76 Hawai'i 137, Reyes v. Kuboyama

• Decision Date: 06 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 15408,15408
• Citation: 870 P.2d 1281
• Parties: 76 Hawai'i 137 Jocelyn Delos REYES, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for Tiffany Nicole Delos Reyes, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Yukiko KUBOYAMA dba Kapa'a Liquor and Wine Company, Defendants-Appellees, and Corey Medeiros, Defendant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1281

870 P.2d 1281

76 Hawai'i 137

Jocelyn Delos REYES, Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for Tiffany Nicole Delos Reyes, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Yukiko KUBOYAMA dba Kapa'a Liquor and Wine Company Defendants-Appellees and Corey Medeiros, Defendant.

No. 15408.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

April 6, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

1. On appeal, an order of summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard applied by the trial courts. Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. Where the circuit court's decision is correct, its conclusion will not be disturbed on the ground that it gave the wrong reason for its ruling. This court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record even if the circuit court did not rely on it.

3. Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 281-78(b)(1)(A) (1992) imposes a duty to innocent third parties upon a liquor licensee who sells alcohol to a minor.

4. The duty to innocent third parties imposed by HRS § 281-78(b)(1)(A) (1992) upon a liquor licensee who sells alcohol to a minor is breached, inter alia, when: (1) an innocent third party has been injured by an intoxicated minor other than the minor to whom the liquor was sold, and (2) the injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the sale of the liquor to the minor.

Kurt R. Bosshard, Lihue, Kauai, for plaintiff-appellant.

Calvin K. Murashige of Shiraishi Yamada & Murashige, Lihue, Kauai, for defendants-appellees.

Before LUM, C.J., ^* MOON, KLEIN, and LEVINSON, JJ., and HEEN, Intermediate Court of Appeals Associate Judge, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy.

MOON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff-Appellant Jocelyn Delos Reyes (appellant), individually and as guardian ad litem for Tiffany Nicole Delos Reyes (Tiffany), appeals from the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Yukiko Kuboyama dba Kapa'a Liquor and Wine Company (Kuboyama). Kuboyama, a package store owner and operator on Kaua'i, sold beer to two minors, in violation of the state liquor control statute, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 281. The two minors, in the company of several other teenagers, held a party at which the beer was consumed. Following the party, Tiffany, who at that time was fifteen years of age, accepted a ride home from a minor who had consumed beer at the party, but who was not one of the two minors who had earlier purchased the beer from Kuboyama. The vehicle in which Tiffany was riding was subsequently involved in an accident, and Tiffany was seriously injured.

Appellant filed suit against both the driver, defendant Corey Medeiros (Corey), ¹ and Kuboyama. Kuboyama moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the ground that Kuboyama owed no duty to Tiffany under the circumstances of this case. The circuit court agreed, granting summary judgment in favor of Kuboyama, and Tiffany appealed.

Because we conclude that Kuboyama owed a duty to Tiffany not to sell liquor to a minor in violation of HRS chapter 281, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Kuboyama owns and operates Kapa'a Liquor and Wine Company in Kapa'a, Kaua'i and is licensed by the County of Kaua'i to sell liquor in its original packaging.

On the evening of November 17, 1989, Kuboyama sold at least two cases of cold beer to two nineteen year old minors, Jose Igaya (Jose) and Howard Kamoku, Jr. (Howard). Kuboyama did not ask either boy for verification that he was at least twenty-one years of age. Corey, who was eighteen years old at the time, was the driver of the car in which Jose and Howard were riding. Corey stayed in the car and did not enter Kuboyama's store.

After buying the beer from Kuboyama, the boys bought more beer at another store and proceeded to Howard's home for a party. Among the other teenagers at the party were Howard's brother, Jason Kamoku (Jason), and Tiffany, Jason's friend.

It is unclear exactly how long Tiffany attended the party. Most of the witnesses indicated that she was there "off and on." There also does not appear to be any evidence that Tiffany drank any alcohol while at the party. However, she was there when the party ended in the early morning hours on November 18, 1989.

There is evidence that Corey was inebriated by the end of the party; however, it was nonetheless agreed that he would drive several of the participants home, including Tiffany. Shortly after leaving Howard's home, Corey allegedly lost control of his vehicle and crashed off the road, causing Tiffany unspecified "serious and permanent injuries."

On January 24, 1990, appellant brought suit, individually and on behalf of Tiffany, against Corey in the Fifth Circuit Court. On September 7, 1990, Kuboyama was cited by the Liquor Control Commission of the County of Kaua'i for violating HRS § 281-78(a)(2)(A) (1985) and fined $1,200.00. ²

On November 1, 1990, appellant filed an amended complaint, adding Kuboyama as a defendant. On December 20, 1990, Kuboyama filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against her for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Kuboyama essentially argued that she owed no duty to Tiffany under the particular circumstances of this case.

The circuit court treated Kuboyama's motion as one for summary judgment and concluded, apparently relying primarily on this court's decision in Winters v. Silver Fox Bar, 71 Haw. 524, 797 P.2d 51 (1990), that minors are not part of the class protected by HRS § 281-78(a)(2)(A), and therefore, that Kuboyama did not owe a tort duty to Tiffany in the present case.

The court entered its order granting summary judgment in favor of Kuboyama on June 3, 1991. Tiffany now appeals from that order.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, an order of summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard applied by the trial courts. Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kaneohe Bay Cruises, Inc. v. Hirata, 75 Haw. 250, 258, 861 P.2d 1, 6 (1993).

III. DISCUSSION

As previously noted, the circuit court apparently concluded that Kuboyama owed no duty to Tiffany under the circumstances because minors who violate the statute are not within the class protected by HRS § 281-78(a)(2)(A). Tiffany argues that she was in fact an innocent third party and that such third parties comprise the exact class the statute is meant to protect. Implicit in Tiffany's argument is a claim that the circuit court was confused in its interpretation of the statute as applied to the situation presented in this case.

On the other hand, Kuboyama contends that the circuit court at least correctly determined that she owed no duty to Tiffany under the circumstances of this case. Kuboyama appears to rely on both of the following arguments: (1) that there is at present no duty under any circumstances to injured third parties on the part of licensee-violators of § 281-78(a)(2)(A), and this court should refuse to recognize such a duty; and (2) because the minor who caused the damage here (Corey) was not the same minor to whom she had sold the beer in violation of the statute. Kuboyama cannot be held liable to Tiffany for any damage Corey may have caused.

Tiffany correctly asserts that the circuit court relied on the wrong reason in granting summary judgment to Kuboyama. Although we ruled in Winters that a minor who purchases liquor in violation of the statute has no claim against a liquor licensee for any subsequent injury to himself or herself, Tiffany has brought suit as an innocent third party and not as a minor who purchased liquor in violation of the statute and subsequently injured herself.

However, we have also ruled that where the circuit court's decision is correct, its conclusion will not be disturbed on the ground that it gave the wrong reason for its ruling. Brooks v. Minn, 73 Haw. 566, 576-77, 836 P.2d 1081, 1087 (1992); Shea v. City and County of Honolulu, 67 Haw. 499, 507, 692 P.2d 1158, 1165 (1985); Agsalud v. Lee, 66 Haw. 425, 430, 664 P.2d 734, 738 (1983). This court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record, even if the circuit court did not rely on it. Waianae Model Neighborhood Area Ass'n v. City and County of Honolulu, 55 Haw. 40, 43, 514 P.2d 861, 864 (1973); McCarthy v. Yempuku, 5 Haw.App. 45, 52, 678 P.2d 11, 16 (1984). Therefore, if Kuboyama is correct in her assertion that she owed no duty to Tiffany as an injured third party on the facts of this case, then we must affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Kuboyama.

Both Tiffany and Kuboyama combine and, thus, confuse two separate questions: (1) whether there is a duty to innocent third parties on the part of a licensee not to sell liquor to a minor in violation of HRS § 281-78(a)(2)(A); and (2) if there is such a duty, whether it covers the instant situation where an innocent third party is injured by an intoxicated minor other than the minor to whom the liquor was sold.

Proper disposition of this case depends on the answer to question No. 2 because Corey was not the minor who had purchased the beer from Kuboyama. However, the second question would necessarily be moot if the answer to the first question is in the negative. This court has yet to rule on either of the specific questions presented here.

A. Is there a duty to innocent third parties on the part of a licensee not to sell liquor to a minor in violation of HRS § 281-78(a)(2)(A)?

Tiffany presents three reasons why this court should recognize a duty to innocent third parties on the part of licensee-violators of HRS § 281-78(a)(2)(A):

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