State v. Davis

• Decision Date: 19 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. A06-1481.,A06-1481.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Detroit DAVIS, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

735 N.W.2d 674

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Detroit DAVIS, Jr., Appellant.

No. A06-1481.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 19, 2007.

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.

OPINION

PAGE, Justice.

A Hennepin County jury found appellant Detroit Davis, Jr., guilty of first-and second-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(3) and 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2006), respectively, for the shooting death of Richard Allan; second-degree murder in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1), for the shooting death of Pablo Morocho; and attempted aggravated robbery in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2006).¹ The jury returned a not-guilty verdict on the charge of first-degree murder in the death of Morocho.

In this direct appeal, Davis first argues that the district court erred when it admitted evidence of five of his previous felony convictions for impeachment purposes pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 609. In making this argument, Davis asks that we alter the analysis we set out in State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534 (Minn.1978), for determining the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's previous convictions and consider only the similarity of the past crime with the charged crime, the importance of the defendant's testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue. He contends that under this altered analysis, it is clear that the probative value of the evidence of his previous convictions was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Davis also argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by cross-examining Davis in such a way as to suggest that Davis's testimony was suspect because he had exercised his right to be present at trial. Finally, Davis argues that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by improperly belittling his self-defense claim. While we conclude that the prosecutor's cross-examination of Davis, which suggested that Davis's presence at trial allowed Davis to tailor his testimony to fit the evidence, constituted misconduct, we also conclude that the misconduct did not affect Davis's substantial rights. We further conclude that the evidence of Davis's previous convictions was properly admitted and that the prosecutor's closing argument did not belittle Davis's self-defense claim. Therefore, we affirm Davis's convictions.

The record indicates that the police, responding to a 911 call on the morning of August 8, 2005, discovered the bodies of Allan and Morocho face down on the floor of Allan's office in south Minneapolis. Blood, some of which was eventually determined to match Davis's DNA profile, had been dripped and smeared in various places throughout the room. A metal pipe was discovered near the body of Morocho. A bag containing about $11,000 was found near Allan's head.

An autopsy revealed that Allan had been shot in the upper left chest and that this wound caused his death. Burn marks at the site of the wound indicated that the shot was fired at a distance of a few inches to a few feet. The autopsy also indicated that Allan had suffered a number of injuries consistent with a struggle before his death. Those injuries included a series of scalp lacerations and a skull fracture, all of which appeared to be the result of blunt force trauma, possibly from being struck with the muzzle of a gun. Allan also had a bruise on the right side of his chest, contusions on his arms, and superficial abrasions on his knees.

Morocho's death was caused by a gunshot wound to the right chest. Burn marks around the chest wound indicated that the shot was fired at a distance of a few inches to no more than three feet. A second bullet had passed through Morocho's shoulder.

At trial, Davis testified on his own behalf and asserted a claim of self-defense. In his testimony, Davis admitted that he shot and killed Allan and Morocho during a botched attempt to rob Allan, who was known to keep large sums of cash at his office. An accomplice suggested the robbery and agreed to ensure that the door to Allan's construction business would be unlocked when Davis arrived. Davis planned to enter the building, quickly get Allan to give him money from the business's safe, and exit the building. Another accomplice was to act as a lookout.

Davis testified that on the morning of August 8, 2005, he entered Allan's office carrying a loaded handgun. Davis said that, when Allan saw him enter, Allan jumped up from his desk and attacked him. A struggle ensued, and Davis struck Allan a number of times with the gun. At some point, Davis left Allan and went to the room where the safe, which was open, was located. Davis testified that he picked up a bag that felt as if it had money in it and stepped out of the safe room, at which point Allan attacked him again. According to Davis, he threw the money down, intending to escape, and said "you got your money. Just let me go." Allan would not release him, however, and Morocho then came to Allan's aid. Davis testified that Morocho started hitting him in the head with a metal pipe, causing both Davis and Allan to fall to the floor. Davis stated that Morocho continued to hit him with the pipe while he tried to block the blows and while Allan urged Morocho to "kill him." Davis claimed that he shot both men in order to end the assault and save his own life. Davis then fled the building, leaving the bag of money behind.

During trial, the court heard arguments regarding whether evidence of nine felony offenses for which Davis had been convicted was admissible for impeachment purposes pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 609. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the evidence, arguing that some of the nine convictions were outside the ten-year period set out in the rule, that the offenses had limited impeachment value, that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, and that, if the evidence of the offenses was found to be admissible, that finding would have a chilling effect on Davis's willingness to testify on his own behalf. The district court found that five of the convictions were admissible under Rule 609 and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice.² The district court made it clear that the jury would be instructed on the proper use of the evidence.

In his direct testimony, Davis testified to having been convicted of the five offenses the district court found admissible: third-degree burglary in 1993, third-degree attempted burglary in 1998, fleeing a peace officer in 1999, third-degree burglary in 2001, and attempted fifth-degree drug possession in 2004. At the close of trial, the district court gave the appropriate cautionary instruction limiting the jury's use of these convictions.

During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Davis a series of questions that suggested that Davis's testimony was not credible because he had access to the discovery materials in his case and had heard all the evidence presented against him during the trial, which gave Davis an opportunity to tailor his story to that evidence. That exchange took place as follows:

Q: You, as part of the discovery in this case, had all the police reports and all the information pertaining to this case provided to you, correct?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: And you had an opportunity to read all of that material, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you sat in court here throughout these proceedings, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And listened to all the testimony?

A: Yes.

Q: And all the other witnesses were what was called sequestered. They couldn't listen to each other, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you've had ample opportunity to think about this matter and review all the reports since August 8th of 2005, correct?

A: Yes.

Davis did not object to these questions.

During closing argument, the prosecutor attacked the veracity of Davis's testimony and in doing so twice called Davis's account of the killings "preposterous." The prosecutor also argued that a self-defense claim was not available to an armed robber who encounters resistance from his victims. Specifically, the prosecutor argued that "[t]he law does not encompass th[e] kind of anarchy" that "Davis [was] attempting to sell." Davis did not object during the prosecutor's closing. During his own closing argument, Davis claimed he killed Morocho and Allan in self-defense, and the court gave the jury a self-defense instruction.

I.

We review a district court's decision to admit evidence of a witness's previous convictions for impeachment purposes for an abuse of discretion. State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 654 (Minn.2006). Minnesota Rule of Evidence 609 reads in part:

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.

(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

When considering whether the probative value of admitting evidence of a conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect, we have indicated that it is appropriate to consider five...