806 N.E.2d 1251 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 2004), 4-03-0782, People v. Bramlett
| Citation | 806 N.E.2d 1251,282 Ill.Dec. 663,347 Ill.App.3d 468 |
| Date | 30 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | 4-03-0782. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles E. BRAMLETT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Page 1251
Page 1252
Charles Bramlett, Ina, Pro Se.
John P. Schmidt, State's Attorney, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Thomas R.
Page 1253
Dodegge, of counsel, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, for the People.
OPINION
TURNER, Justice.
In August 2002, defendant, Charles E. Bramlett, filed a petition for relief of judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)), seeking to set aside the trial court's August 2000 judgment, which found defendant was a sexually dangerous person under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725 ILCS 205/0.01 through 12 (West 1998)). That same month, the court dismissed sua sponte defendant's petition as frivolous and without merit. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied.
Defendant appeals pro se, contending (1) the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss sua sponte his section 2-1401 petition; (2) his section 2-1401 petition is not frivolous or without merit because (a) his trial counsel fraudulently coerced him into stipulating to the psychiatric report that alleged he was sexually dangerous; and (b) his stipulation was based on his belief the Department of Corrections (DOC) would comply with the Act, and DOC has not because its preparer of socio-psychiatric reports is not qualified under the Act to render such reports; and (3) he was found not to be sexually dangerous less than a year before the August 2000 judgment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 1999, the State charged defendant with aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (West 1998)). In January 2000, the State filed a petition to proceed under the Act. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the State's petition. After a hearing, the trial court allowed the State to file a petition under the Act [347 Ill.App.3d 471] and ordered defendant to be examined by two psychiatrists, Dr. Joseph Bohlen and Dr. Terry Killian.
In June 2000, the State informed the trial court the two psychiatrists had found defendant not to be a sexually dangerous person. The State also noted defendant was arrested on new matters, and the State sought a court-ordered reexamination of defendant by the two psychiatrists. The trial court granted the State's motion for reexamination, observing the new charges against defendant were similar to his pending criminal case. People v. Bramlett, 329 Ill.App.3d 286, 288, 263 Ill.Dec. 235, 767 N.E.2d 961, 963 (2002).
In July 2000, the State filed an amended petition to proceed under the Act. On August 2, 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State's petition to proceed under the Act. At the hearing, defendant stipulated to Dr. Killian's and Dr. Bohlen's reports, finding defendant was a sexually dangerous person. The court then found defendant was a sexually dangerous person as defined by the Act, dismissed without prejudice the aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse charge, and ordered defendant committed to DOC's custody for care and treatment.
Defendant appealed the trial court's judgment, asserting the court erred in allowing him to stipulate to evidence that established he was a sexually dangerous person without first admonishing him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill.2d R. 402) to determine the voluntariness of his stipulation. Bramlett, 329 Ill.App.3d at 287-88, 263 Ill.Dec. 235, 767 N.E.2d at 963. In April 2002, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Bramlett, 329 Ill.App.3d 286, 263 Ill.Dec. 235, 767 N.E.2d 961. Defendant then filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which was denied
Page 1254
in October 2002. People v. Bramlett, 201 Ill.2d 579, 271 Ill.Dec. 930, 786 N.E.2d 188 (2002).
On August 7, 2002, defendant filed a section 2-1401 petition (which he mailed on August 2, 2002), requesting the trial court to set aside its August 2000 judgment because (1) his trial counsel fraudulently coerced him into stipulating to the psychiatric reports to avoid presenting a defense, and (2) he believed his evaluations would be performed by qualified staff as mandated by the Act. That same month, the court dismissed sua sponte defendant's petition, finding (1) defendant could have raised his allegations in his appeal, and (2) his petition was frivolous and without merit.
In September 2002, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's dismissal. In August 2003, the court denied defendant's motion. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Trial Court's Authority To Dismiss Sua Sponte Defendant's Section 2-1401 Petition
Defendant first argues the trial court did not have the authority to dismiss sua sponte his section 2-1401 petition. We disagree.
Since defendant has raised a question of law, our review is de novo. See Berryman Transfer & Storage Co. v. New Prime, Inc., 345 Ill.App.3d 859, 862, 280 Ill.Dec. 764, 802 N.E.2d 1285, 1287 (2004).
In Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill.App.3d 834, 842, 266 Ill.Dec. 351, 774 N.E.2d 457, 464 (2002), appeal denied, 205 Ill.2d 587, 281 Ill.Dec. 80, 803 N.E.2d 484 (2003), this court held a trial court has the authority to examine a mandamus petition and to order it stricken sua sponte if the court finds the petition is frivolous and without merit. In reaching that decision, we noted several cases in which the reviewing court had affirmed the trial court's sua sponte dismissal of a civil complaint that failed to state a cause of action. Mason, 332 Ill.App.3d at 840-42, 266 Ill.Dec. 351, 774 N.E.2d at 462-63, citing Barrett v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 123 Ill.App.2d 326, 329, 260 N.E.2d 94, 96 (1970); Rhodes v. Mill Race Inn, Inc., 126 Ill.App.3d 1024, 1028, 81 Ill.Dec. 793, 467 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1984); Mitchell v. Norman James Construction Co., 291 Ill.App.3d 927, 937-38, 225 Ill.Dec. 881, 684 N.E.2d 872, 881 (1997). This court then concluded the following:
"[T]he trial courts, which have the inherent authority to control their court-rooms and their dockets, have the corollary authority to utilize their discretion in dealing with 'professional litigants' who inappropriately burden the court system with nonmeritorious litigation, stemming from their unhappiness as DOC inmates." Mason, 332 Ill.App.3d at 842, 266 Ill.Dec. 351, 774 N.E.2d at 463-64.
The reasoning set forth in Mason also applies to section 2-1401 petitions (see People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 176-77, 280 Ill.Dec. 456, 802 N.E.2d 381, 384 (2003)), as both types of petitions may be used in an attempt...
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