Hinojosa v. Livingston

• Decision Date: 18 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–40459.,14–40459.
• Parties: Ramona HINOJOSA, Individually as a Wrongful Death Beneficiary and as the Heir to the Estate of Albert Hinojosa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Brad LIVINGSTON; Rick Thaler; William Stephens, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

807 F.3d 657

Ramona HINOJOSA, Individually as a Wrongful Death Beneficiary and as the Heir to the Estate of Albert Hinojosa, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Brad LIVINGSTON; Rick Thaler; William Stephens, Defendants–Appellants.

No. 14–40459.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 18, 2015.

Jeff S. Edwards, Scott Charles Medlock, Edwards Law, Sean Patrick Flammer, Esq., Austin, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Demetri Anastasiadis, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, for Defendants–Appellants.

Elizabeth Claire O'Kane Compa, New Orleans, LA, for Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, JONES, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

In this interlocutory appeal, Brad Livingston, Rick Thaler, and William Stephens (collectively "Defendants") challenge an order of the district court that deferred ruling on their motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity and ordered limited discovery. Because the district court correctly concluded that the complaint was sufficient and that further factual development was needed to rule on Defendants' qualified immunity defense, and because the discovery that the district court ordered was narrowly tailored to the facts needed to rule on the defense, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal and dismiss.

I.

On August 29, 2012, Albert Hinojosa died of complications from heatstroke

while he was incarcerated at the Garza West Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ").¹ Shortly after midnight, an inmate reported that Hinojosa had fallen out of his bed and was convulsing. A correctional officer found Hinojosa on the floor of his cell. He was unresponsive, and his skin was hot to the touch. The officer's supervisor called for an ambulance, but Hinojosa was pronounced dead twenty minutes after it arrived. An autopsy concluded that he "was vulnerable to the effects of environmental hyperthermia due to pre-existing natural disease, and likely suffered a seizure followed by fatal cardiac arrhythmia."

Hinojosa's mother and sole heir, Ramona Hinojosa, sued numerous prison officials and employees, the TDCJ, the University of Texas Medical Branch ("UTMB"), and an official of UTMB, alleging that they were responsible for her son's death.² She asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") and the ADA Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Only the § 1983 claim is at issue in this appeal. Hinojosa's mother premised her § 1983 claim on an asserted Eighth Amendment violation, alleging that the conditions in which Defendants housed Hinojosa posed a substantial risk of serious harm, and that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference toward Hinojosa's health and safety needs.

The complaint alleges that at the time of his death, Hinojosa was forty-four years old and obese, and he suffered from hypertension

, diabetes, depression, and schizophrenia —conditions that made him susceptible to heat-related illnesses. According to the complaint, Hinojosa took various medications for his ailments, a common side-effect of which is that they render patients more vulnerable to the heat. The complaint alleges that, as reflected in TDCJ policies, Defendants knew that these conditions and medications put affected prisoners at an increased risk of heat-related illness. Indeed, according to the complaint, from 2007 until Hinojosa's death, thirteen other men had died from heat-related causes in TDCJ prisons. Many of these individuals allegedly suffered from ailments—and had been prescribed medications—similar to Hinojosa's. Moreover, the complaint alleges that like many of the other deceased prisoners, Hinojosa had recently been moved from a climate-controlled county jail,³ and he died shortly after his arrival at a non-air-conditioned TDCJ transfer facility before he had much time to acclimatize to the high temperatures of the new environment. The complaint alleges that TDCJ policies acknowledged the importance of acclimatization to reduce the risk of heatstroke

, but TDCJ did not have any housing assignment policy for newly arrived inmates to help them acclimatize.

According to the complaint, although certain parts of the Garza West Unit have air conditioning, those portions used to house inmates do not, and the Unit's windows are sealed shut. The complaint alleges that summer temperatures inside the Unit routinely exceed 90°F, and even 100°F. The complaint specifically alleges that the day before Hinojosa died, the temperature at the Unit surpassed 100°F, and in twenty-seven of the twenty-eight days preceding his death, the temperature rose above 95°F. According to the complaint, while TDCJ policies dictate that inmates with heat-sensitive conditions not work or recreate in environments where the apparent air temperature is 95°F or higher, they do not address housing assignments for such inmates. In addition, according to the complaint, inmates sometimes wait up to ten days to receive their intake physical examination after their transfer to TDCJ custody. These physicals provide the first opportunity to detect and treat inmates' heat-sensitive medical problems, and the complaint alleges that TDCJ will not allow newly arrived inmates to labor outdoors until they have received an intake physical. But what is true for work is not true for housing, the complaint asserts. According to the complaint, before they receive their intake physicals, newly arrived inmates may not labor outdoors in high temperatures, but they are nonetheless housed in high indoor temperatures along with the rest of the inmate population.

The complaint alleges that despite their awareness of numerous prior heat-related fatalities, Defendants took no corrective action. Under policies that Defendants allegedly implemented and could have changed, no housing accommodation was made for newly arrived inmates or inmates with heat-sensitive medical conditions. The complaint asserts that Thaler and Stephens routinely reviewed reports of heat-related injuries and deaths and regularly discussed those incidents in meetings with their deputies. According to the complaint, however, they made no changes to inmates' accommodations, failed to ensure that inmates timely received intake physicals, and failed to implement any other protective procedures. Livingston also took no action, the complaint alleges, even though he approved cooling measures for barns housing pigs that TDCJ raises for slaughter. The complaint also alleges that Livingston took part in the decision not to employ medical staff at the Garza West Unit during night hours, and that all three supervisory Defendants were responsible for an alleged lack of adequate training that correctional officers received.

II.

Defendants moved to dismiss the § 1983 claim against them on the basis of qualified immunity. They argued that as the top three security administrators of TDCJ,⁴ they were not personally responsible for—and did not personally participate in—any decisions regarding Hinojosa's housing or medical needs, and they did not violate clearly established law.

After hearing argument on the motion, the district court orally denied it from the bench. In its later-issued written order explaining its reasoning, the district court held that the complaint alleged facts which, if true, would permit the inference that the defendants were liable for the alleged harm and would defeat the qualified immunity defense. However, the district court determined that further factual development was necessary for it to rule on the defense, because "[t]here remain significant questions to be answered as to the details of the TDCJ Defendants' knowledge, actions, omissions and/or policies in regards to TDCJ prison operations in times of extreme heat." Therefore, the district court deferred ruling on the qualified immunity defense and ordered discovery "limited to the personal knowledge and personal conduct of each Defendant as it relates to Albert Hinojosa and the circumstances leading to his death." Defendants then initiated this interlocutory appeal.

III.

The parties disagree over whether we have jurisdiction to review the district court's order. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction to review "final decisions" of the district courts in our circuit. Generally, this class of decisions "does not include discovery orders." Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 647–48 (5th Cir.2012). However, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1291 to include a grant of authority to review a "small class" of collateral orders traditionally considered non-final. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Under this collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction under § 1291 to entertain appeals from decisions that "[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Texas v. Caremark, Inc., 584 F.3d 655, 657–58 (5th Cir.2009) (alterations in original) (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) ). A district court's order denying qualified immunity is one such order. Zapata v. Melson, 750 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir.2014) ; Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. So too is an order deferring the district court's qualified immunity ruling and providing for limited discovery if the order fails to comply with our precedent, because "[o]ne of the most salient benefits of qualified immunity is protection from pretrial discovery."

Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. If, however, such an order complies with our precedent, we lack jurisdiction to review it. Zapata, 750 F.3d at 485 ; Backe, 691 F.3d at 648.

Thus, to determine whether we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal, we must determine whether the...