People v. Young
| Docket Number | 359570 |
| Decision Date | 25 May 2023 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIMMIE YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 18-004460-01-FC
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Garrett, JJ.
Defendant appeals by leave granted[1] his nolo contendere plea convictions of manslaughter and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm). Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.
This case arises from the fatal shooting of Angela Foster at approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 5, 2018, in Highland Park Michigan. Early that morning, defendant shot Foster after, as defendant claimed, the two got into an argument and Foster attacked defendant with a piece of metal. Defendant claimed he tried to fire a warning shot but hit Foster. Defendant put Foster into his car and drove her to Henry Ford Hospital. A short time later, Foster died from a single gunshot wound. Defendant was subsequently interviewed by Detective Brian Menge, who read defendant his Miranda[2] rights from a form. Defendant signed the form and placed his initials next to each right. During the interview, defendant admitted to getting into an argument with and shooting Foster.
In the trial court, defendant moved to suppress his statements made to police on the basis that the statements were not voluntary as a result of intoxication and denial of the right to an attorney. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then retained new counsel for the apparent purpose of filing an interlocutory appeal, but no appeal was filed.
Before trial began, defendant decided to accept the prosecutor's offer to plead no contest to the charges in exchange for a 3-to-15-year sentence for the manslaughter conviction and a consecutive two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction. At the sentencing hearing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea on the basis of a lack of evidence and innocence, and the trial court denied the motion without explanation. Defendant was sentenced according to the plea agreement. This appeal followed.
This Court reviews a trial court's ultimate decision on a motion to suppress evidence de novo. People v Elliot, 494 Mich. 292, 300-301; 833 N.W.2d 284 (2013). The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 300. Factual findings are clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a "definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake." People v Wiley, 324 Mich.App. 130, 165; 919 N.W.2d 802 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "On appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence of a confession, deference must be given to the trial court's findings." People v Kowalski, 230 Mich.App. 464, 471; 584 N.W.2d 613 (1998). "A trial court's decision to admit evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes." People v Douglas, 496 Mich. 557, 565; 852 N.W.2d 587 (2014) (quotation marks omitted).
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence of the statements he made to police during a custodial interrogation. We disagree.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions both guarantee the right against self-incrimination. U.S. Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1 § 17. In Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-469; 86 S.Ct. 1602; 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that during a custodial interrogation, a suspect must be "informed in clear and unequivocal terms" that he has the right to remain silent and any statements made may be used against him in court. A suspect also has the constitutional right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. People v Tanner, 496 Mich. 199, 207; 853 N.W.2d 653 (2014). The right to counsel is imperative to protect the suspect's right against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. "Once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent or requests counsel, police questioning must cease unless the suspect affirmatively reinitiates contact." Tanner, 496 Mich. at 208.
"A suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Id. at 209 (quotation marks and citation omitted omitted). To be voluntary, the waiver must be "the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether a statement was made voluntarily is considered under the totality of the circumstances. Id. In People v Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315, 334; 429 N.W.2d 781 (1988), the Michigan Supreme Court set forth the factors a court should consider when determining whether a statement given to police was voluntary.
In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the trial court should consider, among other things, the following factors: the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. [Id.]
A waiver is knowing and intelligent when it is "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Moran v Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421; 106 S.Ct. 1135; 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). The consequences to be understood relate to the admissibility of a defendant's statements in court proceedings, "and the test is not whether it was wise or smart to admit his culpability." People v Tierney, 266 Mich.App. 687, 710; 703 N.W.2d 204 (2005). When deciding whether to waive the Fifth Amendment right to silence, "a defendant need only know of his available options and make a rational decision, not necessarily the best decision." Id.
"When reviewing a trial court's determination of the voluntariness of inculpatory statements, this Court must examine the entire record and make an independent determination, but will not disturb the trial court's factual findings absent clear error." People v Shipley, 256 Mich.App. 367, 372-373; 662 N.W.2d 856 (2003). "The burden is on the state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the suspect properly waived his rights." People v Cheatham, 453 Mich. 1, 27; 551 N.W.2d 355 (1996). "To establish a valid waiver, the state must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the accused understood that he did not have to speak, that he had the right to the presence of counsel, and that the state could use what he said in a later trial against him." Id. at 29. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that "giving the [Miranda] warnings and getting a waiver generally produces a virtual ticket of admissibility." Missouri v Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-609; 124 S.Ct. 2601; 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004).
Defendant argues that his waiver of his Miranda rights was not made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently because he was intoxicated, could not read the form, and was never asked if he understood his rights. The trial court noted that Detective Menge read defendant each of his Miranda rights and that defendant initialed and signed the waiver form. Similarly, defendant never asked questions about his rights or said that he could not read the waiver form. There is no evidence that defendant was subjected to physical coercion. However, defendant was intoxicated during the interview. Indeed, defendant admitted to having four or five drinks the previous day, at least five hours before the interrogation took place. The trial court found, however, that defendant's intoxication was outweighed by other factors showing defendant made a voluntary waiver of his rights. In sum, the trial court's overall finding that defendant made a knowing waiver of his Miranda rights was not clearly erroneous.
Defendant also argues that his statements made to police must be suppressed because he invoked his right to counsel. A defendant's invocation of the right to counsel must be "unequivocal." Tierney, 266 Mich.App. at 711. "[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning." Davis v United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459; 114 S.Ct. 2350; 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that the statement, "[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer," was not an invocation of the right to counsel. Id. at 462. This is because such a statement only indicates the likelihood that the suspect might later invoke his right. Id. at 459. Similarly, in Tierney, this Court held that the statements "[m]aybe I should talk to an attorney" and "I might want to talk to an attorney" were not an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. Tierney, 266 Mich.App. at 711.
This Court has also held that when a reference to obtaining an attorney is made in the future tense, there is no indication that a suspect is presently invoking his right to counsel. People v...
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