State v. Watkins

Decision Date16 August 2018
Docket NumberNO. 94973-5,94973-5
Citation423 P.3d 830
Parties STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Tyler William WATKINS
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Travis Stearns, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 610, Seattle, WA 98101-3647, for Appellant.

Mary Kathleen Webber, Snohomish County Prosecutors Office, MSC 504, 3000 Rockefeller Avenue, Everett, WA 98201-4061, for Respondent.

Vanessa Torres Hernandez, ACLU of Washington, 901 5th Avenue, Suite 630, Seattle, WA 98164-2086, for Amicus Curiae ACLU.

Laurel Anne Jones Simonsen, Center For Children & Youth Justice, 615 2nd Avenue, Suite 275, Seattle, WA 98104-2245, for Amicus Curiae Center for Children and Youth Justice.

Nicholas Brian Allen, Attorney at Law, 101 Yesler Way, Suite 300, Seattle, WA 98104-2528, for Amicus Curiae Columbia Legal Services.

Nikkita Oliver, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 20796, Seattle, WA 98102-1796, Aimee Marie Sutton, The Marshall Defense Firm, 1001 4th Avenue, Suite 4400, Seattle, WA 98154-1192, for Community Passageways, Creative Justice, Glover EmpowerMentoring.

Marsha L. Levick, Juvenile Law Center, 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 400, 4th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19107, for Amicus Curiae Juvenile Law Center.

George Yeannakis, Office of Public Defense, P.O. Box 40957, Olympia, WA 98504-0957, Sara Anne Zier, TeamChild, 715 Tacoma Avenue S, Tacoma, WA 98402-2206, for Amicus Curiae TeamChild.

Thomas E. Weaver, Jr., Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 1056, Bremerton, WA 98337-0221, for Amicus Curiae Washington Assoc. of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

James Morrissey Whisman, King County Prosecutor's Office, 516 3rd Avenue, W554 King County Courthouse, Seattle, WA 98104-2385, for Amicus Curiae Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.

Hillary Ann Behrman, The Washington Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Place South, #610, Seattle, WA 98104-2626, for Amicus Curiae Washington Defender Association.

FAIRHURST, C.J.

¶ 1 Sixteen year old Tyler William Watkins was charged with first degree burglary in adult court pursuant to former ROW 13.04.030(1) (2009), amended by Laws of 2018, chapter 162, section 1.1 Former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009), part of the Basic Juvenile Court Act (BJCA), provided that juvenile courts must automatically decline jurisdiction over 16 and 17 year olds charged with enumerated offenses. Watkins argues that his due process rights were violated because the automatic decline component of former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009) applied without him first having a hearing on whether the juvenile court should retain jurisdiction. As we previously did in In re Boot, 130 Wash.2d 553, 925 P.2d 964 (1996) (upholding former RCW 13.04.030(1) (1994) against substantive and procedural due process challenges), we again hold that automatic decline does not violate due process because juveniles do not have a constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court. We affirm the conviction.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Watkins was charged with one count of first degree burglary based on information that he and his younger brother broke into the victim's home and stole nine firearms when the victim was gone. Watkins' fingerprints matched those found at the scene of the crime, and a search of Watkins' home revealed three of the nine firearms that were stolen in the burglary.

¶ 3 Watkins was 16 years old at the time he was charged and he had a prior felony conviction for theft of a firearm. The information was filed in superior court pursuant to former RCW 13.04.030(l)(e)(v)(D) (2009), which required the juvenile court to automatically decline jurisdiction over a 16 or 17 year old with a prior felony conviction who was subsequently charged with first degree burglary. Before trial, Watkins filed a motion objecting to automatic transfer of his case to superior court, arguing that automatic decline violates federal due process; the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution (prohibiting cruel punishment). The trial court denied the motion on the basis that it was bound by this court's determination in Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 557-58, 925 P.2d 964.

¶ 4 Watkins stipulated to a bench trial on agreed documentary evidence and was found guilty as charged. Accepting the parties' recommendation, the trial court sentenced Watkins to 16 months in prison and 18 months on community supervision. Watkins appealed, and we granted direct review.

II. ISSUES

A. Does a juvenile court's automatic declination of jurisdiction under former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009) violate a juvenile defendant's procedural or substantive due process rights?

B. Has Boot's substantive due process holding been abrogated by subsequent decisions of this court or the United States Supreme Court?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. State v. Jorgenson, 179 Wash.2d 145, 150, 312 P.3d 960 (2013). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Leatherman, 100 Wash. App. 318, 321, 997 P.2d 929 (2000). If possible, the court will construe a statute so as to render it constitutional. Jorgenson, 179 Wash.2d at 150, 312 P.3d 960.

IV. ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Watkins contends that former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009) is unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.2 Specifically, Watkins argues that automatic decline violates procedural due process by depriving him of his right to a hearing3 in juvenile court.4 He also argues that automatic decline violates substantive due process by depriving him of his right to be punished in accordance with his level of culpability. Watkins and amici (Juvenile Law Center, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, and others) make numerous policy arguments in favor of prosecuting all juveniles in juvenile Court5 but fail to show that a Kent hearing in juvenile court is required by the United States Constitution under this particular statutory scheme. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). The Washington State Legislature created our juvenile court system and therefore has the power to define its jurisdiction. RCW 13.04.021. There is no constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court and, hence, no constitutional right to a Kent hearing before being tried in adult court. Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 569-72, 925 P.2d 964.

¶ 7 Watkins also contends that this court's decision in Boot, which upheld the constitutionality of former RCW 13.04.030(1) (1994) against due process, Eighth Amendment, and equal protection challenges, has been abrogated by Eighth Amendment decisions of both this court and the United States Supreme Court. However, Boot's reasoning is sound, and its due process holdings have not been undermined by subsequent Eighth Amendment decisions. Automatic decline does not implicate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because adult courts have discretion to depart from standard sentence ranges to avoid excessive punishment of juveniles. See State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wash.2d 1, 21, 391 P.3d 409 (2017).6

A. Former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009) does not deprive Watkins of any due process right because there is no constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court

¶ 8 Watkins contends that due process requires a Kent hearing before a juvenile court may decline jurisdiction over a juvenile charged with one of the offenses enumerated in former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009). Juveniles charged with crimes have a right to procedural due process. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967). "[T]he Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985). Due process " ‘is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’ " Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230 (1961) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L. Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). Compliance with procedural due process requires the court to identify the private interest affected by the official action, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the probable value of additional safeguards, and the State's interests. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).

¶ 9 " [T]here is no constitutional right to be tried in a juvenile court.’ " Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 571, 925 P.2d 964 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dixon, 114 Wash.2d 857, 860, 792 P.2d 137 (1990) ); State v. Maynard, 183 Wash.2d 253, 259, 351 P.3d 159 (2015) ; In re Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 152 Wash.2d 772, 783 n.8, 100 P.3d 279 (2004) ; State v. Oreiro, 73 Wash. App. 868, 873, 871 P.2d 666 (1994) ; State v. Sandomingo, 39 Wash. App. 709, 711, 695 P.2d 592 (1985) ; State v. Sharon, 33 Wash. App. 491, 494, 655 P.2d 1193 (1982)aff'd, 100 Wash.2d 230, 668 P.2d 584 (1983) ; State v. Hodges, 28 Wash. App. 902, 904, 626 P.2d 1025 (1981). And "the right [to a Kent hearing] attaches only if a court is given statutory discretion to assign juvenile or adult court jurisdiction." State v. Salavea, 151 Wash.2d 133, 140, 86 P.3d 125 (2004) ; Boot, 130 Wash.2d at 570, 925 P.2d 964.

¶ 10 The Washington State Legislature created the juvenile court system by enacting the BJCA. RCW 13.04.021. The BJCA provides that the juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to juvenile offenses—but requires the juvenile court to automatically decline...

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