U.S. v. Wood
| Decision Date | 25 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-2496,86-2496 |
| Citation | 834 F.2d 1382 |
| Parties | 24 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 130 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William E. WOOD, a/k/a Steve Bishop, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Larry Byrd, Sarasota, Fla., for appellant.
Debra E. Herzog, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before ROSS, * Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
William E. Wood appeals from the district court's ** entry of judgment and sentence following a jury verdict of guilty on one count of conspiracy to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, cocaine, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, and one count of interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise (ITAR), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952. Wood received an enhanced twenty-year prison term and a $250,000 fine on the section 846 charge, and a concurrent five-year prison sentence and a $250,000 fine on the ITAR charge. Wood raises numerous issues on appeal. We reject Wood's assignments of error and affirm his conviction and sentence.
Wood headed a cocaine distribution ring centered in Florida. In June 1985, Michael Stanton, Wood's accomplice, returned to Florida from Renton, Missouri, where he had moved following five years employment in Wood's drug smuggling and distribution operation in Florida. Wood met with Stanton, delivered cocaine to him, and had him carry the cocaine back to Renton, Missouri.
Upon his return to Renton, Stanton was questioned by the police. Fearing a search of his home, he put the cocaine in a backpack, and asked his son and a playmate to hide the backpack for him in the woods. Stanton later retrieved the backpack and delivered it to Wood, who had flown to a nearby airport. After delivery, Wood discovered that some of the cocaine was missing. Although denying responsibility, Stanton resolved to find the missing cocaine. In late June of 1985, Stanton was arrested after threatening three local youths he determined had stolen Woods' missing cocaine. State and federal charges were brought against Stanton.
In May 1986, Stanton began cooperating with the government and disclosed Wood's role in the conspiracy, a role Wood later confirmed through several recorded telephone conversations with Stanton and Stanton's wife Mary. On July 30, 1986, Wood was detained by the U.S. Customs Service at the St. Petersburg-Clearwater Airport, while trying to pick up a jet airplane that he had bought with $1,085,000 in cash. Wood was arrested and charged with conspiracy to falsely register an aircraft, after he was unable to resolve the agent's doubts about irregularities in the airplane's registration certificate. The false registration charges were dropped when these drug prosecutions began.
Wood was indicted on three counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, cocaine; (2) interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise; and (3) possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The jury convicted Wood on counts one and two but acquitted him on count three. On appeal, Wood asserts several challenges to his conviction and sentencing, which we discuss in order.
Wood first contends that the district court improperly limited the scope of cross-examination of the government's key witness, Michael Stanton. Wood's counsel sought to ask Stanton whom he visited while in Florida in early June of 1985, in order to challenge Stanton's claim that he received cocaine from Wood. Counsel also attempted to inquire into the contents of a document in which Stanton allegedly complained about the intimidatory tactics used against him by the police. In both instances, the district court prohibited Wood's counsel from pursuing the line of questioning, ruling that the matters were collateral to the main issues at trial.
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the credibility of the witness and the truth of the testimony are verified, and therefore must be accorded great respect. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Where the defense counsel seeks to cross-examine government witnesses about matters relevant to credibility or bias, counsel should ordinarily be allowed wide latitude. Fed.R.Evid. 608; United States v. Mansaw, 714 F.2d 785, 788 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986, 104 S.Ct. 434, 78 L.Ed.2d 366 (1983). Nonetheless, we have long recognized that the trial judge must retain discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 220, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931); United States v. Peyro, 786 F.2d 826 (8th Cir.1986). Reversal, therefore, is warranted only where there has been clear abuse of discretion, and a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Peyro, 786 F.2d at 828; United States v. Lee, 743 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir.1984).
We find no abuse of discretion in the limitation of cross-examination in the present case. While it is somewhat anomalous that the district court accepted Stanton's assertion that those he visited in Florida, other than Wood, were not involved in the drug conspiracy, the testimony of Stanton's traveling companion on the Florida jaunt, David (Tony) Banker, corroborated Stanton's evidence that Wood delivered cocaine to Stanton during the June 1985 visit. In addition, the trial record shows that Wood's counsel was afforded a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine both Stanton and Banker about the details of the Florida trip. Because of this corroboration, and the compelling nature of the other evidence against Wood, we cannot say that the district court's foreclosure of cross-examination concerning the people Stanton visited during the June 1985 trip to Florida amounted to an abuse of discretion or prejudiced Wood.
Similarly, the district court's preclusion of cross-examination about the document in which Stanton alleged that the police dragooned him into cooperation does not call for reversal. Stanton testified that the document was prepared with the intention of dismissing his attorney, while he was disconcerted over the sentence that he had received on related state charges. The document was never filed. In addition, Stanton was subjected to lengthy cross-examination about his cooperation with the government and the details of his plea agreement. Even granting Wood's expansive reading of the record, there is no basis for his inference that Stanton attempted to withdraw the information he provided about Wood to the government.
In sum, Stanton, the chief pillar for the prosecution, was vigorously cross-examined by counsel about both the June, 1985 trip to Florida and his cooperation with the government. The court curtailed cross-examination into areas it felt were collateral to these two events. Given the deference accorded a trial court's determination of the proper scope of cross-examination, and the magnitude of the evidence against Wood, we conclude the district court did not commit reversible error by limiting cross-examination in these two respects.
Wood next avers that the district court erred in allowing Stanton's wife Mary to testify that Stanton had told her that he was working for Wood by putting radios in boats used for drug smuggling. In admitting, over Wood's objections, Mary Stanton's testimony about statements concerning alleged conspirators, it was incumbent upon the district court to determine that adequate foundation existed to invoke the hearsay exception of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Sufficient evidence had to exist to support an inference that the statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy, while the conspiracy was in existence, and independent proof had to establish the existence of a conspiracy in which the declarant and the defendant participated. United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 908 (8th Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. United States, 474 U.S. 980, 106 S.Ct. 382, 88 L.Ed.2d 336 (1985). Wood urges that the statement was improperly admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) because it was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Whether the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy is a close question. Mary Stanton testified that her husband told her that he was working for Wood installing radio equipment in boats "used for marijuana." Although the statement refers to drugs, it doesn't appear that Michael Stanton was seeking to induce his wife to join the conspiracy. There is no evidence that Stanton's statement prompted action in furtherance of the conspiracy by either participant in the conversation. Stanton's statement did not identify the role of one conspirator to another, because Mary Stanton was not involved in the conspiracy. A more credible, albeit pedestrian, interpretation is that he was merely informing his wife about his activities. We hold that the statement was not in furtherance of the conspiracy, and therefore did not qualify for admission under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In view of the overwhelming amount of evidence against William Wood, however, the admission of this hearsay statement was harmless error. See United States v. Harris, 546 F.2d 234 (8th Cir.1976). 1
Wood's next set of contentions addresses the introduction of evidence concerning his purchase of a jet airplane for $1,085,000 in cash. Wood insists that the evidence is irrelevant because there is no proof that the airplane was used for drug smuggling or was purchased with the proceeds of crime. Wood claims that the details of the cash purchase were not proven by clear and convincing evidence and that the testimony and exhibits at issue were "other crimes" evidence, which did not satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Finally, Wood condemns the evidence as more prejudicial than probative. None of Wood's...
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