City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P'ship, s. A11–0644

Decision Date13 March 2013
Docket NumberA11–1471.,Nos. A11–0644,s. A11–0644
PartiesCITY OF BRAINERD, Respondent (A11–0644), v. BRAINERD INVESTMENTS PARTNERSHIP, et al., Respondents Below (A11–0644), Roger Anda, et al., Appellants (A11–0644); Betty Anda, et al., Appellants (A11–1471), v. City of Brainerd, Minnesota, Respondent (A11–1471).
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

Under Minn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(f) (2012), the State of Minnesota can be an “owner” of real property for the purpose of petitioning a municipality for an improvement to a public road.

Gerald W. Von Korff, Rinke Noonan, Saint Cloud, Minnesota, for appellants.

George C. Hoff, Justin L. Templin, Hoff, Barry & Kozar, P.A., Eden Prairie, Minnesota, for respondent.

GILDEA, C.J., G. BARRY ANDERSON, PAUL H. ANDERSON, WRIGHT, JJ.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

This case involves a resolution by respondent City of Brainerd (City) to expand a road and pay for a portion of the improvement with special assessments. Appellants Roger and Elizabeth Anda, and James H. Martin, LLC (appellants), who own property adjacent to the road to be improved, challenge the legality of a petition for the improvement submitted by Central Lakes College (“CLC”). Appellants argue that because CLC is an instrumentality of the State of Minnesota, and the State cannot be bound by special assessments of its property, CLC is not an “owner” of property permitted to petition for an improvement under Minn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(f) (2012). The district court concluded that CLC is an “owner” and granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Invs. P'ship, 812 N.W.2d 885, 892 (Minn.App.2012). Because we conclude that the State is an “owner” of property under the plain language of the statute, we affirm.

This case arises from the City's decision to improve College Drive from a two-lane road with a turn lane into a four-lane road with a center median (“the project”). As the City reviewed funding options, it became clear that either city taxes or special assessments would be necessary to cover a portion of the costs of the project. The Brainerd City Council (City Council) indicated that the owners of the land adjacent to the project would benefit from the improvement to College Drive and, therefore, could be subject to special assessments. Because appellants' property runs adjacent to the project, it falls within the area the City Council proposed to assess.

Under Minnesota law, when a municipality adopts a resolution to fund an improvement by special assessments, the number of votes needed depends on the circumstances. SeeMinn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(f). If the owners of at least 35 percent of the property adjacent to the improvement submit a petition in favor of the improvement, a municipality can pass a special assessment resolution by a simple majority of the City Council (“35 percent owner rule”). Id. But absent such a petition, the vote required to pass a special assessment resolution is a four-fifths majority of the City Council. Id. In the present case, no petition was initially submitted to support the project and there were not enough votes on the City Council to pass a resolution with a four-fifths majority.

Because the City Council did not have a four-fifths majority, the City Engineer sent a letter to the Vice President of Administrative Services for CLC (“Vice President”) inquiring whether CLC intended to pay special assessments to fund the project. CLC owns over 39 percent of the property adjoining the project, but cannot be obligated to pay special assessments because CLC is an instrumentality of the State. SeeMinn.Stat. § 435.19, subd. 2 (2012). The Vice President responded, stating that CLC intended “to pay the special assessments,” but requested that the City “defer final action on the special assessments until [CLC had] the full financial picture of the impact of this project.”

On September 15, 2010, the City Engineer completed a feasibility report for the project. The estimated total cost of the project was $6.9 million, with an estimated cost to the City of $621,200 that was to be funded by special assessments. After the feasibility report was complete, the Vice President sent a memorandum to the City confirming CLC's support of the project. The Vice President stated that [t]he primary driver for this project is safety, and that is the reason why Central Lakes College is willing to pay assessments for this project.”

On November 15, 2010, CLC formally petitioned the City to reconstruct College Drive. CLC asserted that it is “the owner of not less than 35% in frontage of real property abutting” the project. The City Council validated the petition and, on December 6, 2010, resolved to pay for the project with special assessments by a 4–3 vote.

In response to the resolution, appellants initiated an injunction action. Appellants claimed that the petition was invalid and that the City Council did not pass the resolution by the required four-fifths majority.1 Specifically, appellants argued that, pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 435.19, subd. 2, “property owned by the State may not be assessed” because “any payment of costs for a project benefitting State property is merely discretionary.” Because state-owned property is not subject to special assessment absent the State's consent, appellants argued that the State, and therefore CLC, is not an “owner” of land permitted to petition under section 429.031, subdivision 1(f).2

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted the City's motion and dismissed appellants' claims. The court concluded that the plain and unambiguous meaning of the word “owner” in Minn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(f), includes the State. The court therefore determined that CLC is the owner of more than 35 percent of the real property abutting the project and upheld the City's adoption of the special assessment resolution.

The court of appeals affirmed. City of Brainerd, 812 N.W.2d at 892. Following the same reasoning as the district court, the court of appeals concluded that Minn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(f), is not ambiguous because the word “owner” must be “construed according to the rules of grammar and according to its common and approved usage. Id. at 891 (quoting Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2012)). Using the common definition of the word “owner”[o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and convey something”—the court of appeals held that the plain language of Minn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(f), includes the State as an “owner.” Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1214 (9th ed.2009)). We granted appellants' petition for review.

I.

The issue in this case is whether the State of Minnesota is an “owner” of real property for the purpose of petitioning for improvements pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(f). Appellants contend that the court of appeals improperly focused on “a single word, ‘owner,’ without considering [the] context and statutory purpose” of the 35 percent owner rule. To support their argument, appellants rely on three attorney general opinions, as well as other extrinsic sources, to illuminate what they contend is relevant legislative intent. The City argues that CLC is an “owner” under the plain language of the statute and, therefore, CLC can petition the municipality for an improvement funded by special assessments.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Clark v. Lindquist, 683 N.W.2d 784, 785 (Minn.2004). The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2012). When legislative intent is clear from the statute's plain and unambiguous language, we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to other principles of statutory interpretation. Id.

We turn first to the statute under which CLC submitted the petition for the improvement to College Drive—Minn. Stat. § 429.031 (2012). Under this section, before a municipality awards a contract for an improvement, the municipality must hold a public hearing. Minn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(a). Once the hearing is held, the number of votes needed to adopt a resolution for an improvement depends on whether property owners petitioned for the improvement. Id., subd. 1(f). If “the improvement has been petitioned for by the owners of not less than 35 percent in frontage of the real property abutting on the streets named in the petition as the location of the improvement,” then “a resolution ordering the improvement may be adopted” with a “vote of a majority of all members of the council.” Id. But in the absence of a petition, “the resolution may be adopted only by vote of four-fifths of all members of the council.” Id. When a petition is submitted, the municipality must determine whether the petition was signed by the required percentage of owners. Minn.Stat. § 429.035 (2012). If the municipality validates the petition, the improvement may go forward with a majority vote, Minn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(f), and the cost of the improvement “may be assessed upon property benefited by the improvement,” Minn.Stat. § 429.051 (2012).

The parties dispute whether CLC is an “owner” for the purpose of the petition process set forth in subdivision 1(f). The statute states that “owners” of real property abutting a project may petition for an improvement. Minn.Stat. § 429.031, subd. 1(f). The statute does not provide a definition for the word “owner,” but we are required to construe the word according to its “common and approved usage.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1). The common definition of the word “owner” is [o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and convey something.” Black's Law Dictionary 1214. Appellants do not dispute that CLC is the record owner of over 39 percent of the property abutting the College Drive project.

But appellants contend that CLC cannot be an...

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