In re Antonio M.
Decision Date | 08 February 2000 |
Docket Number | (AC 18812) |
Citation | 744 A.2d 915,56 Conn. App. 534 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | IN RE ANTONIO M. |
Landau, Mihalakos and Dupont, Js. David B. Rozwaski, with whom, on the brief, was Sara R. Martin, for the appellant (respondent).
John E. Tucker, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Eric J. Palladino, for the minor child.
The respondent mother appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her child, Antonio M. On appeal, the respondent claims that the trial court improperly (1) found that she committed an act of omission or commission that denied the care, guidance and control necessary for the child's welfare pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 17a-112 (c) (3) (C), (2) admitted certain hearsay statements in violation of her constitutional right to due process, (3) refused to draw an adverse inference against the petitioner, the commissioner of children and families (commissioner), for failing to call certain witnesses, (4) concluded that the department of children and families (department) had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the child as required by § 17a-112 (c) (1), and (5) waived the one year requirement of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 17a-112 (d). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court found the following facts. The respondent is the mother of Lorenzo M., born July 16, 1992, and his younger brother, Antonio M., born April 28, 1993. The father of the children is deceased. On April 17, 1997, the children were placed in foster care after a referral was made to the department by Lorenzo's school, which reported that Lorenzo had a scar under his left eye and that the child stated that his "mommy" did it. An investigation by the department revealed that the respondent had thrown a shovel at her son after telling him that she would do so if he did not obey her. When the child did not obey, she threw the shovel, which hit him in the face and caused a mark that was visible one month after the incident.
On April 21, 1997, the commissioner filed neglect petitions as to both children, alleging that the children were being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being. On that same date, the commissioner secured an ex parte order of temporary custody, which was sustained by the trial court after several days of trial. The trial court ordered that the neglect petitions for the two children be consolidated for trial and that all evidence presented at the temporary custody hearing would be evidence at the neglect trial.
After Antonio was placed in foster care, he immediately began to disclose sexual abuse by his mother. On November 5, 1997, the commissioner amended the neglect petition as to Antonio and filed a coterminous petition for the termination of the respondent's parental rights as to Antonio. The termination petition alleged, pursuant to § 17a-112 (c) (3) (C), that Antonio was being denied, by reason of an act of parental commission or omission, the care, guidance or control necessary for his physical, educational or emotional well-being.
The trial began on June 22, 1998, and lasted two days. The court heard testimony from various witnesses, including a department social worker, a court-appointed psychologist, Lorenzo's primary therapist and Antonio's foster mother. The respondent offered testimony from nine witnesses and testified on her own behalf. Twelve exhibits were introduced into evidence. The court also considered the trial transcripts of the contested order for temporary custody hearing and the exhibits introduced in that trial pursuant to the court's previous ruling.
The trial court first considered the neglect petitions and then considered whether the statutory ground alleged in the termination petition was proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court determined by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Antonio and Lorenzo had been neglected and that the respondent permitted the children to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being. The court ordered Lorenzo committed to the commissioner for one year.2
With respect to the termination petition, the trial court found that the commissioner had proven the statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The court made the required findings pursuant to § 17a-112 (d) and concluded that termination was in Antonio's best interest. The court rendered judgment terminating the respondent's parental rights with respect to Antonio on July 31, 1998. The respondent appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to Antonio.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Anna B., 50 Conn. App. 298, 303-304, 717 A.2d 289 (1998).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Denzel A., 53 Conn. App. 827, 831-32, 733 A.2d 298 (1999).
The respondent first claims that the trial court improperly found that she had committed an act of omission or commission affecting the welfare of Antonio. We disagree.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 17a-112 (c) provides in relevant part:
The crux of the respondent's claim is that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that Antonio had suffered serious physical and emotional injury.3 The respondent claims that there was no basis for the allegations of sexual and physical abuse by her or her boyfriend and no basis for testimony concerning sibling fights. She takes exception to the trial court's alleged failure to credit any of the respondent's witnesses, stating in her brief:
It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 782, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). In its memorandum of decision, the trial court specifically set forth its reasons for believing or disbelieving certain...
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Santos v. Comm'r of Corr.
...function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M. , 56 Conn. App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith , 183 Conn. 121......
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In re Noah B., No. CP00-013544-A (CT 2/16/2005)
...arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence ......
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In re Joseph W.
...neglect or abuse also bear responsibility. See In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 562, 979 A.2d 469 (2009) ; In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 543, 744 A.2d 915 (2000) ; In re Lauren R., 49 Conn.App. 763, 771–72, 715 A.2d 822 (1998) ; In re Felicia D., 35 Conn.App. 490, 501–502, 646 A.2d 862......
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In re Paul P., No. K09-CP00-008024-A (CT 7/23/2003)
...arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence ......