Com. v. Coonan

• Decision Date: 08 February 1999
• Citation: 428 Mass. 823,705 N.E.2d 599
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Wayne R. COONAN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 599

705 N.E.2d 599

428 Mass. 823

COMMONWEALTH v. Wayne R. COONAN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued Nov. 3, 1998.

Decided Feb. 8, 1999.

Jeffrey L. Baler, for the defendant.

Christopher P. Hodgens, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: WILKINS, C.J., LYNCH, FRIED, MARSHALL, & IRELAND, JJ.

LYNCH, J.

A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree based on deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder. On appeal, the defendant asserts the following: (1) the judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because insufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury; (2) defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict of murder because it failed to establish that the defendant committed the crime; and (4) even if minimally sufficient, the evidence is such that we should exercise our supervisory powers, pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 33E, and grant him a new trial or reduce his verdict to murder in the second degree or manslaughter. We conclude that there was no reversible error and decline to exercise our power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E. We now affirm.

We summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for the discussion of issues raised by the defendant on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Burnett, 417 Mass. 740, 741, 632 N.E.2d 1206 (1994); Commonwealth v. Cordle, 404 Mass. 733, 734, 537 N.E.2d 130 (1989), S. C., 412 Mass. 172, 587 N.E.2d 1372 (1992). On October 3, 1995, at about 8:30 P.M., Jose Rivera arrived at the defendant's apartment with the victim. The three smoked crack cocaine and drank alcoholic beverages. Rivera engaged in consensual oral sex with the victim, and left shortly thereafter. A second man, Stephen Langille, arrived at the apartment at approximately 12:30 A.M. Langille, the defendant, and the victim smoked crack cocaine and drank alcoholic beverages. Langille also had consensual oral sex with the victim. At about 2:30 A.M. the victim went to sleep on the defendant's bed. Langille left the apartment at approximately 3:30 A.M.

On October 4, 1995, at approximately 7:50 A.M., the defendant, who had been in the apartment since before 8:30 P.M. the previous evening, called the police from a public telephone claiming that he had just found a dead woman in his apartment. Shortly thereafter, the police discovered the victim's naked body face down on the defendant's bed. Her wrists were bound, and her mouth and nose were covered, with duct tape.

An autopsy revealed the victim suffered severe trauma to the face, head, left eye, and brain. There was also trauma to her vagina, which was coated with a silicone or petroleum lubricant. "[L]inear streaks of fecal material" were found near the anus and vagina, suggesting "something cylindrical had been inside the anus and come out and as it came out it wiped off on either side of the buttocks." "There was fecal material in the vagina" consistent with penetration of the victim's anus and vagina while she was alive. Large flakes of human skin were found over the surface of the victim's body. The victim died as a result of manual strangulation.

1. Insufficiency of evidence presented to the grand jury. The defendant claims the motion judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. Specifically, he maintains that the evidence submitted to the grand jury showed only that he was present at the time of the murder, rather than providing probable cause to believe that he was the person who committed the rape and the murder.

Generally a court will not inquire into the competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 161-162, 430 N.E.2d 1195 (1982). In that case we departed from that general rule and "held that where a grand jury receives no evidence of criminality on the part of the accused, the indictment must be dismissed.... '[A]t the very least the grand jury must hear sufficient evidence to establish the identity of the accused ... and probable cause to arrest him.' " Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 510, 615 N.E.2d 155 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. McCarthy, supra at 163, 430 N.E.2d 1195. Probable cause is based on "reasonably trustworthy information ... sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the defendant had committed ... an offense." Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 450, 466 N.E.2d 828 (1984), quoting Commonwealth v. Stevens, 362 Mass. 24, 26, 283 N.E.2d 673 (1972).

The grand jury heard sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of probable cause. The following evidence was before the grand jury: The defendant told the victim that she was welcome to stay at his apartment for the night; after the victim was sleeping, the defendant told Langille that he did not want to receive oral sex, but wanted to "screw" the victim and said that he had plenty of condoms; the last person to see the victim alive besides the murderer was Langille, who left the apartment at approximately 3:30 A.M.; Langille told the police that a coworker had informed him that the previous week the defendant "was being weird, talking about wanting to kill someone" ¹ ; the defendant was in the apartment when the victim was murdered; the defendant admitted the duct tape that was used to bind and gag the victim was his; the defendant admitted that he suffered from a severe skin disorder; and the defendant delayed calling the police for nearly three hours.

Furthermore, an expert witness testified the autopsy revealed that the victim was badly beaten and suffered severe trauma to the vagina and anus, symptoms consistent with rape, before dying as a result of manual strangulation. He also testified that skin fragments found on the victim's body indicated that the victim was in physical contact with someone who had a severe skin disorder.

Accordingly, there was a more than sufficient basis for the grand jury to have indicted the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Angiulo, supra at 510-512, 615 N.E.2d 155; Commonwealth v. O'Dell, supra at 450-453, 466 N.E.2d 828; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, supra at 163, 430 N.E.2d 1195.

2. Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Specifically, the defendant contends that trial counsel's cross-examination of a witness regarding the defendant's prior statement that, "If you bring somebody back to my house I'll have to kill them," resulted in the introduction of highly prejudicial and damaging testimony, was likely to have unfairly influenced the jury, and thus denied him effective assistance of counsel.

Because the defendant has been convicted of murder, we review his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether there exists a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, as required under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, which is "more favorable to a defendant than is the constitutional standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel." Commonwealth v. Hung Tan Vo, 427 Mass. 464, 469, 693 N.E.2d 1374 (1998), citing Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 393, 649 N.E.2d 1106 (1995), and Commonwealth v. Plant, 417 Mass. 704, 715, 634 N.E.2d 896 (1994). We therefore consider whether an error in the course of the trial created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, and if so, a new trial is warranted unless we are substantially confident that, if the error had not been made, the jury verdict would have been the same. Commonwealth v. Ruddock, 428 Mass. 288, 292 n. 3, 701 N.E.2d 300 (1998). "An attorney's tactical decision amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel only if it was manifestly unreasonable when made." Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 822, 696 N.E.2d 904 (1998), citing Commonwealth v. Roberts, 423 Mass. 17, 20, 666 N.E.2d 475 (1996), and Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728, 375 N.E.2d 681 (1978).

Defense counsel's cross-examination of Rivera, who had also been a suspect, suggested that he had fabricated his testimony to divert suspicion away from himself. ² Thus, the defendant's trial counsel sought to persuade the jury that Rivera's lack of credibility and the presence of his blood in the apartment created a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. We give due deference to defense counsel's strategic decisions and conclude that his strategy was not manifestly unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Iglesias, 426 Mass. 574, 580, 689 N.E.2d 1315 (1998); Breese v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 249, 251, 612 N.E.2d 1170 (1993).

It was a reasonable defense tactic to attempt to discredit Rivera and point to him as a possible suspect. That Rivera told the police that the defendant had made incriminating statements to him at a time when he did not know the defendant was strong evidence attacking Rivera's credibility and casting suspicion on him. It is difficult to imagine how defense counsel could have made use of this evidence without the jury's learning what the purported incriminating statements were.

3. Sufficiency of the evidence. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty, which was denied. The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to establish murder in the first degree on the basis of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, or the application of the felony-murder rule. Rather, he maintains that the evidence merely showed that he was present at the scene of the crime and thus was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that he was the murderer. ³ In considering the defendant's arguments we note "the...