United States v. Bowser

Decision Date23 August 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15-2258,15-2258
Citation834 F.3d 780
Parties United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joshua N. Bowser, et al., Defendants. Appeal of: Bradley W. Carlson
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

834 F.3d 780

United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Joshua N. Bowser, et al., Defendants.


Appeal of: Bradley W. Carlson

No. 15-2258

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 19, 2016
Decided August 23, 2016
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied September 22, 2016


Bradley A. Blackington, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Gavin M. Rose, Jan P. Mensz, ACLU of Indiana, Kenneth J. Falk, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, for Appellant.

Gwendolyn M. Beitz, Monica Foster, Indiana Federal Community Defenders, Inc., Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.

Before Easterbrook, Rovner, and Sykes, Circuit Judges.

Rovner, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves the government's efforts to seize personal property bearing the insignia of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club (the “Outlaws”), and the effort of a representative of the Outlaws to intervene to prevent those forfeitures. The forfeiture actions stemmed from criminal cases brought against a number of Outlaws members, including all members of the Indianapolis chapter of the Outlaws. As we summarized in United States v. Knoll , 785 F.3d 1151, 1152–53 (7th Cir. 2015), “[t]his case began with a forty–nine count indictment that charged fifty–one individuals (all

834 F.3d 782

members of the Outlaws) with racketeering, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, extortion, running an illegal gambling business, witness tampering and firearms offenses, among other things.” Included in that indictment, was a count charging nineteen members of the Outlaws with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO), based on allegations that the Outlaws was an enterprise and its members participated in that enterprise through the commission of various crimes. The indictment included a notice of the government's intent to forfeit any and all property affording the RICO defendants with a source of influence over the enterprise and all property obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity.

On July 11, 2012, in connection with the arrests of the Outlaws members, the FBI executed search warrants on the Outlaws' clubhouses in Indianapolis and Fort Wayne, Indiana, the Outlaws' bunkhouse in Indianapolis, and several individual residences. Pursuant to those searches, the FBI seized numerous items bearing the insignia of the Outlaws, and the FBI sought forfeiture of those items. That property included, but was not limited to: vests, patches, shirts, hats, belt buckles, signs, mirrors, flags, calendars, books, and pictures. The Outlaws used the symbols on the clothing to conspicuously display their presence and to deter other groups from infringing on their territory. The items included the symbol of the Outlaws which was a skull and crossed pistons, and patches with slogans such as “God Forgives, Outlaws Don't” and “Snitches Are a Dying Breed” which communicated a threat to those who would seek to oppose the Outlaws.

One defendant, Christian Miller, was found guilty after trial, but the remaining eighteen defendants pled guilty—sixteen defendants to all charges and two defendants to all but the RICO counts to which they pled nolo contendere. As part of the plea agreements, each agreed to forfeit the Outlaws paraphernalia seized by the FBI. After the government sought and obtained final orders of forfeiture from all but one defendant, and was in the process of finalizing forfeiture with the remaining Outlaws defendant, the court received a letter from Bradley W. Carlson which it interpreted as a motion to intervene in the criminal forfeiture actions. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(2), “[a]ny person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which has been ordered forfeited to the United States ... may ... petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property.” In order to pursue such relief, a petitioner's right to the property must have vested in petitioner rather than the defendant or be superior to any right, title or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the criminal acts, or the petitioner must be a bona fide purchaser of the property. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(6). The government sought to dismiss the motion as untimely in that final forfeiture orders had already issued, but Carlson responded by filing a motion to reopen the final orders and also challenging orders seeking forfeiture of indicia and memorabilia of the Outlaws.

In seeking to reopen the forfeiture actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Carlson contended that he had a property interest in all of the Outlaws paraphernalia and that the government had failed to provide him with direct notice of the forfeiture actions. Therefore, the issue before the district court was whether Carlson was due direct notice of the forfeiture actions filed in this case. The notice requirements for such forfeitures is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(1), which provides that

[f]ollowing the entry of an order of forfeiture under this section, the United
834 F.3d 783
States shall publish notice of the order and of its intent to dispose of the property in such manner as the Attorney General may direct. The Government may also, to the extent practicable, provide direct written notice to any person known to have alleged an interest in the property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture as a substitute for published notice as to those persons so notified.

In addition, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(6)(A) requires the government to “publish notice of the order and send notice to any person who reasonably appears to be a potential claimant with standing to contest the forfeiture in the ancillary proceeding.” The government provided notice of all of the forfeitures to each of the defendants, and also posted notice of each forfeiture on the official government forfeiture site at www.forfeiture.gov for 30 consecutive days.

Carlson asserts that he was entitled to direct written notice of the order because he claims that he has been elected by the collective membership of the Outlaws to protect, manage, direct, oversee, and control all indicia and memorabilia of the Outlaws in the United States. Carlson maintains that all patches and registered collective marks of the Outlaws are owned solely by the collective membership of the Outlaws, not by any individual members. As support for his position, Carlson points out that Outlaws members believe that the property bearing the markings of the Outlaws are the property of the Outlaws as a whole, and that Outlaws members must return their “colors” (paraphernalia with Outlaws markings) if they cease to become active members. The government concedes that Outlaws members share that belief. Carlson claims that by virtue of his elected position he has been vested by the membership of the Outlaws with a “superior possessory interest in all items of [Outlaws] indicia.”

The district court denied that motion, as well as Carlson's subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). The...

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5 cases
  • United States v. Guerrero
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • June 22, 2021
    ...lawful property interest" for purposes of the relevant forfeiture statues "is created and defined by state law." United States v. Bowser, 834 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2016). Under Illinois law, a constructive trust is "raised by operation of law" rather than "by express agreement." Suttles v......
  • Block v. Westra
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • October 14, 2020
    ...Defendant's Rule 41 motion). Therefore, Block was not injured by the forfeiture of the 1984 Jeep Scrambler. See United States v. Bowser, 834 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2016) ("Only a personpossessing a legal interest, rather than an equitable interest, in property will have standing to challen......
  • United States ex rel. Myers v. America's Disabled Homebound, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • March 22, 2018
  • United States v. 2014 Nissan Altima 2.5L Vin 1N4AL3AP9EC195679
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • July 14, 2021
    ...either that Rodriguez had a personal interest in the car or that he had standing to represent his company's alleged interest. See Bowser, 834 F.3d at 785. While discovery revealed bill of sale naming RnR as the car's buyer, Indiana law recognizes only title as facial evidence of ownership. ......
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