State v. Byers
| Decision Date | 04 November 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-406,91-406 |
| Citation | 861 P.2d 860,261 Mont. 17 |
| Parties | The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Brett Donald BYERS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Alexander "Zander" Blewett (argued), Hoyt & Blewett, Great Falls, Wendy Holton, Helena, for defendant and appellant.
Marc Racicot, Atty. Gen., Barbara Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Helena, Mike Salvagni, Gallatin County Atty., Bozeman, for plaintiff and respondent.
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, entered May 1991. Brett Byers was tried and convicted by a Butte-Silver Bow jury of two counts of deliberate homicide. We affirm the District Court on all issues.
We consider the following issues on appeal:
1. Does Montana's mental disease or defect statute unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof on the issue of mental state from the prosecution to the defense?
2. Does Title 46, Chapter 14 of the MCA violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury?
3. Did the District Court err when it allowed the State's psychiatrist, William Stratford, to testify in spite of the fact that the State violated the discovery statutes and the trial judge's omnibus order, when it failed to disclose Dr. Stratford's diagnosis to the defense until he was in the midst of his testimony?
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial when the State's psychologist, John Van Hassel, testified, in response to questioning by the County Attorney, to statements made during the course of his examination of Brett Byers?
5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to present evidence that the length of the shotgun possessed by Brett Byers was in violation of federal regulations?
6. Did the District Court err when it denied Brett Byers' motion to dismiss the charges of deliberate homicide in favor of those of mitigated deliberate homicide?
7. Did the District Court err by instructing the jury that it could convict Brett Byers if it merely found that Byers was aware of his conduct or if he had the conscious object to engage in conduct of a particular nature?
8. Did the District Court err by instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to criminal activity?
9. Did the District Court err by refusing to include voluntariness in instructions 17 and 18?
10. Did the District Court make an improper comment on the evidence when it instructed the jury that consciousness of guilt could be inferred from flight?
11. Did the District Court err when it imposed a separate, consecutive sentence for weapon use even though the offense of weapon use was not charged?
12. Did the District Court err when it imposed a fifteen year sentence for weapon use when the statute provides for a maximum sentence of ten years?
13. Should Byers' conviction be reversed?
In the early morning of May 15, 1990, two Montana State University students, Brian Boeder and James Clevenger, were shot in a dormitory room on campus. Each student was shot twice and died before 4 a.m. that morning. Brett Byers, another Montana State University student, was subsequently arrested and charged with two counts of deliberate homicide for their deaths.
At arraignment, Byers gave notice he would introduce evidence of mental disease or defect at trial. The County Attorney requested Byers be sent to Warm Springs State Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which was done. Subsequently, Byers was also evaluated for the State by Dr. William Stratford, a psychiatrist. Byers himself obtained a lengthy evaluation by Dr. D.J. Plazak, a forensic psychiatrist.
The jury trial was moved from Gallatin County to Butte-Silver Bow and began January 2, 1991. The trial lasted nine days. At trial, Byers introduced evidence that he suffered from Borderline Personality Disorder and was in a derealized state at the time of the homicides and, therefore, could not have acted knowingly, purposely or voluntarily. Byers also presented evidence that he was under extreme emotional and mental stress at the time of the shootings. The State presented evidence that Byers acted knowingly and purposely when he shot Boeder and Clevenger.
After receiving instructions, the jury found Byers guilty of both counts of deliberate homicide. A sentencing hearing was held and on May 17, 1991, Byers was sentenced to two seventy-five year terms of incarceration for deliberate homicide and fifteen years for the use of a weapon--all terms to run consecutively. Byers was designated a dangerous offender. This appeal followed and oral argument was granted.
Does Montana's mental disease or defect statute unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof on the issue of mental state from the prosecution to the defense?
The statute at issue provides:
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the offense.
Section 46-14-102, MCA.
Byers contends that his defense of mental disease or defect is inextricably intertwined with proof of "knowingly" or "purposely" which are elements of the crime. Byers contends that when such a defense negates an element of a crime, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to disprove the defendant's contentions with regards to that defense. According to Byers, it is unconstitutional to require a defendant to prove that he did not have the requisite mental state because of his mental disease or defect. Such a requirement, argues Byers, shifts the burden of proof from the State to the defendant.
The State argues that the burden of proof is not shifted to the defense. The State contends that the Montana statute provides specifically that evidence relevant to the issue of mental disease or defect is admissible. The State argues that it must still prove the elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the State argues that Montana's statute does not provide an affirmative defense of mental disease or defect as Byers contends.
Byers' assumption that this statute shifts the burden to him to disprove an element of the crime is not correct. The statute enables a defendant to present evidence concerning his claim of mental disease or defect. It does not require the defendant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his disease absolutely negates the required state of mind.
To require such proof would be to determine that the presentation of evidence permitted to defendant by § 46-14-102, MCA, rises to the level of an affirmative defense. Evidence of mental disease or defect is not an affirmative defense. It is evidence of a condition that could have prevented the defendant from having the requisite state of mind. Whether defendant actually has a mental disease or defect and if so, whether that disease precludes the required mental state are questions of fact for the jury. We stated in State v. Watson (1984), 211 Mont. 401, 686 P.2d 879:
Read together, the jury instructions properly informed the jury on the law of mental disease or defect and the burden on the part of the State to establish the necessary criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether his mental disease affected the defendant's ability to act with purpose and knowledge was a question of fact for the jury. The jury answered that question by returning guilty verdicts on each count.
Watson, 211 Mont. at 415, 686 P.2d at 886.
It is unconstitutional for the State to be relieved of the burden of proof of an element of a criminal offense. In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368. The jury was properly instructed that the State had the burden to prove that Byers acted knowingly and purposely beyond a reasonable doubt.
Byers relies on Walker v. Endell (9th Cir.1987), 850 F.2d 470, for his argument that if a defense negates an element of the crime, rather than mitigates culpability once guilt is proven, it is unconstitutional to put the burden of proof on the defendant. While that is true, Walker distinguishes defenses which necessarily negate an element of the crime and those that can, but do not necessarily do so. Walker, 850 F.2d at 472, 473.
In Walker, one of three co-defendants in a double homicide claimed that once their original burglary plan had gone awry, he was afraid of his comrades because of their violent propensities. He argued that he was under duress to go along with the murders for fear that the other two would shoot him. According to Walker he could not have had the requisite intent to commit the murders because of this duress.
On appeal, the court upheld Walker's 89 year conviction for kidnapping, robbery, burglary, and theft, committed attendant to the homicides. The appeals court stated that duress did not negate intent. Walker, 850 F.2d at 473. Duress and intent are not mutually exclusive terms. Similarly, the existence of a mental disease or defect in a person does not necessarily preclude such a person from acting knowingly or purposely. State v. Korell (1984), 213 Mont. 316, 690 P.2d 992. It is up to the jury to determine the interaction of any mental disease or defect Byers may have and the required states of mind to commit the act in question.
Byers' reasoning is also faulty in his argument that the burden "shifts" to him by permitting him to introduce evidence that he did not act knowingly or purposely. When a burden "shifts" it goes from one party to another, from prosecution to defendant. But the prosecution here was not relieved of its burden. The jury was not instructed that Byers had any kind of burden at all. Byers chose to introduce evidence that he had a mental disease or defect and such condition prevented him from acting knowingly or purposely. By...
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