Com. v. Manzelli

• Citation: 68 Mass. App. Ct. 691,864 N.E.2d 566
• Decision Date: 18 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-P-1041.,05-P-1041.
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Jeffrey MANZELLI.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

864 N.E.2d 566

68 Mass. App. Ct. 691

COMMONWEALTH v. Jeffrey MANZELLI.

No. 05-P-1041.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued October 3, 2006.

Decided April 18, 2007.

David P. Russman for the defendant.

David S. Bradley, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: GRASSO, BROWN, & TRAINOR, JJ.

BROWN, J.

The defendant was convicted of unlawful electronic interception of an oral communication, G.L. c. 272, § 99, as amended by St.1968, c. 738, § 1, and disorderly conduct, G.L. c. 272, § 53, as amended by St.1943, c. 377. On appeal he alleges that: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient as to both charges, and (2) the judge's instructions on the elements of disorderly conduct were incorrect. We affirm.

Facts. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found as follows: During a political rally, the defendant approached and photographed Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) police Officers Brian Harer and Victoria Riel. Harer asked the defendant to stop taking pictures of the officers, but the defendant continued to do so. After a few minutes, the defendant walked away. Once the defendant left, MBTA inspector Charles Kenneally walked over to Harer and Riel to ask about the encounter.

Shortly thereafter, the defendant returned and asked Kenneally whether it was true that "officer badge number forty-six of the MBTA police department said that I can't take his picture and use it." Kenneally asked Harer whether he had told the defendant not to take his picture. As Harer turned to answer, he noticed that the defendant had a microphone tucked into the zippered front of his jacket. Harer asked the defendant if he was tape recording their conversation.

The defendant immediately took the microphone, along with a black bag containing a tape recorder and cassette tapes, and threw them among a nearby group of protestors. The defendant shouted for people to take the tapes. Riel attempted to retrieve the recorder and tapes, but was thwarted by the crowd, which began to throng Riel. Harer came to Riel's aid, and the two of them managed to recover an empty bag, the microphone, and a few tapes. Riel was punched in the eye by a protestor as she attempted to collect the items.

Harer then attempted to arrest the defendant, who, by that time, had fled into a nearby subway station. After a brief chase, Harer took the defendant into custody. As Harer placed the defendant under arrest, the defendant threw an audio tape into the crowd inside the station, striking a passerby in the head and causing her to fall down. Other evidence is included in our analysis as required.

1. Sufficiency of evidence. a. Tape recording. The defendant was charged with, inter alia, unlawful electronic interception of an oral communication, G.L. c. 272, § 99. Specifically, the

government alleged that the defendant had made¹ a secret recording of his conversations with Kenneally, Riel, and Harer as they conversed with the defendant outside the subway station. On appeal, the defendant argues that the government's proof was fatally deficient insofar as no actual recording was introduced at trial.²

In support of his claim, the defendant relies primarily on Commonwealth v. Wright, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 790, 814 N.E.2d 741 (2004), a case in which we considered whether the fact that the recording quality of an alleged unlawful interception was so poor as to render voices partially inaudible precluded conviction under § 99. We ultimately held that since the tape in question contained at least some audible words, it qualified as an interception under the statute. However, it is arguable that the Wright case stands for the proposition that where an audio recording contains no discernable voices whatsoever, it would not qualify as an intercepted communication under § 99.³

Even assuming that our decision in Wright would require acquittal in cases where an audiotape, actually submitted in evidence, was found to contain no intelligible words,⁴ we do not believe that it follows therefrom that the government is required to produce a recording to obtain a conviction under § 99.⁵ For most crimes, indirect or circumstantial evidence is generally sufficient to prove any or all of the elements of an offense. See Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 140-141, 741 N.E.2d 25 (2001). Stated differently, provided a jury's verdict does not rest upon speculation or conjecture, the mere absence of direct evidence with respect to one or more elements of a crime by no means mandates a finding of legal insufficiency.⁶ See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beckett, 373 Mass. 329, 341, 366 N.E.2d 1252 (1977). Here, we conclude that the government met its threshold burden of proof, even without an audiotape.

Despite the lack of a tape, there was ample circumstantial evidence that the defendant made an unlawful secret recording, including (1) his possession of a device, together with the microphone secreted in his jacket, (2) the fact that the microphone was pointed in the direction of the officers during their conversation with the defendant, (3) the odd manner in which the defendant put his questions to police,⁷ and (4) the tapes he discarded into the crowd.

Further, the jury might have viewed the defendant's efforts to elude arrest (namely his retreat into the subway station), and to avoid having his recording equipment seized (by throwing it into the crowd) as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Coonan, 428 Mass. 823, 830, 705 N.E.2d 599 (1999) (attempts to destroy evidence reflect consciousness of guilt). While evidence of consciousness of guilt is never sufficient, standing alone, to support a conviction, it may be considered by the jury in combination with other inculpatory facts in determining whether the government has met its burden of proof. Id. at 830-831, 705 N.E.2d 599. See also Commonwealth v. Bush, 427 Mass. 26, 30-31, 691 N.E.2d 218 (1998). We conclude that, on the basis of all of the evidence properly before the jury in this case, the Commonwealth's evidence was legally sufficient, its circumstantial character notwithstanding.⁸

b. Disorderly conduct. The defendant was also charged with being a disorderly person, G.L. c. 272, § 53. The defendant's argument implicitly concedes that the evidence that he threw an audiotape, hitting a passerby in the head, was properly before the jury, therefore, the government met its threshold burden of proof with respect to that charge. The defendant contends, however, that the jury should not have been permitted to consider that conduct as the basis for the charge because the conduct occurred after the police decided to arrest the defendant for violating § 53. We disagree.

Both the subjective intent of the police and the precise timeline of events here are not relevant to the question of legal sufficiency. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the defendant did not engage in disorderly conduct as defined in § 53 before the police decided to arrest him, this would not prevent him from being tried on that charge for conduct undertaken after the decision to arrest the defendant was made. We note that the defendant has pointed to no case law or authority to support such an argument. Viewing all of the evidence properly before the jury, we conclude that the Commonwealth's proof on the disorderly conduct charge was legally sufficient.⁹

2. Jury instructions on disorderly conduct. With respect to the criminal complaint for disorderly conduct, G.L. c. 272, § 53, upon the express request of the defendant, the judge charged the jury as follows:

"[F]irst, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant involved himself in at least one of the following actions. One, he either engaged in fighting or threatening. Or two, he engaged in violent or tumultuous behavior. Or three, he created a hazardous or physically offensive condition by an act that served no legitimate purpose of the defendant's. [Second], the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's actions were reasonably likely to affect the public. [T]hird, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. You have heard discussions of the defendant being a reporter and you need to know that he may not be convicted of disorderly conduct based solely on activities that are protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, you may not convict the defendant if his actions were based on legitimate news gathering activities." (Emphasis added).

The defendant now argues that the instruction was fatally flawed, creating a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Specifically, the defendant argues that the judge's reference to "legitimate news gathering activities" improperly limited the judge's earlier reference to "legitimate purpose." Further, the defendant contends that the instruction contained improper language that shifted the burden of proof on this element to the defendant and thus violated his due process protections. We consider each claim in turn.

The defendant does not dispute that he requested an instruction, or that such an instruction was appropriate in the circumstances.¹⁰ Rather, the defendant, for the first time on appeal, contends that the judge's reference to "legitimate news gathering activities" might have been misunderstood by the jury as limiting the judge's earlier reference in his instruction to "legitimate purpose" — that is, the judge's reference to the principle that the defendant could not be convicted of disorderly conduct on the theory that he created a "hazardous or physically offensive condition" unless his actions served no "legitimate purpose." See Commonwealth v. Sholley, 432 Mass. 721, 728 n. 8, 739 N.E.2d 236 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S.Ct. 1621, 149 L.Ed.2d 484 (2001) (proof of the absence of a "legitimate purpose" only required with respect to...