Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-5945,95-5945
• Citation: 88 F.3d 410
• Parties: 71 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 300, 68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,178, 110 Ed. Law Rep. 981 Andrea E. BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARDING ACADEMY OF MEMPHIS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 410

88 F.3d 410

71 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 300,

68 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,178, 110 Ed. Law Rep. 981

Andrea E. BOYD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARDING ACADEMY OF MEMPHIS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-5945.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued June 11, 1996.

Decided July 9, 1996.

Richard L. Rikard (argued and briefed), Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jeff Weintraub (argued), Weintraub, Robinson, Weintraub, Stock, Bennett, Ettinghoff & Grisham, Memphis, TN, Richard M. Murrell (briefed), Memphis, TN, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: KENNEDY, JONES, and CONTIE, Circuit Judges.

CONTIE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Andrea E. Boyd appeals the district court's judgment for defendant-appellee Harding Academy of Memphis, Inc. ("Harding") in this action alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. On appeal, the issue is whether the district court erred in holding that defendant's articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was not a pretext for illegal discrimination. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Defendant Harding is a religious school affiliated with the Church of Christ and located in Memphis, Tennessee. It is made up of eight campuses and staffed by approximately 130 teachers. All faculty members are required to be Christians, and a preference is given to Church of Christ members. Dr. Harold Bowie serves as its President and CEO. One of the eight campuses contains the preschool facility known as Little Harding, and Brenda Rubio serves as Little Harding's director. Rubio's duties as director include taking applications, interviewing applicants, and recommending those who are to be hired or terminated. However, Dr. Bowie is the only person with the authority to terminate the employment of teachers at Harding.

Plaintiff Boyd was hired for a preschool teaching position at Little Harding in January 1992. Plaintiff knew that Harding was a church-related school and indicated on her application for employment that she had a Christian background and believed in God. The faculty handbook given to plaintiff after she was hired to work at Harding read: "Christian character, as well as professional ability, is the basis for hiring teachers at Harding Academy. Each teacher at Harding is expected in all actions to be a Christian example for the students...." Plaintiff was not married at any time during her employment by Harding, and she testified at trial that she was never told that she would be terminated if she engaged in sex outside of marriage. She further testified that she did not think that sex outside of marriage was against the tenets of all faiths, but she could not name a religious entity that teaches that sexual activity among unmarried persons is appropriate.

In May 1992, plaintiff had a miscarriage with some minor complications. She told Rubio about her condition, and pursuant to her doctor's request, she asked Rubio for a few days off. Rubio agreed and told plaintiff that she would pray for her. Rubio testified that she thought to herself at the time that if Boyd had been pregnant, she would have had to terminate her. Rubio did not report this incident to Dr. Bowie.

In February 1993, Sharon Cooper, Rubio's assistant, told her that plaintiff Boyd might be pregnant. Rubio reported this information to Pat Bowie, her superior and Dr. Bowie's wife. After checking with Dr. Bowie, Ms. Bowie told Rubio to determine whether Boyd was pregnant in a direct conversation with her and to terminate her if she was pregnant because it would establish that she had engaged in extramarital sexual intercourse. ¹

On February 10, 1993, Rubio called Boyd into her office for a meeting. Cooper was also present and was taking notes. At the meeting, Rubio asked Boyd if she was pregnant, and Boyd answered affirmatively. Rubio then told plaintiff that because she was pregnant and unwed, ² she set a bad example for the students and parents and would therefore have to be terminated. However, Rubio informed plaintiff that if she were to marry the father of the child, she would be eligible for re-employment. During the course of the meeting, Rubio also told plaintiff Boyd about Toni Climer, another teacher at Little Harding who had become pregnant while unwed. Climer was terminated, but was rehired when she married the father of her child.

At trial, Dr. Bowie described several occasions during his tenure when he terminated employees for violating Harding's prohibition against sex outside of marriage. The district court summarized Bowie's testimony on this subject as follows:

In 1961, James Rogers was terminated for living with a woman who was not his wife. Approximately ten (10) years ago, another male, Bob Alley, who was then the principal or academic dean and who had worked at Harding Academy approximately twenty (20) years, was terminated for sexual immorality. In terms of female employees terminated for engaging in sex outside of marriage, Dr. Bowie testified that Betty Madewell Dover, an elementary school teacher, was involved with a man to whom she was not married and was terminated based on this conduct. (No pregnancy resulted in Ms. Dover's case.) Another female, Wanda Watson, was also terminated based on her involvement in an extramarital relationship, in which no pregnancy resulted.

There were no situations described at trial in which Dr. Bowie was aware of an employee's sexual activity outside of marriage and failed to take action. Finally, defendant presented evidence at trial to show that at least six married women who became pregnant while working at Harding remained employed there during and after their pregnancies.

On February 16, 1993, plaintiff Boyd filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that defendant's termination of her was on the basis of her pregnancy and constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. On June 30, 1993, the EEOC completed its investigation and issued a right to sue letter. On September 29, 1993, plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court.

On February 28, 1994, defendant Harding filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, which the district court denied. On August 25 and 26, 1994, the district court held a non-jury trial, and on May 31, 1995, it entered judgment for defendant. This timely appeal followed.

II.

Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In 1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), which amended Title VII to specify that sex discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 89, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2896, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). By incorporating the PDA into Title VII, Congress manifested its belief that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes discrimination based upon sex. Therefore, it is now well settled that a claim of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy must be analyzed in the same manner as any other sex discrimination claim brought pursuant to Title VII. EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 947 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817, 113 S.Ct. 60, 121 L.Ed.2d 28 (1992); Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc., 780 F.2d 987, 989 (11th Cir.1986).

A plaintiff claiming disparate treatment under Title VII must first establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In order to make out a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, a plaintiff must initially show: (1) that she was pregnant; (2) that she was qualified for her job; (3) that she was subjected to an adverse employment decision; and (4) that there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment decision. See LaFleur v. Westridge Consultants, Inc., 844 F.Supp. 318, 324 (E.D.Tex.1994). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the McDonnell Douglas presumption of intentional discrimination "drops out of the picture." St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The employee must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her. She may satisfy this burden by showing that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id.

Title VII does provide for certain religious exemptions. It does not apply "to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected...