People v. Bullis

• Decision Date: 31 October 1968
• Citation: 30 A.D.2d 470,294 N.Y.S.2d 331
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony G. BULLIS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 331

294 N.Y.S.2d 331

30 A.D.2d 470

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony G. BULLIS, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Oct. 31, 1968.

[30 A.D.2d 471] Jon H. Porter, Geneseo, for appellant.

Scott W. Crane, Dist. Atty., of Livingston County, Geneseo, for the People; (J. Robert Houston, Geneseo, of counsel).

OPINION

GOLDMAN, Justice:

The indictment charged defendant in three counts: that he had engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with a female infant eight years of age and accused him of sodomy in the first degree (Penal Law, § 130.50), sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law, § 130.65) and sexual misconduct (Penal Law, § 130.20). The first count is a class B felony, the second a class D felony and the third a class A misdemeanor. The jury acquitted defendant of the sodomy count and found him guilty of the other two counts.

Defendant urges with considerable logic that the acquittal of the sodomy charge and the conviction of the sexual misconduct charge constitute inconsistent verdicts. Sodomy, first degree, is defined in the Penal Law (§ 130.50) as 'deviate sexual intercourse with another person * * * who is less than eleven years old'. A person is guilty of sexual misconduct (§ 130.20) when 'He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person without the latter's consent * * *' and under section 130.05, subsection 3(a) 'A person is deemed incapable of consent when he is: (a) less than seventeen years old * * *'. The basic elements of both statutes are that the behavior involves 'deviate sexual intercourse' and with a person either under eleven or seventeen years of age. Being but eight years old the girl involved in this appeal qualifies under both statutes. The record amply supports the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of deviate sexual intercourse with the child in question. Thus, the crime constituted both a class B felony and a class A misdemeanor. The question is quite properly raised how the jury could acquit on one charge and find guilt on the other. This squarely presents the dilemma in which a trial judge finds himself under the facts here presented.

It might well be contended that each count in an indictment is to be regarded as if it were a separate indictment and consistency in a verdict is unnecessary (Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356; People v. Steffens, 12 A.D.2d 962, 211 N.Y.S.2d 249; People v. Sciascia, 268 App.Div. 14, 15, 48 N.Y.S.2d 428). However, as indicated above, because sodomy, first degree, and sexual misconduct both involve an act of deviate sexual intercourse with one not capable of consenting, we have a situation in this record where the evidence either supports a finding that the defendant was guilty of deviate sexual intercourse or that he was not and an acquittal of one of these counts and a verdict of guilty on the other is not merely inconsistent but repugnant. When the indictment charges two crimes, each of which has identical elements, a finding of guilty on one but not on the other is truly repugnant, as opposed to being merely inconsistent. Although Mr. Justice Butler dissented in Dunn v. United States, supra, he concurred with the majority in this statement on page 402, of 284 U.S., page 194 of 52 S.Ct.: 'One accused in different counts of an indictment of the same crime, there being no difference in the means alleged to have been employed, may not be adjudged guilty on a verdict of conviction on one count and of acquittal on the other. (citing cases)'. The probable reason for the jury's verdict in the case at bar is the instruction of the trial court that the crime of sexual misconduct was a lesser degree of the crime of sodomy, first degree. The court said in its charge that sexual misconduct had the same elements as sodomy, first, but that it was required to charge the crime of sexual misconduct because it was a lesser degree of sodomy, although included in the sodomy charge (Code Crim.Pro. §§ 444, 445; People v. Calhoun, 20...