People v. Brown

• Decision Date: 16 August 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. 143733.
• Citation: 822 N.W.2d 208,492 Mich. 684
• Parties: PEOPLE v. BROWN.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

492 Mich. 684
822 N.W.2d 208

PEOPLE
v.
BROWN.

Docket No. 143733.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 5, 2012.
Decided Aug. 16, 2012.

[822 N.W.2d 210]

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Jeffrey R. Fink, Prosecuting Attorney, and Heather S. Bergmann, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Anne M. Yantus) for defendant.

MARILYN KELLY, J.

[492 Mich. 686]This criminal law case involves a defendant who was not informed of the maximum sentence that could be imposed on him before he pleaded guilty. MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires that the court notify a defendant of the maximum possible prison sentence. Defendant pleaded guilty of second-degree home invasion as a second-offense habitual offender, but the trial court never advised him of his maximum possible sentence as an habitual offender. We ordered oral argument on defendant's application for leave to appeal to determine if the [492 Mich. 687]court rule requires such notice.¹ We also asked the parties to address what relief, if any, is available to a defendant under the circumstances of this case.²

We hold that MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires the trial court to apprise a defendant of his or her maximum possible prison sentence as an habitual offender before accepting a guilty plea. Because defendant in this case was not so apprised, his guilty plea was defective. We also hold that MCR 6.310(C) provides the sole remedy available to a defendant in these circumstances. Hence, pursuant to MCR 6.310(C), defendant may allow his plea and sentence to stand or withdraw his plea, in which case the court shall vacate his conviction and sentence. In the latter event, the matter may proceed to trial. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant conspired with his girlfriend to rob her employer's home. He stole $10,300 worth of coins, currency, and guns from the unlocked home and shared the proceeds with her. He was apprehended and charged with second-degree home invasion,³ larceny of a firearm,⁴ being a felon in possession of a firearm,⁵ and larceny in a building ⁶ as a fourth-offense habitual offender.⁷

Defendant pleaded guilty as a second-offense habitual offender ⁸ to second-degree home invasion in [492 Mich. 688]exchange for dismissal of the other charges. At his plea hearing, the trial judge explained the maximum sentence, advising him that second-degree home invasion “is a felony; it is

[822 N.W.2d 211]

punishable by up to 15 years in the state prison. Do you understand?” Defendant confirmed that he understood. The judge sentenced him to a prison term of 6 years and 3 months to 22 years and 6 months and ordered him to pay restitution.⁹ He did not object to the maximum sentence.

Defendant later moved to withdraw his plea or for resentencing. He argued that he should be resentenced without the habitual-offender enhancement because the trial judge had failed to advise him of the enhanced maximum sentence before taking the guilty plea. The judge denied the motion, relying on People v. Boatman¹⁰ and declining to decide whether various orders of this Court ¹¹ had impliedly overruled Boatman.

The Court of Appeals denied defendant's application for leave to appeal in a split decision; Judge Gleicher would have granted the application. Defendant applied for leave to appeal in this Court, and we ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action.¹²

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea.¹³ A defendant pleading guilty must enter an understanding,[492 Mich. 689]voluntary, and accurate plea. ¹⁴MCR 6.302(B)(2) states that for a plea to be understanding, the defendant must be informed of “the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense and any mandatory minimum sentence required by law[.]”

The habitual-offender statutes, MCL 769.10 et seq., provide enhancement of a defendant's sentence on the basis of prior felony convictions. They do not create a substantive offense independent of the principal charge. “Rather, it is a sentence-enhancement procedure with a deterrent and punitive purpose.” ¹⁵ Under MCL 769.13(3), the prosecution is permitted to file notice of an habitual-offender enhancement after a defendant pleads guilty.¹⁶

This Court has never determined whether, in order to comply with

[822 N.W.2d 212]

MCR 6.302(B)(2), a trial court must to inform a defendant of the maximum possible enhanced sentence before taking a guilty plea. The question was [492 Mich. 690]presented six years ago in People v. Boatman.¹⁷ In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty of resisting and obstructing a police officer as a fourth-offense habitual offender. The plea agreement required him to be sentenced within the sentencing guidelines.

The trial court informed Mr. Boatman that his maximum sentence would be two years' incarceration, the correct sentence for an unenhanced charge of resisting and obstructing a police officer. With enhancement, however, the maximum sentence was 15 years. Boatman was eventually sentenced to 3 to 15 years in prison. He unsuccessfully moved the trial court to set aside his plea, and the Court of Appeals denied him leave to appeal. This Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals as on leave granted for consideration of whether the defendant's plea was understanding.¹⁸

On remand, in a split, published decision, the Court of Appeals held in Boatman that MCR 6.302(B)(2) requires the trial court to inform a defendant of only the maximum sentence for the underlying offense. It does not require that he or she be informed before pleading guilty of the enhancement created by habitual-offender status. The Court concluded that Boatman

was informed of the maximum sentence for the charged “offense,” because “[t]he habitual-offender statute does not create a substantive offense that is separate from and independent of the principal charge.” Nothing in the wording of the court rule can be construed to require a trial court to address every possible configuration or consequence of sentencing. In accordance with the dictates of MCR 6.302(B)(2), when pleading guilty, the court rule requirement that a defendant be advised of the consequences of his or her plea does not encompass advice [492 Mich. 691]extending beyond the maximum possible sentence and any mandatory minimum sentence necessitated by law.¹⁹

The Boatman Court recognized that MCR 6.302 “requires a defendant to be informed of the consequences of his or her plea and, necessarily, the resultant sentence.” ²⁰ Nonetheless, it concluded that MCR 6.302 does not require notification of the enhanced sentence, even though this conclusion violated the intent of the rule. No appeal was taken from the decision.

Concurring in the result only in Boatman, Judge Servitto would have required trial courts to advise a defendant of the maximum sentence as enhanced by his or her habitual-offender status. She reasoned that this status directly affects the possible maximum sentence for the underlying offense, and she opined that “[w]here a defendant's habitual-offender status leads to no separate sentence, such status could only be viewed as part and parcel of the charged crime.” ²¹

This Court has since expressed disapproval with the holding of Boatman. In People v. Kade, in a statement joined by Justices Cavanagh, Markman, and Hathaway, I wrote that Boatman should be overruled.

[822 N.W.2d 213]

²² Since Kade was decided, two decisions of this Court have suggested that Boatman is no longer good law without expressly overruling it.

In People v. Ruffin, the defendant was incorrectly told that his maximum enhanced sentence was 30 years' imprisonment.²³ In reality, as a third-offense habitual offender, the defendant was subject to a maximum of 40 [492 Mich. 692]years in prison. This Court vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the trial court to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea or be resentenced to no more than 30 years' imprisonment. We noted, in support of our determination to allow the defendant to be resentenced to the unenhanced sentence, that the prosecution had conceded that it was the appropriate remedy. ²⁴

Similarly, in People v. Lofton,²⁵ the defendant was an habitual offender and was not informed of the enhanced possible maximum sentence before he pleaded guilty. The trial court told him that a felony-firearm conviction would result in a 2–year prison sentence. However, at sentencing, the court imposed a 5–year enhanced sentence as required by statute.²⁶ The defendant did not object. We remanded the case to the trial court to allow him to withdraw his plea or be resentenced to a 2–year sentence of imprisonment on the felony-firearm conviction.²⁷

Plea withdrawals after sentencing are governed by MCR 6.310(C), which provides:

Motion to Withdraw Plea After Sentence. The defendant may file a motion to withdraw the plea within 6 months after sentence. Thereafter, the defendant may seek relief only in accordance with the procedure set forth in subchapter 6.500. If the trial court determines that there was an error in the plea proceeding that would entitle the defendant to have the plea set aside, the court must give the advice or make the inquiries necessary to rectify the error and then give the defendant the opportunity to elect to allow the plea and sentence to stand or to withdraw the plea. If the [492 Mich. 693]defendant elects to allow the plea and sentence to stand, the additional advice given and inquiries made become part of the plea proceeding for the purposes of further proceedings, including appeals.²⁸

A defendant seeking to withdraw his or her plea after sentencing must demonstrate a defect in the plea-taking process.²⁹

THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF MCR 6.302(B)(2) AND ITS APPLICATION

In its decision in Boatman, the Court of Appeals accurately...