79 Hawai'i 468, State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 17 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 18478,18478
• Citation: 903 P.2d 1289
• Parties: 79 Hawai'i 468 STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul D. ROBINSON, Jr., also known as Paul D. Robinson and Paul Robinson, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1289

903 P.2d 1289

79 Hawai'i 468

STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul D. ROBINSON, Jr., also known as Paul D. Robinson and Paul Robinson, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18478.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Oct. 17, 1995.

[79 Hawai'i 469] Deborah L. Kim, Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Loren J. Thomas, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ.

OPINION

KLEIN, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant Paul D. Robinson, Jr., was convicted on July 20, 1993, of second degree murder under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-701.5(1) (Supp.1992). ¹ Robinson subsequently filed this timely appeal. He contends that the circuit court committed prejudicial error in admitting certain evidence. We disagree and affirm.

I.

On January 29, 1993, Robinson killed his live-in girlfriend, Irene Bowles, by asphyxiation. At trial, Robinson asserted the mitigating defense of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance manslaughter" or, in the alternative, "reckless manslaughter." Robinson did not testify at trial, but audiotaped and videotaped confessions that he gave to the police were played to the jury. ² No objection was made as to the voluntariness of these statements. The tapes were marked as exhibits and, over Robinson's objection, the circuit court allowed the jury to take these tapes into the jury room during deliberations.

On January 29, 1993, after purchasing a cellular phone, Robinson and Bowles stopped at a Diner's restaurant on the way back to their apartment. Bowles became angry at Robinson after he paid for their food even though the counter clerk forgot to charge them for it. Bowles continued to berate him as they drove home and while they ate at their apartment. She was still upset later that evening when she made several calls from work to "check up" on Robinson. A mutual friend, Michael Nadeau, confirmed that the couple was still arguing about who was right when the three of them gathered for drinks at Robinson and Bowles's apartment later that night.

After Nadeau left the apartment, Robinson admitted that he "kind of went off" at Bowles, calling her selfish and greedy. Bowles got up and went into the bedroom, while Robinson stayed in the living room and tried to cool down. He claims that there had been no physical violence as of that point. About a half an hour later, Robinson purportedly went into the bedroom and lay down next to Bowles, intending to apologize. ³ However, Bowles went into a rage and told him to leave the room. She then allegedly followed him into the living room and grabbed him around the mouth, digging her nails into his face while screaming at him. Robinson struggled to keep calm and claims that he got up to go to the bathroom, saying to Bowles, "Just leave me alone and I won't bother you." Bowles blocked his path through the bedroom and, when he turned to walk away, punched him in the back with her fist.

At that point, Robinson claims that he "snapped." He turned around and grabbed Bowles around the throat with his left hand. His momentum caused them to fall over onto the bed, with his chest covering her face. He then "blacked out" and could not remember anything until he woke up at least a couple of hours later with his hand still around her neck. Bowles was dead. A few hours later, Robinson went downstairs to help Nadeau work on his van. Robinson later fed the cat, told several of Bowles's friends who called from work that she was not at home, asked if they had seen her, and then covered her with pillows and a sheet. Robinson then burned some incense, took four thousand dollars, and left to spend the night at the Ala Moana Hotel. The next day, he drove Bowles's car to the airport and took a commercial flight to Seattle, purportedly to speak with his daughter before killing himself. Later, without having spoken to his daughter, Robinson proceeded on to the Virgin Islands, where he eventually ran out of money. Almost three months later, Robinson was extradited and returned to Hawai'i.

In his taped confessions, Robinson admitted that he and Bowles had had arguments before, which "got a little physical." Furthermore, Nadeau's girlfriend, Susan Riccoban, testified that two or three weeks before Bowles's death, Bowles told her (in private at first and later repeating her comments to Robinson in Riccoban's presence) that she wanted to get out of the relationship because it was not working out and because Robinson did not believe that Bowles loved him. Bowles also reportedly mentioned to Robinson, in Riccoban's presence, that both her sister and mother lived in Las Vegas and that she could make a good living there.

The jury deliberated for less than four hours before returning its verdict of guilty on the charge of second degree murder.

II.

Robinson argues that the circuit court erred by: 1) admitting Riccoban's testimony regarding out-of-court statements made by Bowles two to three weeks prior to her death; 2) allowing the jury to have unsupervised, unlimited access to his audiotaped and videotaped confessions; and 3) failing to redact the portions of his confessions that referred to prior domestic arguments with Bowles. We address Robinson's claims as follows.

A.

Bowles's out-of-court statements concerning her relationship with Robinson were properly admitted under the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule. State v. O'Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 525-26, 616 P.2d 1383, 1389 (1980) (holding that the trial court properly admitted a letter written by a murder victim to a friend, which indicated that she intended to divorce the defendant, because the evidence was relevant to the determination of the defendant's motive or intent). ⁴ See also Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 803(b)(3) (1985). Because Robinson was present and heard the out-of-court statements Bowles made to himself and to Riccoban, the declaration provided relevant evidence that Robinson was aware of Bowles's future intent to leave him if their relationship did not improve. See Commentary on HRE Rule 803(b)(3) (1994) (citing Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892)). Consequently, these statements are relevant to prove that, when it became apparent to him that his relationship with Bowles had not improved, Robinson had a motive to kill her rather than lose her--in other words, Robinson caused Bowles's death neither accidentally nor recklessly.

Although it is a close question whether Bowles's out-of-court statements are more probative than prejudicial, see HRE Rule 403 (1985), ⁵ we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. The evidence is clearly admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule and relevant to Robinson's possible motive for causing Bowles's death. None of the restrictions on the admissibility of relevant evidence as set forth in HRE Rule 403 favor the exclusion of Bowles's declarations.

B.

Robinson admitted in his videotaped confession that he and Bowles had occasionally had arguments that would "[become] a little physical." This is an admission by a party defendant that is highly probative of the issue whether the defendant acted intentionally or accidentally. See State v. Renon, 73 Haw. 23, 36, 828 P.2d 1266, 1272 (approving the use of prior act evidence to establish the defendant's motive or intent), reconsideration denied, 73 Haw. 625, 858 P.2d 734 (1992); HRE Rule 404(b) (1985). ⁶ "Prior bad act evidence" is admissible when it is 1) relevant and 2) more probative than prejudicial. Cf. State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 517-18, 778 P.2d 704, 710-11 (1989); HRE Rules 403 and 404(b), supra notes 5 and 6.

In Pinero, we held that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony about a prior encounter--in which Pinero attempted to grab another officer's service revolver--to disprove Pinero's defense that he accidentally shot the officer whom he was charged with having murdered. Id. at 518, 778 P.2d at 711. We observed that "the trial court ... did not say why the evidence had a 'tendency to make the existence of any fact that [was] of consequence to the determination of the [case] more probable or less probable[.]' " Id. at 517, 778 P.2d at 710 (brackets in original). Furthermore, "[n]othing in the record even intimate[d] that [the trial court weighed the probative value of the prior bad act against the danger of unfair prejudice]." Id. at 518, 778 P.2d at 711.

When evidence of other [bad] acts of the defendant is offered to prove [or disprove ] a fact of consequence in the determination of the case, the trial court must weigh a variety of factors before ruling it admissible. These include "the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other [bad acts], the similarities between the [bad acts], the ... time that has elapsed between [the bad acts], the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence will probably rouse the jury to overmastering hostility."

Id. (citing E.W. Cleary, McCormack on Evidence § 190, at 565 (3d ed. 1984); State v. Murphy, 59 Haw. 1, 9, 575 P.2d 448, 455 (1978)) (emphasis added). Applying this balancing test to the admitted facts in Pinero, ⁷ we held that, "on balance, [the] admission [of the evidence] constituted an abuse of discretion." Id. Based on our review of the record in the instant case, including the circuit court's oral rulings on the parties' respective motions in limine, the requirements of HRE Rule 404(b) have clearly been met. Thus, we hold that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in admitting evidence of Robinson's prior bad acts.

C.

Finally, Robinson argues that the circuit court erred in allowing the jury to have unsupervised, unlimited access to his taped confessions during its deliberations.

In People v. Ferrero, 874 P.2d 468 (Colo.App.1993), cert....