State v. Oreiro
| Decision Date | 26 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 15084-1-II,15084-1-II |
| Citation | 871 P.2d 666,73 Wn.App. 868 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Ted Edward OREIRO, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Dana Michael Ryan, Court Appointed Counsel, Milton, for appellant.
James B. Roche, Deputy Pros. Atty., Tacoma, for respondent.
In late 1990, 16-year-old Ted Edward Oreiro was charged in Pierce County Juvenile Court with six felony counts. In early 1991, the Juvenile Court entered an order declining jurisdiction on the three most recent charges and dismissing the other three counts without prejudice.
On February 14, 1991, Oreiro was charged in Pierce County Superior Court with first degree burglary, second degree theft and second degree escape. The charges were based upon allegations that Oreiro: unlawfully entered a residence in November 1990; unlawfully obtained handguns and other property located in the residence; and escaped from the juvenile detention center in December 1990.
On March 29, 1991, the information was amended to add one count of first degree possession of stolen property, one count of first degree theft, and a second count of second degree escape. The added charges were based upon allegations that Oreiro: knowingly possessed a stolen automobile in October 1990; unlawfully obtained a television set and other property in October 1990; and escaped from the juvenile detention center in November 1990.
A Second Amended Information was filed on June 5, 1991 charging Oreiro with a total of five counts, including: first degree burglary (Count I); second degree theft (Count II); second degree escape (Counts III and IV); and first degree possession of stolen property (Count V).
In May of 1991, Oreiro moved to dismiss Counts IV, V and VI of the First Amended Information, referred to as Counts IV and V in the Second Amended Information, contending that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over those charges. Count V of the First Amended Information was dropped. Oreiro argued that the challenged charges were, in effect, the same charges that had been dismissed by the juvenile court, and that the State, by moving to dismiss those charges in juvenile court and then refiling them in Superior Oreiro was convicted on Counts I and II by a jury, on Count III by plea, and on Counts IV and V by stipulated facts. Oreiro appeals and asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.
Court, was attempting to circumvent the juvenile justice system. The trial judge denied Oreiro's motion
Oreiro contends the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss certain counts of the amended informations because those counts fell within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, not the Superior Court. He also contends that filing in adult court charges which had previously been dismissed in juvenile court violates his right to due process.
The Juvenile Justice Act, RCW 13.40, vests the juvenile court with jurisdiction over any individual who is under the chronological age of 18 years and who has not been previously transferred to adult court. See State v. Sharon, 100 Wash.2d 230, 231, 668 P.2d 584 (1983); see also, RCW 13.40.020(10). Prior to a juvenile court hearing on the merits of a case, the prosecutor, the juvenile, or the court may file a motion requesting the court to transfer the juvenile for adult criminal prosecution. See RCW 13.40.110(1). If such a motion is made, the matter is set for a hearing on the question of declining juvenile court jurisdiction. See RCW 13.40.110(1). In cases involving felony charges, the declination hearing must be held within 14 days after the information is filed, unless the time is extended by the court for good cause. JuCR 8.1(b). Once a juvenile offender has been transferred to adult court, that offender no longer meets the definition of a "juvenile" over which the juvenile court has jurisdiction. See Sharon, 100 Wash.2d at 231, 668 P.2d 584.
The law is settled as to future offenses. When the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, the youth comes under the permanent jurisdiction of the adult criminal system and is treated as an adult as to all future offenses. (Italics ours.) See Sharon, 100 Wash.2d at 231, 668 P.2d 584; State v. Mitchell, 32 Wash.App. 499, 500, 648 P.2d 456 (1982).
The question here is as to past offenses (using the date of declination as a point of reference). Here, the challenged counts were charged in juvenile court before the declination. The counts were based upon conduct alleged to have occurred before the declination, and they were not included in the State's declination motion. Thus, at issue is whether the order of dismissal following the declination order divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction over those charges.
Jurisdiction over an offense committed by a juvenile is determined at the time proceedings are initiated against the alleged offender. See e.g. State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 351-52, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984). Here, the juvenile court initially had jurisdiction over the challenged charges because those charges were originally filed in juvenile court. However, after the declination on the more recent charges, the juvenile court divested itself of jurisdiction over the challenged charges by dismissing them, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was without prejudice. The filing of these charges in adult court thus constitutes a new filing. Accordingly, we are satisfied that absent a showing of misconduct by the prosecutor, the post-declination dismissal of charges in juvenile court divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction over the dismissed charges. We reserve for another case the question of what constitutes such prosecutorial misconduct, however, we are satisfied there is no showing of prosecutorial misconduct in this case.
Finally, Oreiro contends that allowing the State to file in adult court...
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