State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 31 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. A07-457.,A07-457.
• Citation: 753 N.W.2d 677
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kent Richard JONES, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

753 N.W.2d 677

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kent Richard JONES, Appellant.

No. A07-457.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 31, 2008.

Mark D. Nyvold, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Atty. Gen., Kimberly R. Parker, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, MN, Kathleen Heaney, Sherburne County Atty., Elk River, MN, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

Following a jury trial, appellant Kent Richard Jones was found guilty of first-degree murder committed during the course of a criminal sexual assault, second-degree intentional murder, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Jones asserts that numerous instances of unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial, that the district court erroneously admitted testimony in violation of the marital communications privilege, and that the court erroneously excluded evidence supporting his defense of an alternative perpetrator. In a supplementary pro se brief, Jones also asserts that the search warrant for his DNA was unsupported by probable cause and that numerous errors during the grand jury proceedings require dismissal of his indictment. Because Jones was not deprived of a fair trial and the district court properly applied the applicable evidentiary standards, we affirm.

Linda and Charles Jensen were married in 1971, divorced 8 years later, and remarried in 1991. They lived together with her young son and infant daughter in Big Lake, Minnesota. Their oldest son, Andrew, lived nearby. Appellant Kent Richard Jones and his wife Deborah lived a short distance from the Jensens' home.

On February 24, 1992, Charles discovered Linda's dead body in the bedroom of their home. Her nude body was partially covered by a comforter, which had been pinned to her chest with a knife. Charles immediately notified law enforcement officials, who arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. The police conducted an extensive investigation, but found almost no physical evidence in the home. The sheets from the bed were missing and have never been located, no fingerprints discovered in the home were of sufficient quality to yield an identification, and a K-9 unit survey of the area around the Jensen residence uncovered no other evidence.

An autopsy revealed that Linda had been beaten, sexually assaulted anally and vaginally, strangled, and slowly stabbed numerous times in the chest. A quantity of semen was recovered from Linda's body, and it was determined that she had been killed in the course of a criminal sexual assault. Based on a number of factors, the medical examiner concluded that Linda died sometime on the morning of February 24, likely between 8:00 and 10:00 a.m.

Law enforcement officers initially focused their investigation on Charles and Andrew Jensen, whom they considered the most likely suspects. Officers also interviewed residents of the neighborhood to determine if anyone had observed anything unusual on the morning of the murder. Jones was briefly interviewed at his residence, but did not mention that he knew Linda or her family, or that he had seen any suspicious activity on the day of the murder.

Semen found at the crime scene yielded a DNA profile, which was compared against samples from approximately 80 suspects and a national DNA database, but no match was found. Investigators reviewed over 1,000 other possible leads, but without a DNA match or other evidence to identify a perpetrator, the case went cold.

In 2000, a citizen informant came forward with information connecting Jones to Linda Jensen's murder. Subsequently, a search warrant was obtained for a sample of Jones's DNA. Testing of that sample revealed that Jones's DNA matched that of the semen found on Linda's body.

The State convened a grand jury, which indicted Jones for first-degree murder committed during the course of criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(2) (1990); second-degree intentional murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.19(1) (1990); and first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2006). That indictment was subsequently quashed, but a second grand jury again indicted Jones on all three counts. Jones moved to dismiss the second indictment, but his motion was denied.

The first trial commenced in November 2001. Jones testified in his defense and admitted that he had known Linda Jensen and that they had engaged in a brief extramarital affair. The semen found on Linda, he claimed, had been deposited when the two had intercourse the day before the murder. Following the trial, the jury found Jones guilty of all three counts of the indictment. Subsequently, this court reversed that conviction, concluding, inter alia, that the district court erroneously excluded alternative perpetrator evidence. State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 21, 26 (Minn. 2004) (Jones I). The case was remanded for retrial. Id. at 21.

Before the second trial, Jones was interviewed by law enforcement. During that interview, Jones admitted that he had sexual intercourse with Linda on the morning of her murder, not the night before as he had earlier claimed.

At the second trial, the State presented evidence that Jones's DNA matched the semen in Linda Jensen's body, and investigators testified regarding the changes in Jones's story over the course of their investigation. Jones also testified in his own defense. Jones claimed that he lied at the first trial based on discussions with his counsel, and because he feared he would be convicted if he admitted being with Linda on the morning of her death. He also claimed to have seen an unidentified truck pull into the Jensens' driveway shortly after he left the Jensens' home on the morning Linda was killed. Jones attempted to paint Charles Jensen as an alternative perpetrator, but Charles testified that he was elsewhere for most of the day, and his alibi was corroborated by a number of witnesses and documentary evidence. During cross-examination, the prosecution pointed out the inconsistencies in Jones's story and his history of dishonest behavior, as well as the fact that Jones admitted perjuring himself at his first trial. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts of the indictment. This appeal followed.

I.

Jones argues that prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the trial that deprived him of a fair trial. "Prosecutors have an affirmative obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial." State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688, 701-02 (Minn.2001). When this court considers allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, our primary concern is whether such misconduct deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn.2006). Jones concedes that he failed to object at trial to the alleged misconduct. Consequently, our review is limited to a plain-error analysis. Id. at 299; see Minn. R.Crim. P. 31.02.

Before an appellate court reviews unobjected-to prosecutorial conduct for error, there must be (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1998). An error is "plain" if it is clear or obvious. State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn.2002) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. at 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Usually, prosecutorial error is clear or obvious if the prosecutor's conduct contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. "[W]hen the defendant demonstrates that the prosecutor's conduct constitutes an error that is plain, the burden [shifts] to the state to demonstrate lack of prejudice; that is, the misconduct did not affect substantial rights." Id. In this context, "lack of prejudice" means "that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Essentially, Jones argues that the prosecutor engaged in four different types of misconduct during the trial. We now turn to those allegations.

A. Violations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights

Jones argues that the prosecutor elicited testimony that police executed a DNA search warrant upon a suspect who had not consented to a search, and then elicited testimony from an officer that a DNA search warrant was also executed on Jones. Jones asserts that this testimony violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, and "unfairly implied to the jurors" that his withholding of consent stemmed from his guilt. The State counters that no testimony was presented that Jones refused to consent to a search.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." It is undisputed that requiring a defendant to provide a blood sample for DNA analysis constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (concluding that the taking of a blood, urine, or breath sample constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment); In re Welfare of J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752, 754-55 (Minn. 1998). Absent exceptions not applicable here, a warrant supported by probable cause is necessary to obtain a sample of an individual's DNA. See State v. Gilbert, 262 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn.1977) (noting that a search warrant is typically required for a sample of blood). The federal and state constitutions' guarantees of due process grant the accused "the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); see Jones I, 678 N.W.2d at 15-16. Thus, Jones had the right to require a warrant before providing a sample of his DNA.

It is a...