79 Hawai'i 1, State v. Higa
| Decision Date | 17 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 17737,17737 |
| Citation | 79 Hawaii 1,897 P.2d 928 |
| Parties | 79 Hawai'i 1 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Guyus L. HIGA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Hayden Aluli, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.
James M. Anderson, Deputy Prosecuting Atty., on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ.
Defendant-appellant Guyus L. Higa appeals his conviction and sentence for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-4 (Supp.1992). 1 On appeal Higa contends that his conviction should be reversed because: (1) as a first time offender, he was entitled to a jury trial; and (2) the administrative license revocation proceeding barred a subsequent criminal prosecution under the principles of double jeopardy, res judicata, and/or collateral estoppel.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Higa's conviction.
On February 26, 1993, Higa was arrested and charged with DUI. The police confiscated Higa's license and issued him a thirty-day temporary driving permit. As a result of the administrative review that automatically followed his arrest, Higa's license was revoked. Subsequently, Higa requested an administrative hearing regarding his license revocation. At the hearing before the Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office (ADLRO), the administrative decision revoking Higa's license was "rescinded" by the hearings officer on the ground that Higa had requested, but was not given, a blood alcohol test. 2
At his arraignment on the DUI charge on May 25, 1993, Higa pled not guilty and requested a jury trial, which the court denied. On December 17, 1993, Higa filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the DUI charge against him, arguing that the plaintiff-appellee State of Hawai'i (the prosecution) should be barred from prosecuting the case on the grounds of double jeopardy, res judicata, and/or collateral estoppel. The motion was denied. Thereafter, Higa consented to a stipulated facts trial and was convicted and sentenced as a first-time DUI offender to: (1) a ninety day revocation of his driver's license; (2) fourteen hours of alcohol abuse counseling and assessment; and (3) a fine of $150.00. Higa's sentence was stayed pending disposition of this timely appeal.
Questions of law are reviewed under the right/wrong standard of review. State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai'i 360, 365, 878 P.2d 699, 704, reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai'i 453, 879 P.2d 558 (1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1095, 130 L.Ed.2d 1063 (1995).
Preliminarily, we believe it pertinent to recite the description of Hawai'i's Administrative Revocation Program, which has been aptly set forth in Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 29, 856 P.2d 1207 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119, 114 S.Ct. 1070, 127 L.Ed.2d 389 (1994):
Administrative revocation begins when a police officer stops a motorist suspected of DUI, arrests him or her, and takes possession of the arrestee's driver's license, giving the arrestee notice of the revocation action. The police also present the arrestee with a thirty-day temporary driving permit. HRS § 286-254 requires informing the arrestee of the specific violation for which he or she is arrested, the consequences of refusing to be tested for blood-alcohol content, that the revocation will be administratively reviewed, and that he or she may request an administrative hearing after the review. HRS § 286-254.
An administrative review of the police officer's actions occurs automatically after the arrest. HRS § 286-258. The arrestee is allowed to submit written information for the reviewing officer to consider along with the breath or blood test results and the sworn statements of the law enforcement officials. HRS § 286-258(b)-(c) and HRS § 286-257. The reviewing officer will revoke the arrestee's license if it is determined that: (1) reasonable suspicion to stop the driver existed; (2) probable cause was shown that the driver operated the vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor; and (3) the evidence proved by a preponderance that the arrestee did in fact drive under the influence. HRS § 286-258(d). A written decision is mailed to the arrestee within eight days after the arrest and issuance of the notice of the revocation. HRS § 286-258(a). If the arrestee's license is revoked, he or she is further informed of the right to request an administrative hearing, of the right to review the evidence, and all applicable procedures. HRS § 286-258(f).
The arrestee is provided five days from the mailing date of the administrative review decision to request an administrative hearing. HRS § 286-259(a). The hearing must be scheduled to commence no later than twenty-five days after the notice of revocation was issued, unless continued by the director for good cause. HRS § 286-259(a). The arrestee may be represented by counsel. HRS § 286-259(c). The director conducting the hearing (hearing officer) has the authority to examine witnesses and take testimony, receive and determine the relevant evidence, issue subpoenas, regulate the hearing, and make a final ruling. HRS § 286-259(d). The hearing officer may affirm the revocation if: (1) reasonable suspicion to stop the driver is found to have existed; (2) probable cause to believe that the driver was operating the vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor is shown; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance that the driver did in fact drive under the influence. HRS § 286-259(e). The hearing is recorded in a manner "to be determined by the director." HRS § 286-259(h). If the hearing is continued for good cause at the request of the director, the director is required to extend the arrestee's temporary driving permit during the period of the delay. HRS § 286-259(j). The final written decision of the director is mailed to the arrestee within five days of the hearing. HRS § 286-259(i).
An adverse decision of the hearing officer may be appealed to the district court by filing a petition for judicial review within thirty days after the adverse decision is mailed. HRS § 286-260(a). There is no stay of the revocation pending the appeal. HRS § 286-260(a). Judicial review is confined to the record of the administrative hearing. HRS § 286-260(b). The issues on appeal may include whether the director exceeded his authority, erroneously interpreted the law, acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, committed an abuse of discretion, or made a determination that was unsupported by the evidence. HRS § 286-260(c). An affirmation of the revocation by the district court may be appealed to the supreme court under the general jurisdiction statutes. See HRS §§ 602-5(1) and 641-1(a). (See Part II, supra).
Id. at 17-20, 856 P.2d at 1216-17 (footnotes omitted). We turn now to the issues raised on appeal.
Higa argues that, because the offense of DUI is constitutionally serious, he is entitled to a trial by jury. This argument was thoroughly considered and rejected by this court in Nakata wherein we held that "no right to a jury trial attaches to first-offense DUI." Nakata, 76 Hawai'i at 374, 878 P.2d at 718. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Higa's request for a jury trial.
Higa essentially contends that, "where the prior administrative proceeding before the [ADLRO] ended in [his] favor," 3 any subsequent criminal prosecution for DUI is barred under the principles of double jeopardy, res judicata, and/or collateral estoppel. 1. Double Jeopardy
Double jeopardy protects individuals against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Lessary, 75 Haw. 446, 454, 865 P.2d 150, 154 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). Here, Higa asserts that the first and third protections of double jeopardy have been violated.
With respect to the first protection, Higa seemingly argues that, because the ADLRO proceeding "ended in his favor," he should not be forced to undergo a second prosecution for the same offense. In other words, Higa implicitly equates "ended in his favor" with an "acquittal," thus implicating the first protection enunciated in Lessary and Halper. However, because we conclude in the following discussion that the ADLRO proceeding does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution, whether the ADLRO proceeding "ended in his favor" or resulted in an "acquittal" is immaterial. We therefore turn to the issue regarding multiple punishments for the same offense.
Higa argues that he is being exposed to multiple punishments for the same offense, and that, by permitting the government two chances to revoke his driving privileges via a civil administrative proceeding and a subsequent criminal prosecution, both the letter and the spirit of the protection that the double jeopardy clause was designed to ensure is violated.
The prosecution, on the other hand, argues that, because the revocation procedure is a civil administrative proceeding that is separate and distinct from a subsequent criminal prosecution, double jeopardy does not attach. More specifically, the prosecution contends that: (1) the administrative procedure does not entail a criminal prosecution; (2) criminal sanctions cannot be imposed at the ADLRO level; (3) a license revocation is a civil sanction that is remedial in nature; and (4) any criminal sanctions that may be imposed does not qualify as a "second punishment" for the same offense, as proscribed by the double jeopardy clause.
Both Higa and the prosecution rely on Halper to bolster their respective positions. 4 We...
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