Haynes v. Golub Corp.

• Citation: 166 Vt. 228,692 A.2d 377
• Decision Date: 31 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-444,95-444
• Parties: , 134 Lab.Cas. P 58,303, 12 IER Cases 1388 Marylu HAYNES v. GOLUB CORPORATION, et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Vermont

Page 377

692 A.2d 377

166 Vt. 228, 134 Lab.Cas. P 58,303,

12 IER Cases 1388

Marylu HAYNES v. GOLUB CORPORATION, et al.

No. 95-444.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Jan. 31, 1997.

Leighton C. Detora of Valsangiacomo, Detora & McQuesten, P.C., Barre, for plaintiff-appellee.

Robert H. Claridge, Schenectady, New York, and John J. Boylan, III, of Boylan & Bowen, Springfield, for defendants-appellants.

Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE, and JOHNSON, JJ.

DOOLEY, Justice.

Defendant Golub Corporation ^* appeals from a $175,000 jury verdict finding that defendant had wrongfully discharged plaintiff, Marylu Haynes. Defendant raises four claims of error: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that plaintiff was fired without sufficient cause; (2) evidence regarding a promise to retransfer plaintiff to her backdoor receiver position was erroneously admitted; (3) the jury instructions on reducing damages for future wages to present value misled the jury and require a new trial on damages; and (4) the trial court erred in failing to grant a remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial on damages because the jury award was excessive. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Plaintiff was a long-time employee of a grocery store first owned by Martin's, then by P & C, and finally by defendant, which operated it as Price Chopper, Inc. Defendant retained plaintiff as an employee and granted her sixteen years of seniority for her years of employment with the former owners.

Plaintiff began as a backdoor receiver, the same position she had with P & C. As a receiver, plaintiff kept the back room clean, took care of any damage, and checked in inventory items that came into the store. She continued to work as a backdoor receiver until a new store manager decided to transfer her to the deli department. Plaintiff resisted the transfer, explaining to the manager that she understood that the deli supervisor was a difficult person to work under. Plaintiff finally agreed to the transfer on the condition that if it did not work out, she would be able to return to her original receiver position. The manager agreed to the condition and put it in writing.

Another employee expressed surprise about the transfer to the manager because everyone knew that plaintiff did not get along with the deli manager. Moreover, the deli department was busy and understaffed. When the employee asked the manager about the transfer, he replied with a muffled laugh, "We'll see which one of them goes out the door first."

After some time in the deli department, plaintiff requested to be returned to her receiver position. The manager replied to the effect that if plaintiff went back to her receiver position, she would end up being fired within two weeks. Somewhat intimidated by the manager's remarks, plaintiff remained at her deli position. Subsequently, she was disciplined on three occasions. The latter two incidents became the basis of her termination.

The first incident involved the use of abusive language. Plaintiff was written up for swearing at a co-worker. The second alleged act of misconduct occurred on December 4, 1991 when plaintiff was disciplined for acting rudely towards a customer who requested a complimentary cup of coffee. The store manager recorded the violation, reporting in writing: "[c]ustomer asked [plaintiff] for free cup of coffee and [plaintiff] ignored and was rude when he asked her for the coffee--customer felt he was intruding and was upset after I personally told him that free coffee was available at deli." For this infraction, plaintiff received a three-day suspension and a warning that in the event of further infractions she would be terminated.

In January, the deli supervisor told another employee that the store management was looking for a way to "get rid of" plaintiff. The supervisor complained that plaintiff's presence in the deli department was requiring her to cut the hours of part-time workers to pay plaintiff's salary as a long-tenured employee. To a different employee, the supervisor described plaintiff as the most highly paid deli employee and part of the reason the deli was losing money.

On January 16, 1992, plaintiff was again disciplined for rude conduct toward a patron. A customer complained that plaintiff had been rude and had thrown cold cuts of meat at her. The store manager again documented this incident on the appropriate form, but plaintiff refused to sign and verify the complaint. On the basis of this alleged violation of store policy, defendant terminated plaintiff on January 23, 1992.

Plaintiff brought this wrongful discharge action in May 1992. She claimed that her at-will employment relationship was modified by defendant's policy to terminate employees only for just cause. She disputed that neither of the disciplinary incidents occurred as charged. She alleged that she was set up for failure by the transfer to the deli department because of the personal animus of the manager and her status as a long-term employee with a relatively large salary.

Plaintiff also claimed two violations of specific personnel policies in the decision to discharge her. First, plaintiff argued that defendant's employee handbook required four misconduct citations to support termination, and only three had occurred. Second, she argued that the handbook provided extra procedural protection for employees with five or more years of experience, that the proposed termination would be "automatically ... reviewed" by the company president, and that that had not occurred.

The case was tried to a jury in November 1994. Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court held a jury charge conference. Defendant agreed to jury instructions on just cause for termination and also to instructions that the jury had to determine whether the proffered reasons for plaintiff's termination were pretextual. Defendant objected, however, to the trial court's instructions on future damages. Both defendant and plaintiff agreed to submit the following interrogatories for the jury to answer:

1. Was there an employment contract which required just cause for discharge?

2. If your answer is YES, was the Plaintiff discharged without just cause?

3. Aside from the just cause discharge question, was there a substantial breach of contract of employment by Defendant in the manner and means of discharge?

4. If your answer to questions 1 and 2 were yes, or your answer to question 3 was yes, what damages, if any, were proximately caused by the breach of contract?

5. Do you award punitive damages?

The jury chose to believe plaintiff's version of the events. It found that (1) plaintiff could be terminated only for just cause, (2) plaintiff was discharged without just cause, and (3) defendant breached its contract in the manner and means of discharge. As a result, the jury awarded plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $175,000. No punitive damages were awarded.

Following the verdict, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It also moved for a new trial on liability on the basis that irrelevant evidence was erroneously admitted and on damages because of an error in the jury instructions. It requested that the court order a remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial on damages because the jury award was excessive. The trial court denied all of defendant's motions.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for judgment as a matter of law made after the verdict on plaintiff's wrongful discharge and breach-of-implied-contract claims. The motion for judgment as a matter of law is the successor to the motion for a directed verdict and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See V.R.C.P. 50. Although the terminology has changed, the applicable standard has not. See Reporter's Notes to 1995 Amendment, V.R.C.P. 50. Thus, on review of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we must determine " 'whether the result reached by the jury is sound in law on the evidence produced.' " Nadeau v. Imtec, Inc., 164 Vt. 471, 475, 670 A.2d 841, 844 (1995) (quoting Foote v. Simmonds Precision Prods. Co., 158 Vt. 566, 570, 613 A.2d 1277, 1279 (1992)). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and exclude the effect of any modifying evidence. Id. We will uphold the trial court's denial of the motion if any evidence fairly or reasonably supports a lawful theory of the plaintiff. Id.

Defendant's position on appeal is that there was just cause to terminate plaintiff as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, defendant argues the standard is not whether plaintiff committed the acts that resulted in her termination, but instead whether "the employer reasonably believed the facts to be true and whether they were supported by substantial evidence." Defendant claims that, as a matter of law, it met this standard.

It is helpful to put this position in the context of wrongful termination law in this state. In Taylor v. National Life Ins. Co., 161 Vt. 457, 464, 652 A.2d 466, 471 (1993), we held that although an employment contract is normally "at will," terminable at any time for any reason, personnel manual provisions inconsistent with an at-will relationship may be used as evidence that the contract requires good cause for termination. We found that manual provisions committing the employer to a progressive discipline system were sufficient for a jury to find that the employment contract restricted defendant to terminating plaintiff only for cause. Id. at 465, 652 A.2d at 471. We have followed Taylor in more recent decisions. See Clement v. Woodstock Resort Corp., 165 Vt. 627, ----, 687 A.2d 886, 887 (1996); Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., --- Vt. ----, ----, 683 A.2d 386, 389 (1996); Farnum v. Brattleboro Retreat, Inc., 164 Vt. 488, 494-95, 671 A.2d 1249, 1254-55 (1995); Ross v. Times Mirror, Inc., 164 Vt. 13, 18-21, 665 A.2d 580,...