Cimochowski v. Hartford Public Schools, (SC 16578).

Decision Date13 August 2002
Docket Number(SC 16578).
Citation802 A.2d 800,261 Conn. 287
PartiesANNA M. CIMOCHOWSKI v. HARTFORD PUBLIC SCHOOLS ET AL.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Leon M. Rosenblatt, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Ann F. Bird, assistant corporation counsel, for the appellees (defendants).

Patrice McCarthy filed a brief for the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education as amicus curiae.

Opinion

SULLIVAN, C. J.

The dispositive issue in this case, which comes to us on certification from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (d),1 is: "Was the plaintiff, who was Assistant Superintendent of Schools in the Hartford Public Schools, and who had been a certified professional employee employed for more than ninety days in a position requiring a certificate issued by the State Board of Education, a `teacher,' as that term is used in the Teacher Tenure Act [act], [General Statutes §] 10-151?"2 We answer the certified question in the affirmative.

The plaintiff, Anna M. Cimochowski, was assistant superintendent for support programs/services in the Hartford public school system. On May 14, 1999, she was terminated from her position. After her termination, she filed a three count amended complaint in the District Court against the named defendant, the Hartford public schools; the city of Hartford; the state board of trustees for the Hartford public schools; the former interim superintendent of schools, Matthew Borrelli; and the current superintendent, Anthony Amato. The complaint alleged, inter alia,3 a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights act), based on her claimed status as a teacher under the act. The plaintiff subsequently moved for partial summary judgment with respect to this claim, contending that, as a tenured teacher under the act, she had a property right in her employment.4 The defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff was not a teacher under the act and that, therefore, the act does not afford the plaintiff a property right in her job. Accordingly, the defendants contend that her termination did not violate the civil rights act. The District Court certified to this court the stated question of law to this court, which this court accepted.

The District Court's certification order set forth the following relevant facts. "The plaintiff, Anna M. Cimochowski, Ph.D., went to work for the Hartford Public Schools in 1966.5 She was appointed Acting Assistant Superintendent for Support Programs/Services by the State Board of Trustees for the Hartford Public Schools on October 14, 1997. On January 8, 1998, she was appointed Assistant Superintendent for Support Programs/Services by the State Board of Trustees6 for the Hartford Public Schools.7

"The Hartford Superintendent of Schools is the chief executive officer of the Hartford Public Schools. The Assistant Superintendent is responsible for certain components of the system, and reports to the Superintendent of Schools. The Hartford Superintendent of Schools supervises the Assistant Superintendent. The posting for the position the plaintiff held stated that the occupant `[a]ssists the Superintendent in the exercise of line authority' and performs `other duties and responsibilities as assigned by the Superintendent/Designee.'

"The contract in force between the plaintiff and the Hartford Public Schools required the plaintiff to `perform duties as detailed in the job description under the direction of the Superintendent of Schools.'8

"The certification which the plaintiff held from the State Board of Education was the certification of `Intermediate Administrator.' The certification which the Hartford Superintendent of Schools holds is the certification of `School Superintendent.'9

"On May 14, 1999, the plaintiff was terminated from her employment with the Hartford Public Schools without being afforded the procedures contained in the [act], [General Statutes §] 10-151."10 The plaintiff claims that the position of assistant superintendent falls within the definition of teacher under the act because the definition of teacher includes administrative positions below the rank of superintendent. See footnote 2 of this opinion. The plaintiff further contends that the plain and unambiguous language of the act extends protection to assistant superintendents and that the statutory scheme requires that assistant superintendents be covered by the act. Conversely, the defendants claim that the plaintiff, as an assistant superintendent, does not qualify as a teacher under the act because the position of assistant superintendent is a high-level management position, equal to the heightened rank of superintendent. We find the plaintiff's argument persuasive and the defendants' argument unpersuasive.

Whether or not an assistant superintendent falls within the definition of teacher as defined by § 10-151 (a) (2) is a question of statutory construction over which our review is plenary. State v. Murray, 254 Conn. 472, 487, 757 A.2d 578 (2000).

We begin our analysis with the language of the statute. Section 10-151 (a) (2) provides that "[t]he term `teacher' shall include each certified professional employee below the rank of superintendent employed by a board of education for at least ninety days in a position requiring a certificate issued by the State Board of Education. . . ." Accordingly, an individual must satisfy three requirements to be considered a teacher under the act: (1) the employee must hold a position below the rank of superintendent; (2) the employee must be certified and employed by a board of education for at least ninety days; and (3) the employee must be employed in a position requiring a certificate issued by the state board of education. It is not disputed that the plaintiff has satisfied the second and third requirements. The sole issue that we must decide, therefore, is whether an assistant superintendent is "below the rank of superintendent. . . ." General Statutes § 10-151 (a) (2).

As a preliminary matter, we note that the plaintiff asserts, and the defendants do not dispute, that in general administrators are teachers for purposes of the act. The plaintiff points to Delagorges v. Board of Education, 176 Conn. 630, 410 A.2d 461 (1979), as support for the statement in her brief that "[s]chool administrators are covered by the . . . [a]ct, though they are administrators." See Connecticut Education Assn. v. State Board of Labor Relations, 5 Conn. App. 253, 270, 498 A.2d 102, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 814, 499 A.2d 804 (1985) (under Delagorges, administrators do not have tenure as administrators but do have tenure as teachers). Because we believe that the Appellate Court's interpretation of the act in Connecticut Education Assn. is an extension of this court's holding in Delagorges, and because the question of whether or not administrators are teachers for purposes of the act is central to the question of whether assistant superintendents are teachers, we begin with a preliminary examination of the holdings in Delagorges and Connecticut Education Assn.

In Delagorges we were asked to decide whether a principal and vice principal were "entitled to invoke § 10-151 (f) when they [were] terminated as administrators but retained as teachers."11 Id., 634. We stated, alternatively, the question as, "have the plaintiffs, by virtue of their certification as administrators and their many years of administrative service, acquired tenure as administrators?" Id. We held that, when administrators are reassigned to classroom teaching positions rather than being fired outright, the act does not apply. Id., 634-37.

The facts of that case were as follows. Both plaintiffs, George Delagorges and George Richards, had been employed by the West Haven school system for over twenty years. Id., 632. Each became an administrator. Delagorges was an administrator for four years and an assistant principal for three years; Richards was an administrator for thirteen years and a principal for twelve years. Id. The defendant board of education undertook a study of the West Haven school system in which both plaintiffs had participated. As a result of the study, the positions of principal and vice principal were eliminated and several new administrative positions were substituted. Both plaintiffs applied for new positions under the reorganization, but neither was selected. They both subsequently were reassigned to teaching positions at a substantially reduced salary. Id. They protested the reassignment to the board of education and then sought judicial review. Id. The trial court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' appeal under the act. Id., 633.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claimed that they had "tenure as administrators because they were employed for more than three continuous years under individual administrative contracts." Id., 634. We stated that the language of the statute "is sufficiently open-ended so that it might be read either to encompass or deny the plaintiffs' claim"; id., 635; and questioned "whether we should take this opportunity, in the absence of explicit legislative direction, to construe the. . . [a]ct to provide tenure for administrators not as teachers but as administrators." Id., 636. We concluded that the relevant case law "illustrate[d] the wisdom of restricting tenure to teachers until the legislature . . . instructs us to the contrary." (Citation omitted.) Id., 637. We also concluded, however, that the plaintiffs had not been terminated for cause and, therefore, that the provisions of the act entitling terminated teachers to certain review procedures had not been triggered. Id., 637-38. Thus, it is unclear whether our holding in that case that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to...

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    ...was actually terminated and that such termination violates a clear mandate of public policy. See Cimochowski v. Hartford Pub. Schs., 261 Conn. 287, 306, 802 A.2d 800 (2002). Similarly, constructive discharge is a common law tort that requires a plaintiff to prove that, although his employme......
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