Myrick v. Fruehauf Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1:91-CV-0465-JOF.
• Citation: 795 F. Supp. 1139
• Parties: Ben MYRICK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FRUEHAUF CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

795 F. Supp. 1139

Ben MYRICK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FRUEHAUF CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 1:91-CV-0465-JOF.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

March 26, 1992.

James Edward Carter, The Carter Firm, Madison, Ga., Charles Allison Mathis, Jr., Mathis, Sands, Jordan & Adams, Milledgeville, Ga., for plaintiffs.

Benjamin Louis Weinberg, Jr., Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Richard B. North, Jr., Edgar Adams Neely, III, Eugene Casey Brock, II, Neely & Player, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.

ORDER

FORRESTER, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant Freightliner Corporation's motion for summary judgment on grounds that plaintiffs' state law claims are preempted by federal law. Both parties have requested oral argument. However, because there are no disputed facts and disposition of defendant's motion turns purely on legal grounds, the request for oral argument will be DENIED.

I. FACTS

The following facts are undisputed. On February 6, 1989 a truck operated by Munson Transportation, Inc., collided with a vehicle being driven by plaintiff, Ben Myrick, on U.S. Highway 441 in Morgan County, Georgia. The Munson truck tractor was manufactured by defendant Freightliner Corporation. Its trailer was manufactured by defendant Fruehauf Corporation. Neither the truck nor trailer were equipped with anti-lock braking devices. Plaintiff seeks damages under state tort law on account of this alleged defect.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Defendant Freightliner moves for summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff's state law tort claims are preempted by Standard Number 121, 49 C.F.R. § 571.121, promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (hereinafter "Safety Act"). Standard 121 regulates air braking systems used on trucks, trailers, and buses.

Plaintiffs ask the court to treat Freightliner's motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss because no factual or evidentiary questions are involved.¹ It is true that defendants could have raised the preemption issue in a timely-filed motion to dismiss. However, it is also appropriate to consider preemption issues on summary judgment. See, e.g., Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1020 (11th Cir.1991) (preemption of state law claims by federal pharmaceutical labeling regulations); see also Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F.Supp. 1135, 1137 (S.D.Ga.1990) and cases cited therein. Defendants' motion will be treated as one for summary judgment.

A. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act

The Safety Act contains both a preemption clause and a savings clause. The preemption clause provides,

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of the State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance as such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.

15 U.S.C. § 1392(d). The savings clause provides, "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law." 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c).

B. Standard 121

When it was originally adopted, certain provisions of Standard 121 imposed stopping distance requirements that could only be met through the installation of anti-lock braking devices. However, in Paccar, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862, 99 S.Ct. 184, 58 L.Ed.2d 172 (1978), the Ninth Circuit ruled that the provisions of Standard 121 requiring heavier axles and anti-lock devices on trucks and trailers should be suspended. Id. at 643.² Following Paccar, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration amended section 3 of Standard 121 to provide "notwithstanding any language to the contrary, sections S5.3.1, S5.3.1.1, S5.3.2, S5.3.2.1, S5.3.2.2, S5.7.1, S5.7.3(a), S5.7.3(b) of this standard are not applicable to trucks and trailers...." However, those provisions were left in the standard so that they could be

easily reinstated when suitable solutions to the requirements laid down by the Court are found. In addition, by retaining the standard's language in its entirety in its existing form, manufacturers are made aware of what the agency still considers to be reasonable standards for minimum acceptable performance, and those manufacturers that wish to construct their vehicles in accordance with the non-mandatory sections of the standard will have the necessary guidance to do so.

44 F.R. 46849 (1979). Thus, after Paccar and the amendment to Standard 121, installation of anti-lock braking devices is clearly "optional." The unstated but inescapable corollary is that manufacturers may comply with Standard 121 by opting to produce trucks and trailers without anti-lock devices.

C. Implied Preemption

Relying on Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.1989), defendants argue that plaintiffs' state statutory and common law claims are "impliedly preempted" by Standard 121. In Taylor, the court reviewed the principle of implied preemption:

Our analysis begins with the principle that federal law preempts state law when the state law creates "a potential frustration of the administrative scheme provided by the federal law," Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1562 (11th Cir.1983), or when the state law "interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach its goal." International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494, 107 S.Ct. 805, 813, 93 L.Ed.2d 883 (1987).

The court held that plaintiff's state tort law claim against the defendant automobile manufacturers for failure to equip vehicles with air bags was "impliedly preempted by the Safety Act."³

The principle of implied preemption applies whether the federal law is embodied in a statute or regulation, see Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (holding that "federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes"), and whether the state law is rooted in a statute, regulation, or common law rule. State common law claims are preempted because "the duties imposed through state common law damage actions have the effect of requirements that are capable of creating an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir.1987) (adopting decision and reasoning of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043, 107 S.Ct. 907, 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987)).

The Taylor court noted that there is no strong presumption against implied preemption and that preemptive intent may be inferred solely from effects. 875 F.2d at 826. "Where the preemptive intent behind the federal regulatory scheme is unclear from its statutory language or legislative history, the federal law nevertheless preempts the state law to the extent that ordinary application of the two laws creates a conflict." Id. (citing Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union, 468 U.S. 491, 501, 104 S.Ct. 3179, 3185, 82 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984)).

In Taylor the applicable regulation allowed manufacturers to choose between manual seat belts and automatic passive restraint systems. Reviewing the pertinent Supreme Court cases, the court held that "a state cannot impose common law damages on individuals for doing what a federal act or regulation `authorized them to do.'" 875 F.2d at 827 (citing Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1131, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981)). "A state common law rule cannot take away the flexibility provided by a federal regulation, and cannot prohibit the exercise of a federally granted option." Id. at 827; see Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 155, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3023, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (California common law rule that due on sale clauses were unenforceable was preempted by federal regulation that permitted but did not compel the use of due on sale clauses).

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish De la Cuesta, arguing that there was no savings clause in that case. However, the Act's savings clause is not a bar to implied preemption. Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827 n. 20.⁴ See also Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1989); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d 1116, 1124 (3d Cir.1990) (allowing manufacturer choice of restraint systems was an essential element of regulatory framework and preempted common law product liability claims); Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F.Supp. 1135 (S.D.Ga.1990). The savings clause would protect a cause of action alleging that some component of a braking system was defective if the overall system met the performance and design criteria in Standard 121. However, plaintiffs' claim is based on an allegation that defendants should have installed another type of braking system, not that some part of the system actually installed was inherently defective.

Even if the court were to assume, which it does not, that plaintiffs are correct in contending that the failure to install anti-lock devices constituted negligence or resulted in an inherently defective product, allowing plaintiffs' state statutory or common law claims to proceed in this action would, in effect, establish a performance standard stricter than those set forth in Standard 121. Such a result is prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (state safety standards not identical to federal standards are preempted). See Taylor, 875 F.2d at 827 n. 20; Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 402 (1st Cir.1988) (followed in Taylor); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th...