Reed v. Reed

• Decision Date: 11 February 1909
• Citation: 72 A. 414,109 Md. 690
• Parties: REED v. REED.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

72 A. 414

109 Md. 690

REED v. REED.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

February 11, 1909

Appeal from Circuit Court, Baltimore County; Frank I. Duncan, Judge.

Bill by Marie L. Reed against John A. Reed. From the decree plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, BURKE, WORTHINGTON THOMAS, and HENRY, JJ.

John Hinkley and Thomas Foley Hisky, for appellant.

L. B Keene Claggett and J. Kemp Bartlett, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

The appellant, in her bill of complaint in this case, filed in the circuit court for Baltimore county, alleges that she was married to the appellee on the 7th day of September, 1894 that after her said marriage she purchased, on the 22nd of May, 1896, four lots of the ground near Catonsville, in Baltimore county, and paid the consideration therefor, to wit, the sum of $14,500, out of her separate funds and estate, and that she caused said lots to be conveyed to herself and the appellant "as tenants by entireties" by the deed, a copy of which was filed with the bill; that on the 11th of December, 1905, by the final decree of the "Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty division of the High Court of Justice" of England, she was absolutely divorced from the appellee, and that she "is advised that in consequence of said divorce she is entitled to have said property decreed to be hers, in her own right, free, clear, and discharged of any interest therein of her former husband, from whom she has now been divorced." The prayer of the bill is that the property may be decreed to be the property of the appellant, clear of any interest of the appellee; that a trustee may be appointed, "if necessary," to convey the property to her; and that she may have such other relief as her case may require.

The bill, it is to be noted, does not charge that the property was purchased by the appellee and paid for with money belonging to the appellant, or that the conveyance of the property to her and her husband was procured by the fraud or undue influence of the appellee; but the theory on which the bill was filed is that, the appellant having been divorced from the appellee, the mere fact that the property was paid for out of money belonging to the appellant is sufficient to authorize a court of equity, either under the authority of article 16, § 37, Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, or independently of that section, to restore the property to her.

Without considering or determining whether said section, which confers upon the court granting the divorce "power to award to the wife such property or estate as she had when married," has reference only to the court decreeing the divorce, or whether courts of equity, apart from the statute, have such power, it is clear from the decisions in this state that where a wife during coverture voluntarily, and without any fraud or undue influence on the part of the husband, conveys her property to him, the effect of a decree for divorce is not to vest in her an equitable title to such property. It has been repeatedly held by this court that if a wife gives to her husband property belonging to her separate estate, or permits him to apply it to his own use, or he does so with her knowledge and consent, in the absence of proof that it was given to him to be held in trust for her use, or of a promise by the husband at the time to repay it, it will be presumed that it was intended as an absolute gift to him, and she has no claim therefor against him or his estate. Edelen v. Edelen, 11 Md. 415; Kuhn v. Stansfield, 28 Md. 210, 92 Am. Dec. 681; Farm. & Mer. Nat. Bank v. Jenkins, 65 Md. 245, 3 A. 302; Jenkins v. Middleton, 68 Md. 540, 13 A. 155; Taylor v. Brown, 65 Md. 366, 4 A. 888.

In the case of Tyson v. Tyson, 54 Md. 35, the bill was for divorce and restoration to the wife of the property belonging to her when married, or the value thereof. The court below granted the divorce, and awarded alimony, but omitted to award to the plaintiff certain property, and because of such omission the appeal was taken from the decree. The property which it was claimed should have been awarded to the wife consisted of a legacy to her from her father, amounting to $2,873.75, which had been paid to the husband and wife jointly by the executor of her father's estate, and for which they had executed a joint release. Her claim was resisted on the ground that the legacy had been appropriated and converted by the husband, with the knowledge and consent of the wife, and without any agreement to repay it or to hold it for her use and benefit. The court, in constructing article 16, § 37, Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, said that it was not contemplated "to authorize the court to annual all previous disposition made by the wife during coverture, by gifts to her husband or others. *** If the husband received and applied the fund, whether money, goods, or chattels, or collected choses in action, with the wife's privity and consent, and without an agreement or promise to repay or restore it, no legal obligation rests on the husband to restore it; no right of action inures to her, and to that extent her rights are extinct. A decree for divorce has no retroactive effect; per se, it does not legally restore the status quo of the parties before marriage, or annual their voluntary and legal acts...