McCray v. State
| Decision Date | 09 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 90305,90305 |
| Citation | 699 So.2d 1366 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly S627 Ervin McCRAY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Patrick C. Rastatter of Glass & Rastatter, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Ervin McCray petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus, asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. We deny the petition, finding it to be barred by the doctrine of laches.
McCray was convicted of first-degree murder for a 1980 homicide. Initially, he received the death penalty for that conviction. In 1982, this Court reduced that sentence on direct appeal to life imprisonment without parole for twenty-five years in accordance with the jury's recommendation. McCray v. State, 416 So.2d 804 (Fla.1982). Now, fifteen years later, McCray has filed this petition, asserting that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise an issue regarding the asserted erroneous introduction of a prior conviction during the conviction phase of his trial.
Were McCray raising the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, his petition would be barred pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which sets forth a two year time limit for filing most motions for post-conviction relief. 1 Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which is asserted here, is not covered under that rule. Rogers v. Singletary, 698 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1996). Recently, however, this Court amended Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j)(3)(B) to establish time limits on claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. That rule provides:
A petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel shall not be filed more than two years after the conviction becomes final on direct review unless it alleges under oath with a specific factual basis that the petitioner was affirmatively misled about the results of the appeal by counsel.
Under this rule, McCray's petition would be barred because his petition contained no allegation under oath that he was misled by counsel about the results of the appeal. However, rule 9.140(j)(3)(C) provides that the time period set forth in rule 9.140(j)(3)(B) "shall not begin to run prior to the effective date of this rule." The rule became effective January 1, 1997. As such, under this rule, McCray has two years from January 1, 1997, to bring this petition. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we are prohibited from finding the petition to be time-barred. Indeed, we conclude that, under the doctrine of laches, McCray is barred from bringing this petition.
Generally, laches is a doctrine asserted as a defense, which "requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense." Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282, 81 S.Ct. 534, 543, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961). This doctrine is properly applied to habeas corpus petitions "when the delay in bringing a claim for collateral relief has been unreasonable and the state has been prejudiced in responding to the claim." Anderson v. Singletary, 688 So.2d 462, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). See also Xiques v. Dugger, 571 So.2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Smith v. Wainwright, 425 So.2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Remp v. State, 248 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970). Moreover, the doctrine of laches has been applied to bar a collateral relief proceeding when, from the face of the petition, it is obvious that the state has been manifestly prejudiced and no reason for an extraordinary delay has been provided. Anderson (petition filed fifteen years after appeal was decided and saying nothing to justify delay barred by laches where trial transcripts and appellate records had been destroyed). This Court has implemented time restrictions in the filing of collateral relief petitions because inmates must not be allowed to engage in inordinate delays in bringing their claims for relief before the courts without justification and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Unger v. State
...have applied the doctrine of laches to bar postconviction claims coming many years after the asserted errors. See, e.g., McCray v. State, 699 So.2d 1366, 1368 (Fla.1997) (applying the doctrine of laches to bar a petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made 15 years after tri......
-
Downs v. Moore
...was filed more than twenty years after Downs' conviction and sentence became final, and therefore requires dismissal under McCray v. State, 699 So.2d 1366 (Fla.1997), and (2) it was not filed simultaneously with the most recent appeal from the denial of his 3.850 motion as required under ru......
-
Unger v. State
...applied the doctrine of laches to bar postconviction claims coming many years after the asserted errors. See, e.g., McCray v. State, 699 So. 2d 1366, 1368 (Fla. 1997) (applying the doctrine of laches to bar a petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made 15 years after trial,......
-
Ex parte Perez
...of prejudice to State five years after conviction in light of social and administrative costs associated with retrial); McCray v. Florida, 699 So.2d 1366,1368 (Fla.1997) (applying presumption of prejudice in Florida post-conviction cases after five years, explaining that it was “obvious tha......