Murphy v. Rychlowski, 16-1662
| Decision Date | 18 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-1662,16-1662 |
| Citation | 868 F.3d 561 |
| Parties | Paul MURPHY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deborah RYCHLOWSKI, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Jeff Scott Olson, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Chad R. Gendreau, Anthony D. Russomanno, Colin Thomas Roth, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before Wood, Chief Judge, and Ripple and Williams, Circuit Judges.
Paul Murphy was convicted of rape by force in Los Angeles County, California 37 years ago. Because of that conviction, California law required Murphy, while he resided in the state, to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. Murphy moved to Wisconsin 21 years after he committed this offense and was arrested and convicted of aggravated assault. While he never registered with the State of Wisconsin as a sex offender, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (the "Department") determined that because of his California conviction, Murphy should register as a sex offender for the rest of his life once he was released from prison, in Wisconsin.
In 2012, Murphy challenged the Department's determination that he must register as a sex offender. After a short investigation, the Department concluded that he was not required to register in Wisconsin. It removed Murphy from the registry, and for almost two years, Murphy was free from the restrictions placed upon sex offenders and from the state's registration requirements. But, when Murphy brought this current suit, the Department determined that it had erred when it relieved Murphy of these obligations, and returned him to the registry in October 2014.
Murphy brings suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He argues that he was denied his constitutional right to due process before being placed on the registry by the Department. Because he did not receive prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, Murphy believes he was erroneously listed as a sex offender. We disagree, as the Supreme Court has been clear that the Constitution does not require that a state provide individuals with process before being placed on a sex offender registry if the decision to do so is based upon an individual's conviction. Because Murphy's registration status in California is dependent upon his conviction in that state, Murphy was not entitled to process before being placed on the Wisconsin registry and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
On August 28, 1979, Paul Murphy raped a 35-year-old woman during a robbery. He was 19 years old at the time. He was convicted of rape by force in January 1980, in Los Angeles County, California. As a result, he served a prison sentence and was released on September 7, 1986, remaining on parole until March 6, 1990. Because of this conviction and pursuant to California law, Murphy, for the remainder of his life, must register with California's Sex Offender Registry while residing in California.
In March of 2001—11 years after completing parole—Murphy moved to Wisconsin. Although required to register for the remainder of his life as a sex offender in California, Murphy did not register as a sex offender with the State of Wisconsin. Five months after his move, he was involved in a fight with two men in Madison, Wisconsin. Although the dispute was perhaps racially motivated, there was no sexual element to the incident. Murphy was convicted of battery in Wisconsin state court and was sentenced to a 15-year bifurcated sentence, which consisted of seven and a half years' confinement followed by an equivalent term of extended supervision.
While incarcerated, Murphy was evaluated by a clinical psychologist who concluded that despite Murphy's prior conviction, sex-offender treatment was not recommended. The Department also determined that Murphy would not be referred for any further evaluation as a sexually violent person because there was insufficient evidence to label him as such. Nor would a special bulletin be issued upon his release.
But before his release, the Department concluded that Murphy's 1980 California conviction, and the resulting lifetime registration requirement, required him to register as a sex offender while residing in Wisconsin. Murphy was released from the state's custody on February 17, 2009. Three days later, on February 20, 2009, he received a letter from the State of Wisconsin's Sex Offender Registration Program that informed him of the Department's decision. The letter noted that the failure to comply with the state's registration requirements would result in a Class H felony, punishable by either a $10,000 fine, up to six years in prison, or both. This was the first time that Murphy was made aware that his California conviction required registration in Wisconsin.
After receiving the letter, Murphy completed the registration form, dating it February 25, 2009. He noted on the bottom of the form that he was completing it "under duress." As a registered sex offender, Murphy's name, address, photo, and physical description were posted on a public and searchable website that the Department maintains.
In 2012, Murphy retained an attorney to challenge his inclusion on the Wisconsin Sex Offender Registry. That attorney reached out to the California Department of Justice for guidance regarding Murphy's reporting requirements under California law. In an email dated June 27, 2012, a Deputy Attorney General for the California Department of Justice stated, "[s]ince [Murphy] is living out of state, he is not currently required to register in California." After Murphy's counsel communicated this information to the Department, it relieved Murphy from Wisconsin's reporting requirements in early July 2012 and removed his information from its website.
Murphy was not registered as a sex offender in the State of Wisconsin and was free of the obligations associated with registration from July 2012 until October 2014. In October 2014, he filed this action. After receiving a records request from Murphy's attorney, a Department employee contacted a Deputy Attorney General in the California Attorney General's Office for further guidance regarding Murphy's reporting requirements under California law. The Deputy Attorney General informed the Department employee that since Murphy no longer lived in California, his information had been removed from the public California Megan's Law website, but he was still active in the California Sex and Arson Registry ("CSAR"), a law enforcement internet resource not available to the general public. So, even though he was not publically listed as a sex offender, Murphy's information remained (and continues to be) available to law enforcement in California. After learning this, the Department concluded that Murphy was still registered in California, and was, therefore, required to register while residing in Wisconsin.
In a letter dated October 22, 2014, defendant Deborah Rychlowski, an attorney for the Department, notified Murphy of the Department's decision. She provided Murphy with the basis of the Department's decision: that although his information was no longer published to the public, he remained active on the CSAR. Further, because under California law, Murphy would be placed on the public registry if he returned to California, the Department determined that he was required to register with the state pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1g)(f). Although Murphy disagreed with the Department's determination, he fulfilled his obligations and registered as a sex offender to avoid the penalties associated with the failure to do so.
Murphy filed suit on October 9, 2014. He contends that the Department violated his constitutional right to due process when it did not provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to placing him on the Sex Offender Registry. He named as a defendant Rychlowski,1 the attorney who authored the letter informing him of the Department's decision. Later, he filed a Second Amended Complaint adding two more Department employees as defendants—Gail Faust and Sue Klemann.
Murphy asserts that had he received process, he would never have been erroneously required to register. The district judge, however, granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe , 538 U.S. 1, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), dictated that Murphy was not entitled to process prior to his placement on the registry. While declining Murphy's invitation to answer the question of whether, as a matter of Wisconsin law, he was required to register as a sex offender in Wisconsin, the district judge granted the defendants summary judgment2 after concluding that Murphy received adequate post-deprivation process. Murphy now appeals.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo , viewing the record in the light most favorable to Murphy, the non-moving party, while also drawing all inferences in his favor. Sorensen v. WD-40 Co. , 792 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P . 56(a).
To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants: (1) acted under the color of state law; and (2) deprived him of a constitutional right. Colbert v. City of Chi. , 851 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, there is no dispute that the defendants were acting in their capacities as state employees when they determined that Murphy's registration status in California required him to register as a sex offender in Wisconsin.
The parties' dispute focuses on whether Murphy was deprived of a constitutional right. The Fourteenth Amendment...
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