Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Decision Date | 22 August 2013 |
Docket Number | 12–8030.,Nos. 11–8029,s. 11–8029 |
Citation | 727 F.3d 796 |
Parties | Larry BUTLER, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants, Cross–Appellees, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., Defendant–Appellee, Cross–Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Joel S. Neckers, Michael T. Williams, Attorneys, Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP, Denver, CO, for Petitioner.
Jonathan D. Selbin, Jason L. Lichtman, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, New York, NY, Richard J. Burke, Complex Litigation Group LLC, St. Louis, MO, Paul M. Weiss, Jamie E. Weiss, Complex Litigation Group LLC, Highland Park, IL, Jonathan D. Shubb, Seeger Weiss LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
Before POSNER, RIPPLE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
The Supreme Court has vacated our judgment in this class action suit (reported at 702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir.2012)) and remanded the case to us for reconsideration in light of Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013). Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, –––U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2768, 186 L.Ed.2d 215 (2013) (mem.).
This suit, a diversity suit based on the breach-of-warranty laws of six states, is really two class actions because the classes have different members and different claims, though both arise from alleged defects in Kenmore brand Sears washing machines sold in overlapping periods beginning in 2001 and 2004. One class action complains of a defect that causes mold (the “mold claim”), the other of a defect that stops the machine inopportunely (the “control-unit claim”). The district court denied certification of the class complaining about the defect that causes mold and granted certification of the class complaining about the defect that causes the sudden stoppage. The plaintiffs asked us to reverse the denial, and we did so; Sears asked us to reverse the grant, and we refused.
Sears asks us to remand the case to the district court for a fresh ruling on certification in light of Comcast, or alternatively to deny certification in both class actions. The plaintiffs ask us to reinstate our judgment, granting certification in both.
Sears' request for a remand to the district court is based to a significant degree on new evidence that has come to light since the district court ruled on certification in September 2011. But the case remains pending in the district court, and, as Sears itself emphasizes, rulings on certification in class action suits are tentative and can be revisited by the district court as changed circumstances require. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(C); Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendment of Rule 23(c)(1); Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1202 n. 9, 185 L.Ed.2d 308 (2013); Johnson v. Meriter Health Services Employee Retirement Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 370 (7th Cir.2012). What could it mean to remand a case to a court before which the case is pending?
The question presented by the Supreme Court's remand is one of law—whether the Comcast decision cut the ground out from under our decision ordering that the two classes be certified. There is no point in delaying our decision on remand to await consideration by the district court of factual issues that may be moot on the basis of the Comcast decision.
The claim in the mold class action is that because of the low volume and temperature of the water in the front-loading machines compared to its volume and temperature in the traditional top-loading machines, they don't clean themselves adequately and as a result mold accumulates that emits bad odors. Traditional household cleaners do not eliminate the molds or the odors. Roughly 200,000 of these Kenmore-brand machines are sold each year and there have been many thousands of complaints of bad odors by the machines' owners.
Sears contends that Whirlpool (the manufacturer of the washing machines) made a number of design modifications, and as a result different models are differently defective; Sears does not contend that any of the design changes eliminated the odor problem, only that they diminished it. The basic question presented by the mold claim—are the machines defective in permitting mold to accumulate and generate noxious odors?—is common to the entire mold class, although damages are likely to vary across class members (the owners of the washing machines). A class action is the efficient procedure for litigation of a case such as this, a case involving a defect that may have imposed costs on tens of thousands of consumers, yet not a cost to any one of them large enough to justify the expense of an individual suit. A determination of liability could be followed by individual hearings to determine the damages sustained by each class member. The parties probably would agree on a schedule of damages based on the cost of fixing or replacing class members' mold-contaminated washing machines. In that event the hearings would be brief; indeed the case would probably be quickly settled.
We added that if it turned out as the litigation unfolded that there were large differences in the mold problem among the differently designed washing machines, the district judge might decide to create subclasses (and for the further reason that Sears' liability might vary across the states embraced by the class action because of differences among those states' laws), but that this possibility was not an obstacle to certification of a single mold class at the outset.
Sears argued that most members of the plaintiff class had not experienced any mold problem. But if so, we pointed out, that was an argument not for refusing to certify the class but for certifying it and then entering a judgment that would largely exonerate Sears—a course it should welcome, as all class members who did not opt out of the class action would be bound by the judgment.
The second class action involves a computer device that gives instructions to a washing machine's various moving parts. In 2004 the company that supplied these control units in Kenmore washing machines altered its manufacturing process in a way that caused some control units mistakenly to “believe” that a serious error had occurred and therefore to order the machine to shut down, though actually there had been no error. The plaintiffs allege that Sears knew about the problem yet charged each owner of a defective machine hundreds of dollars to repair the central control unit, and that after the defect was corrected in 2005, Sears continued to ship machines containing the earlier-manufactured, defective units.
The principal issue in the control-unit class action is whether the control unit is indeed defective. The only individual issues concern the amount of harm to particular class members, and we pointed out that it was more efficient for the principal issue—common to all class members—to be resolved in a single proceeding than for it to be litigated separately in hundreds of different trials. But we added that, as with the mold class action, the district court would want to consider whether to create different subclasses of the control unit class for the different states because of different state laws.
So how does the Supreme Court's Comcast decision bear on the rulings, just summarized, in our first decision?
Comcast holds that a damages suit cannot be certified to proceed as a class action unless the damages sought are the result of the class-wide injury that the suit alleges. Comcast was an antitrust suit, and the Court said that 133 S.Ct. at 1433. “[A] methodology that identifies damages that are not the result of the wrong ” is an impermissible basis for calculating class-wide damages. Id. at 1434 (emphasis added). “For all we know, cable subscribers in Gloucester County may have been overcharged because of petitioners' alleged elimination of satellite competition ( a theory of liability that is not capable of classwide proof ).” Id. (emphasis added). And on the next page of its opinion the Court quotes approvingly from Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 432 (3d ed.2011), that “the first step in a damages study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis of the economic impact of that event.” (emphasis the Court's). None of the parties had even challenged the district court's ruling that class certification required “that the damages resulting from ... [the antitrust violation] were measurable ‘on a class-wide basis' through use of a ‘common methodology.’ ” 133 S.Ct. at 1430.
Unlike the situation in Comcast, there is no possibility in this case that damages could be attributed to acts of the defendants that are not challenged on a class-wide basis; all members of the mold class attribute their damages to mold and all members of the control-unit class to a defect in the control unit.
Sears argues that Comcast rejects the notion that efficiency is a proper basis for class certification, and thus rejects our statement that “predominance” of issues common to the entire class, a requirement of a damages class action under Rule 23(b)(3), “is a question of efficiency.” 702 F.3d at 362. But in support of its argument Sears cites only the statement in the dissenting opinion in Comcast that “economies of time and expense” favor class...
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