Town of Washington v. Hammond
Decision Date | 31 January 1877 |
Citation | 76 N.C. 33 |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | TOWN OF WASHINGTON v. JOHN H. HAMMOND. |
CRIMINAL ACTION, tried at Fall Term 1876 of BEAUFORT Superior Court, before Moore, J.
This was an appeal by the defendant from the judgment of the Intendant of Police of the Town of Washington, sentencing him to jail for violation of an ordinance, of which the following is a copy: The Market House was the property alleged to have been injured by defendant.
The defendant moved to dismiss the action: 1. Because the Act of 1871-'72, ch. 195, conferring criminal jurisdiction upon chief officers of cities and towns, is unconstitutional, in that the jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace is exclusive. 2. Because the said Act delegates power to enact criminal law.
His Honor sustained the motion and dismissed the case, and held the Act to be unconstitutional. From this ruling, the plaintiff appealed.
Mr. D. M. Carter, for plaintiff .
Mr Geo. H. Brown, Jr. for defendant .
The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Court for the trial of Impeachments, a Supreme Court, Superior Courts, Courts of Justices of the Peace and Special Courts. Art. IV. § 4. It also declares that the General Assembly shall provide for the establishment of Special Courts for the trial of misdemeanors, in cities and towns, where they may be necessary. Art IV. § 19. Here then is an express power to create Special Courts for the trial of misdemeanors, in cities and towns, where they may be necessary; and the General Assembly is constituted the judge of the necessity, and when deemed to be necessary, is clothed with the power and duty of creating them. Accordingly, the Legislature of 1871-'2, by an Act, ch. 195, § 1, ,) did exercise the power by constituting the chief officers of all the incorporated cities and towns of the State, the officers to hold such Special Courts in their respective municipalities, and conferred upon them jurisdiction over misdemeanors committed within their corporations, to-wit: that of Justices of the Peace. Under the Constitution, both before and since it has been amended, these Special Courts can exercise no civil jurisdiction at all, and no criminal jurisdiction except over misdemeanors. It was not necessary for the Act creating, to designate them by name, as Special Courts, if the powers and duties imparted to them constituted them such. His Honor, therefore, erred in holding that the Act so establishing these Courts, is unconstitutional and void. Town of Edenton v. Wool et al., 65 N. C. 379. State v. Pender, 66 N. C. 313. But the question occurs: Has the Intendant of the town final jurisdiction in this case? The charge is, that the defendant wilfully injured the “Market House” of the town, in wiolation of “Ordinance No. 21,” declaring the offender liable to a fine of twenty dollars or imprisonment of not more than a month. The general criminal law of the State, long prior to the ordinance, had made the same act and offence, a misdemeanor. Bat. Rev. ch. 32. § § 23-29. As under the general law, all misdemeanors are punishable by fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Superior Court, so by the Constitution, the jurisdiction over such offences appertains exclusively to the Superior Courts, unless some statute has limited the punishment to a fine not exceeding fifty dollars or imprisonment not exceeding one month. Art. IV. § 15. We are unaware of any statute which has so limited the punishment of this offence. It does not then fall within the jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace, and by consequence is not within the jurisdiction of the Intendant of the town. The jurisdiction of the Superior Courts remains exclusive, unless the next position of the prosecution is true. It is next contended, however, that “Ordinance No. 21,” creates an offence which is made a misdemeanor by statute. Bat. Rev. ch. 3, § 31. It is in these words: “Any person violating any ordinance of any city or town of this State, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” It is insisted that the ordinance having prescribed a punishment for the offence, which brings it within a Justice's jurisdiction, the Intendant thereby acquires jurisdiction. This Court will be slow...
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...Town of Edenton v. Wool, 65 N.C. 379), and no criminal jurisdiction except over misdemeanors (State v. Pender, 66 N.C. 313; Town of Washington v. Hammond, 76 N.C. 33). "straight jacket" system not being satisfactory to the people of the state, they amended the constitution in 1875 by striki......
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Hood, Chief Of Police, Et Al.,v,von Glahn.
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