State v. Struzyk, A13–0821.

• Citation: 869 N.W.2d 280
• Decision Date: 26 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. A13–0821.,A13–0821.
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Thomas Raymond STRUZYK, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

869 N.W.2d 280

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent

v.Thomas Raymond STRUZYK, Appellant.

No. A13–0821.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 26, 2015.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, John B. Galus, Assistant Attorney General, Karen Andrews, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN, and Philip Miller, Benton County Attorney, Karl Schmidt, Assistant Benton County Attorney, Foley, MN, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

Cort C. Holten, Jeffrey D. Bores, Gary K. Luloff, Chestnut Cambronne PA, Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association Legal Defense Fund.

OPINION

WRIGHT, Justice.

Following a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer, Minn.Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1 (2014), and gross-misdemeanor obstruction of legal process or arrest, Minn.Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2014). At issue is whether the intentional act of throwing or transferring bodily fluids at or onto the officer, in itself, is the crime of felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer (transfer of bodily fluids), in violation of section 609.2231, subdivision 1. We conclude that the plain and unambiguous language of section 609.2231, subdivision 1, requires that the State prove the elements of a physical assault in addition to proving that a defendant intentionally threw or transferred bodily fluids at or onto the officer. Because the district court erred by failing to include the element of “physical assault” in its instructions to the jury, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

On August 22, 2012, Benton County Sheriff's Deputy Brad Kadlec went to the home that appellant Thomas R. Struzyk shared with his mother. The purpose of the officer's visit was to execute a Stearns County arrest warrant alleging that Struzyk drove without proof of insurance. Struzyk's mother allowed the officer to come inside, then woke up her son. Standing outside Struzyk's bedroom, the officer identified himself as a law enforcement officer and told Struzyk of the warrant for Struzyk's arrest. In response to Struzyk's request to see the warrant, the officer explained that he did not have the warrant in his possession but that Struzyk could view an electronic copy on the computer in the officer's squad car. After Struzyk inquired about the nature of the charged offense, the officer mistakenly told Struzyk that it was for passing a dishonored check.

Struzyk repeatedly swore at the officer and refused to get out of bed, prompting the deputy to call for backup assistance. As the officer stepped aside to place the call, he noticed a gun case in Struzyk's bedroom. Struzyk slammed the bedroom door. Because the officer was concerned that Struzyk might possess a firearm, the officer reopened the bedroom door. Struzyk clenched his fists, assumed a “fighting stance,” and began to advance toward the officer. Retrieving his Taser, the officer ordered Struzyk to calm down. As Struzyk continued to advance, saying, “f* * *ing tase me,” the officer fired his Taser. Taser probes struck Struzyk in the chest and abdomen.

The officer testified that Struzyk removed one of the Taser probes and agreed to come with the officer. According to the officer, Struzyk subsequently lifted his shirt and said, “Look what you did to me.” Struzyk touched a small, bleeding chest wound with his index finger and smeared a small amount of blood from the wound onto the officer's uniform. As he did so, Struzyk said, “This is for you.” The officer testified that he also was wearing a bullet-proof vest and a T-shirt and that no blood touched his skin.

Struzyk testified that he never threatened the officer. According to Struzyk, as he was putting on his clothes, the officer became upset and tased him. After being tased, Struzyk testified, he pulled the probes out of his chest and tossed them to the officer. Struzyk admitted that, when he tossed the probes to the officer, blood could have transferred from the probes onto the officer's uniform. The officer subsequently arrested Struzyk.

The State charged Struzyk with three offenses related to the incident. Count one alleged felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer, a violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1, for intentionally smearing blood on the officer's uniform. Count two alleged gross-misdemeanor fourth-degree assault of a peace officer, a violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1, for physically assaulting the officer while he was effectuating a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law.¹ Count three alleged gross-misdemeanor obstructing legal process or arrest, a violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2).

Prior to trial, Struzyk moved the district court to instruct the jury on count one as follows:

A “physical assault” is the intentional infliction of bodily harm upon another or an intentional attempt to inflict bodily harm upon another. You may find that the act of throwing or transferring bodily fluid at or onto the officer in itself constituted a physical assault if you find that the manner in which the bodily fluids were thrown or transferred at or onto the officer meets the definition of “physical assault,” contained herein.

The State objected. In its view, because the act of intentionally throwing or otherwise transferring bodily fluids or feces at or onto an officer, in itself, is a felony assault under Minn.Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1, the act need not independently involve an intentional infliction of bodily harm on another or an intentional attempt to inflict bodily harm.

The district court denied Struzyk's requested instructions, citing State v. Kelley, 734 N.W.2d 689, 691–95 (Minn.App.2007). In Kelley, the court of appeals rejected an argument that a felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer, section 609.2231, subdivision 1, requires the State to prove both an independent assault and the intentional act of throwing or transferring bodily fluids or feces. Instead, the district court instructed the jury based on CRIMJIG 13.22, which required for a felony fourth-degree assault that a jury find only that the accused intentionally threw or transferred bodily fluids onto a peace officer. See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 13.22 (5th ed. Supp. 2012). Specifically, the district court instructed the jury that the elements of felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer are as follows:

First, [the officer] was a licensed Minnesota peace officer at the time of the assault.

Second, the Defendant threw or otherwise transferred bodily fluid or feces at or onto the officer.

Third, the Defendant did so intentionally.

Fourth, the assault occurred while [the officer] was effecting an arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law.

Fifth, the Defendant's act took place on or about August 22, 2012 in Benton County.

The jury found Struzyk guilty of count one, felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer, and count three, gross-misdemeanor obstruction of legal process or arrest. But the jury acquitted Struzyk of count two: gross-misdemeanor fourth-degree physical assault of a peace officer, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1, for allegedly inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm upon the officer while he was effectuating a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law. The district court stayed the imposition of Struzyk's sentence for the fourth-degree felony-assault conviction and placed Struzyk on probation for three years. The district court declined to adjudicate the gross-misdemeanor obstruction offense.

On appeal, Struzyk argued that the district court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury that the act of throwing or transferring bodily fluids at or onto the officer, in itself, is a physical assault only when the manner in which the bodily fluids were thrown or transferred at or onto the officer inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily harm on the officer. The court of appeals affirmed the district court, concluding that the transfer of blood onto an officer in and of itself constitutes fourth-degree felony assault. State v. Struzyk, No. A13–0821, 2014 WL 996522, at *2 (Minn.App. Mar. 17, 2014). In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals relied on Kelley, 734 N.W.2d at 695 (holding that “an intentional throwing or otherwise transferring of bodily fluids or feces at or onto an officer” is a fourth-degree assault without other assaultive behavior). We granted Struzyk's petition for further review.

II.

We first consider whether a “transfer of bodily fluids” is a physical assault for the purpose of fourth-degree felony assault of a peace officer (transfer of bodily fluids), Minn.Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1. Both parties argue that section 609.2231, subdivision 1, is unambiguous and that its meaning is plain. Yet each advances a different meaning. Struzyk contends that the language of subdivision 1 compels the conclusion that a physical assault is an element of the crime of felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer (transfer of bodily fluids). Therefore, under Struzyk's theory, the State must prove that a physical assault occurred. The State argues that the intentional transfer of bodily fluids is the physical assault.

A.

Whether the intentional transfer of bodily fluids is per se a physical assault under Minn.Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1, presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn.2013). The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature's intent. State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn.2013) (citing City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P'ship, 827 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn.2013) ). When interpreting a statute, we “give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.” Hayes, 826 N.W.2d at 803–04 (quotin...