Boyd v. Brookstone Corp. of New Hampshire, Inc., 93-6632-CIV.

Citation857 F. Supp. 1568
Decision Date18 July 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-6632-CIV.,93-6632-CIV.
PartiesCorrie BOYD, Jr., Plaintiff, v. BROOKSTONE CORPORATION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Peter W. Zinober, Edwin J. Turanchik, Frank E. Brown, Zinober & McCrea, Tampa, FL, for defendant.

Gene Reibman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Stuart A. Rosenfeldt, Herzfeld & Rubin, Miami, FL, for plaintiff.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

HIGHSMITH, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Brookstone Corporation of New Hampshire, Inc.'s ("Brookstone") Partial Motion to Dismiss, filed July 27, 1993. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part Brookstone's motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Corrie Boyd, Jr. ("Boyd") is a black male employed by Brookstone as a sales supervisor in Brookstone's Galleria store in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On or about December 1, 1991, Boyd was denied a promotion to the position of assistant manager. Boyd asserts he performed his job duties with competence and diligence, and alleges he was denied the promotion based on his race.

On February 11, 1992, Boyd filed a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Brookstone, alleging racial discrimination. The EEOC rendered a decision in favor of Brookstone, and issued Boyd a right-to-sue letter. Thereafter, Boyd filed this discrimination action, alleging that Brookstone failed to promote him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"). Boyd also asserts that Brookstone retaliated against him for engaging in a protected Title VII activity; namely, the filing of the EEOC complaint. Boyd additionally seeks to enforce rights secured to him under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; to wit, the right to make and enforce contracts.

In response, Brookstone filed a motion to dismiss certain portions of Boyd's retaliation claim. Brookstone asserts that the allegations sought to be dismissed fail to state a cause of action, under Title VII, upon which relief can be granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To state a claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires, inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The Court must "take the material allegations of the complaint and its incorporated exhibits as true, and liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff." Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Servs., Inc., 840 F.2d 797, 798 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted), aff'd, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). The law in this Circuit is well-settled that "the `accepted rule' for appraising the sufficiency of a complaint is `that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" SEC v. ESM Group, Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)), cert. denied 486 U.S. 1055, 108 S.Ct. 2822, 100 L.Ed.2d 923 (1988). The moving party bears a heavy burden. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 953 (11th Cir.1986).

DISCUSSION

The pertinent facts, as Boyd alleges them, and placed in the light most favorable to him, are that Boyd was denied a promotion because of his race, for which denial Boyd instituted a proceeding before the EEOC. Allegedly, in retaliation for Boyd's filing of the EEOC complaint, Brookstone presented manufactured evidence to the EEOC, to influence the outcome of the EEOC's determination. After its investigation of Boyd's complaint, which included consideration of the allegedly manufactured evidence, the EEOC determined that Boyd had not been discriminated against. The EEOC then gave Boyd leave to pursue his discrimination claim in federal court for violation of § 703(a) of Title VII. In the Complaint now before this Court, however, Boyd raises a retaliation claim under § 704(a) in addition to his § 703(a) claim, based on Brookstone's alleged submission of manufactured evidence to the EEOC. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Brookstone retaliated against Boyd by: (1) directing lower level management employees to prepare false and fraudulent evaluations of Boyd in an attempt to influence the outcome of the EEOC complaint by justifying Brookstone's unlawful denial of a promotion to Boyd, and also to harass Boyd for filing his complaint and to deny him equal employment opportunities such as annual raises and advancement; and (2) giving false evidence to the EEOC, and directing other Brookstone employees to give false evidence to the EEOC.1 Brookstone seeks dismissal of these retaliation claims.

Title VII was enacted by Congress to "achieve employment equality by preventing discrimination and to make persons whole for injuries suffered due to unlawful employment discrimination." Adler v. John Carroll Univ., 549 F.Supp. 652, 655 (N.D.Ohio 1982). Sections 703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII identify the types of employment practices that are considered unlawful. Specifically, § 703(a) prohibits the discharge or other discrimination "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section 704(a), on the other hand, prohibits an employer from engaging in retaliatory conduct against an employee because that employee seeks to exercise his rights under Title VII or in some other way opposes an employer's unlawful employment practices.2

To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under § 704(a), a plaintiff must satisfy the three-part test articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Jordan v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 1290 (11th Cir.1988); namely:

a) that the employee's activity falls within the scope of protection of Title VII;
b) that the employee suffered an adverse employment decision; and
c) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the detrimental employment action.

Jordan, 851 F.2d at 1292. See also Bigge v. Albertsons, Inc., 894 F.2d 1497, 1501 (11th Cir.1990). The crux of Brookstone's motion to dismiss is that Boyd has not suffered an "adverse employment decision" in relation to his filing of the EEOC complaint. Thus, Brookstone contends, Boyd has not satisfied the three-part Jordan test, and the contested portions of his retaliation claim must be dismissed. At best, Brookstone urges, the alleged conduct would only be relevant to proving that Brookstone's denial of Boyd's promotion was done with discriminatory intent in violation of § 703(a).

1. Allegations of False Evaluations.

The Court first addresses Boyd's retaliation claim based on the alleged false evaluations. Boyd asserts that, subsequent to the filing of his EEOC complaint, and in retaliation for such filing, Brookstone prepared false evaluations of Boyd's job performance. An allegation that false performance evaluations were prepared in retaliation for the filing of an EEOC claim is a recognized cause of action under § 704(a). See, e.g., EEOC v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1572 (11th Cir.1993); Sowers v. Kemira, Inc., 701 F.Supp. 809, 825 (S.D.Ga.1988). See also Scales v. The George Washington Univ., 1991 WL 199869, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 3887 (D.D.C. March 25, 1991) (Retaliatory conduct complained of included a performance evaluation containing falsehoods and malicious accusations.). While the claim in Boyd's complaint for retaliation based upon false evaluations includes a litany of motivations for the alleged retaliatory conduct, such alleged motivations do not impair the validity of the cause of action. Accordingly, Brookstone's motion shall be denied as to Boyd's retaliation claim relating to the alleged false evaluations.

2. Allegations of Manufactured Evidence.

The Court next addresses Boyd's retaliation claim based on Brookstone's alleged submission of manufactured evidence to the EEOC. In this regard, the Court notes that, to its knowledge, no other authority has addressed the issue of whether procuring false testimony and evidence, and proffering such in an EEOC proceeding, constitutes retaliatory conduct prohibited by § 704(a).3 Hence, the issue is one of first impression for this Court. In addressing this issue, the Court must keep in mind the remedial nature of Title VII, and apply § 704(a) in a manner consistent with the statute's purpose of "preventing employers from chilling employees' assertions of Title VII rights." Bilka v. Pepe's Inc., 601 F.Supp. 1254, 1259 (N.D.Ill. 1985).

At the outset, the Court recognizes that, although § 704(a) specifically states that an employer cannot retaliate against protected employees, the statute does not make all hostile acts wrongful. Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 274 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1543, 128 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994). Moreover, while the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the statutory language to mean that an employer cannot retaliate against an employee by making an "adverse employment decision," it has not defined what constitutes such an action. Wu, 996 F.2d at 273. Cases addressing the retaliation provision of Title VII have found that adverse employment decisions include failure to rehire, failure to promote, termination, differential compensation, or some other action which tangibly injures an employee who pursued a Title VII action.4 Other courts addressing the issue of retaliation have identified a broader range of acts as adverse, based on the scope of their consequences. In Collins v. State of Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 702 (7th Cir.1987), the Seventh Circuit held that an employer retaliated against its employee for her filing of an EEOC complaint when it transferred the employee to a lateral position which, although not involving any reduction in pay or...

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