almost certainly in or around the scene at the time of the murder (as indicated by the presence of his hat under Palmer's body). The area was sparsely populated, and very few people used the road where the van was found; thus, the presence of strangers in the area was conspicuous. Witnesses observed a van Palmer and Currier had been driving on that road shortly before three men, whose identities were...