State v. Halstead

• Decision Date: 17 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-0647.,09-0647.
• Citation: 791 N.W.2d 805
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. David John HALSTEAD, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

791 N.W.2d 805

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.David John HALSTEAD, Appellant.

No. 09-0647.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 17, 2010.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defender, and Cory McAnelly, Student Legal Intern, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Drew H. Bockenstedt, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

APPEL, Justice.

In this case, we confront the validity of inconsistent jury verdicts in a criminal trial in which a single defendant is convicted on a compound offense that requires, as an element, a finding of guilt on a predicate offense, but is acquitted on the underlying predicate offense. The rule in the majority of jurisdictions is to ignore the inconsistency and uphold the jury verdicts. The majority rule, however, has been subject to criticism, and a minority of courts has declined to follow it.

The court of appeals applied the majority rule and upheld the verdict. We granted further review. After review of the pertinent precedents and authorities, we decline to adopt the majority rule. Pursuant to our power to supervise Iowa courts, we hold that a criminal conviction of a compound offense cannot stand when the defendant has been acquitted of the underlying predicate offense. As a result, the defendant's conviction for assault while participating in a felony is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for resentencing of the defendant based on his unappealed convictions.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

Lester Recinos lived in a group home in Sioux City, Iowa, when he became a crime victim. On August 1, 2008, Recinos failed to return to the group home by curfew. At 2:30 a.m., a group-home employee saw Recinos being pulled from a parked minivan. As Recinos fell to the ground, a man kicked and punched him. Passengers in the van ordered the attacker to take jewelry and money from Recinos. The group-home employee called the police. The ensuing investigation implicated David Halstead, allegedly a passenger in the van, in the crime.

The State charged Halstead with four criminal offenses: assault while participating in a felony; theft in the first degree, which served as the predicate felony for assault while participating in a felony; robbery in the second degree; and conspiracy to commit a forcible felony (robbery in the second degree). A jury convicted Halstead of assault while participating in a felony and robbery in the second degree. The jury acquitted Halstead of theft in the first degree and instead found him guilty of theft in the fifth degree, a misdemeanor lesser included offense of theft in the first degree.

Halstead filed a motion for a new trial. In the motion, Halstead asserted that the jury's verdict on assault while participating in a felony, a compound felony, was inconsistent with his acquittal on the charge of theft in the first degree, the only available predicate felony under the jury instructions in the case. The trial court overruled the motion, and this appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review.

The parties suggest that the proper standard of review in this case is for substantial evidence. The issue in this case, however, relates primarily to a question of law regarding the consequence of a jury verdict that convicts the defendant of a compound felony yet acquits the defendant on the only predicate felony in the case as instructed by the court.¹ See United States v. Hart, 963 F.2d 1278, 1280 (9th Cir.1992). To the extent constitutional issues are raised, review is de novo. State v. Taeger, 781 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 2010).

III. Discussion.

A. Introduction. The problem of inconsistent verdicts has plagued courts for some time. At common law, inconsistent verdicts were invalid and set aside. See Steven T. Wax, Inconsistent and Repugnant Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L.Rev. 713, 732 (1979) [hereinafter Wax]. In the United States, however, the approach to inconsistent verdicts has varied, depending on the nature of the alleged inconsistency and the jurisdiction involved.

At the outset, it is important to note that the term "inconsistent verdicts" is often used in an imprecise manner and may include a wide variety of related, but nonetheless distinct, problems. A jury verdict may be deemed inconsistent based upon inconsistent application of facts or inconsistent application of law. For example, in a vehicular manslaughter case, the conviction of a defendant for the death of one passenger in the car but acquittal on a charge related to another passenger is "factually inconsistent." DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 371, 377-78 (Alaska 1970). There is no legal flaw in the jury's verdict, but the verdicts seem inconsistent with the facts. On the other hand, the conviction of a defendant of a compound crime when he or she is acquitted on all predicate offenses is said to be "legally inconsistent." See Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 949 A.2d 619, 634-38 (2008) (Harrell, J., concurring); State v. Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163, 171 (R.I.2004); 75B Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1558, at 352-55 (2007); see also Gonzalez v. State, 440 So.2d 514, 515 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983). In these cases, the jury verdict is inconsistent as a matter of law because it is impossible to convict a defendant of the compound crime without also convicting the defendant of the predicate offense.²

Some allegedly inconsistent verdicts involve a defendant in a single proceeding having multiple counts, such as a case involving compound and predicate felonies or multiple deaths due to a single act or occurrence. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict with Verdict on Another Indictment or Information Tried at Same Time, 16 A.L.R.3d 866, 868 (1967). In other cases, jury verdicts may be said to be inconsistent if multiple defendants are tried either together or separately. For instance, it may be claimed that the conviction of one defendant of conspiracy while all of the possible confederates are acquitted produces an inconsistent verdict because it takes more than one person to conspire. See Michelle Migdal Gee, Annotation, Prosecution or Conviction of One Conspirator as Affected by Disposition of Case Against Coconspirators, 19 A.L.R.4th 192, 198-204 (1983); C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdicts as Between Two or More Defendants Tried Together, 22 A.L.R.3d 717, 720-21 (1968).

This case involves a single defendant who is convicted of a compound crime and acquitted of the predicate crime in a single proceeding. Sometimes labeled in the cases as "true inconsistency" or "repugnancy," see, e.g., Brown v. State, 959 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla.2007); People v. Bullis, 30 A.D.2d 470, 294 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332-33 (1968), a jury verdict in a compound-conflict case, as will be seen below, has serious flaws. For purposes of clarity, in this opinion we will refer to the inconsistency in this case as a compound inconsistency.

Before addressing the narrow issue presented in this case, it is important to note that the question of inconsistent verdicts has sometimes been characterized as not involving constitutional issues. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S.Ct. 471, 477, 83 L.Ed.2d 461, 469 (1984). As will be seen below, the question of the validity of an inconsistent verdict, however, can be approached only with due regard to important constitutional concepts including double jeopardy, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to a unanimous jury verdict. At a minimum, the outcome in this case is affected by strong constitutional currents.

B. Approach of the United States Supreme Court to Compound Inconsistency in Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases. In Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), the United States Supreme Court considered the question of proper disposition of a case when the jury convicted a defendant of a compound offense but acquitted the defendant on all predicate offenses. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 391-92, 52 S.Ct. at 190, 76 L.Ed. at 358. In Dunn, the government charged Dunn with "maintaining a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a specified place intoxicating liquor," "unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor," and "unlawful sale of such liquor." Id. at 391, 52 S.Ct. at 190, 76 L.Ed. at 358. The jury acquitted the defendant of the possession and sale counts, but convicted him of maintaining a nuisance. Id. at 391-92, 52 S.Ct. at 190, 76 L.Ed. at 359. As is apparent, the case involved a claim of compound inconsistency. See id. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Dunn upheld the conviction on the compound felony. Id. at 394, 52 S.Ct. at 191, 76 L.Ed. at 359. The Supreme Court offered two rationales in support of its decision.

At the outset, the Dunn Court noted that if the case had been tried in two separate trials, the first trial would have no res judicata effect in the second proceeding. Id. at 393, 52 S.Ct. at 190, 76 L.Ed. at 358-59. Therefore, the Court reasoned, there should be no res judicata effect when the counts just happen to bepart of a single indictment considered by a jury in a single proceeding. Id.

Next, the Dunn Court justified the result on another ground. According to the Court, the acquittal on the possession charge should be interpreted merely as the assumption of a power that the jury had no right to exercise, but was disposed to do so through lenity. Id. While recognizing that an inconsistent verdict could be based upon motivation other than lenity-for instance, as a result of compromise or of a mistake on the part of the jury-the Court reasoned that it could not speculate regarding these matters. Id. at 393-94, 52 S.Ct. at 190-91, 76 L.Ed. at 359. As a result, the Dunn Court adopted what amounted to an irrebuttable presumption that the jury was engaged in an act of lenity when it acquitted the defendant of the possession charge, even though the Court...