Chilingirian v. Boris

• Decision Date: 05 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-1443,88-1443
• Parties: Jack C. CHILINGIRIAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph F. BORIS, Jr., Janice A.B. Wilson, Leo R. Sadowski, Edmund T. Adamczyk, and City of Fraser, a Municipal Corporation, Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 200

882 F.2d 200

Jack C. CHILINGIRIAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph F. BORIS, Jr., Janice A.B. Wilson, Leo R. Sadowski, Edmund T. Adamczyk, and City of Fraser, a

Municipal Corporation, Jointly and

Severally, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 88-1443.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 10, 1989.

Decided May 5, 1989.

Kenneth H. Karam (argued), St. Clair Shores, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael J. Barton, Christine D. Oldani (argued), Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk & Pedersen, Detroit, Mich., Paul J. O'Reilly, O'Reilly, Rancilio, Nitz, Andrews & Turnbull, Sterling Heights, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Before JONES, WELLFORD, and GUY, Circuit Judges.

RALPH B. GUY, JR. Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Jack C. Chilingirian, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants Mayor Joseph F. Boris, Jr.; city council members Janice A.B. Wilson, Leo R. Sadowski, and Edmund T. Adamczyk; and the City of Fraser (the city) in his civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. Chilingirian's suit challenges his termination as a city attorney for Fraser, Michigan. He first claims that the district court erred in concluding that he lacked a property interest in continued employment as city attorney. Additionally, he claims that statements made by a city council member during the meeting at which he was terminated in absentia so stigmatized his name and reputation as to deprive him of a liberty interest. Finally, Chilingirian challenges the procedural sufficiency of a name-clearing hearing granted him by the city. Finding Chilingirian's claims to be without merit, we affirm the district court's ruling.

The undisputed facts of this case reveal that on December 8, 1983, the city council for Fraser, Michigan, appointed the law firm of Berschback, Kerwin, Locicero, Brennan & Chilingirian as the city's legal counsel. Apparently, Chilingirian acted as the city attorney while two of his colleagues acted as the city's labor attorney and district attorney. At a subsequent city council meeting, held on July 23, 1987, a resolution was passed dismissing Chilingirian from all city business effective August 1, 1987. ¹ Chilingirian was not present at that meeting. He contends that his termination was prompted by his investigation into alleged improprieties and irregularities involved in a 1983 loan agreement between the city and the Michigan Department of Transportation. ² In her motion to oust Chilingirian, defendant Councilwoman Wilson indicated, among other things, that Chilingirian elicited press publicity too often, lacked respect for proper courtroom decorum, was not well respected by other attorneys or judges, lacked an understanding of his role as city counsel, and was earning substantial sums at first class rates for less than first class legal services. Other council members present at the meeting ardently refuted each of Wilson's contentions and, in opposition to Chilingirian's ouster, cited his numerous attributes and accomplishments. Accounts of plaintiff's termination, including the previous remarks of council members, appeared in the newspaper, on the radio, and on television. A month after Chilingirian's termination, Mr. Berschback tendered a letter of resignation to the city on behalf of his firm.

On July 30 and again on October 8, 1987, Chilingirian wrote to the Fraser City Council seeking a hearing on the charges against him. On November 17, 1987, through its new attorney, Paul O'Reilly, the city granted Chilingirian's request for a "name-clearing hearing." Chilingirian then submitted a set of eleven detailed questions that he insisted be asked of city council members in connection with his name-clearing hearing. ³ He also sought a public expression of regret for any impugnity to his reputation attributable to the city and public verification that his termination was unrelated to his professional competence or integrity. The city's response indicated that Chilingirian would be permitted to address the purportedly stigmatizing statements made at the July 23, 1987, council meeting and that, although council members could respond to those statements if they so chose, they would not be subjected to interrogation. Accordingly, at the December 10, 1987, hearing, O'Reilly advised city council members against engaging in debate or dialogue during the hearing. He indicated that council members could, if desired, respond to any specific questions raised during the hearing or those previously submitted by Chilingirian. O'Reilly recommended that no other action be taken by council at the conclusion of the hearing. Both Chilingirian and his counsel attended and spoke at the hearing. Chilingirian's counsel stated that the defendants' failure to respond to the eleven submitted questions indicated that Chilingirian was terminated without cause. He noted that Chilingirian had won for the city fifty-one of fifty-three court-considered cases and that he had even taken one city appeal at his own expense. Plaintiff's counsel also noted that less than half of a recent $14,000 legal bill submitted to the city was attributed to plaintiff's services. No one else spoke on behalf of plaintiff at the hearing, and the council did not respond to any questions.

On December 17, 1987, as a consequence of his termination, Chilingirian filed a seven-count complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. He claimed that he was denied due process in connection with the defendants' deprivation of his protected liberty and property interests (counts one and two). He also alleged equal protection violations (count three), conspiracy to violate civil rights (count four), neglect or refusal to prevent a conspiracy to violate his civil rights (count five), interference with contractual relationships (count six), and refusal to conduct a name-clearing hearing consistent with due process requirements (count seven).

Shortly after filing his complaint, Chilingirian filed various discovery documents and requests. Following the defendants' answer to the complaint and while discovery requests were pending, Chilingirian filed a partial summary judgment motion, alleging that the December 10, 1987, name-clearing hearing was procedurally inadequate. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all counts. At a hearing on March 24, 1988, the district court denied Chilingirian's motion and granted the defendants' motion as to the due process liberty and property counts, as well as the equal protection and name-clearing counts. This ruling effectively disposed of the two conspiracy related counts. Finally, the district court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the interference with contractual relations claim and dismissed it without prejudice. After the district court dismissed his complaint, Chilingirian filed this appeal.

I.

In assessing the propriety of the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants, ⁴ we first note that the purpose of summary judgment as a procedural device is to allow a court to decide whether any material issues of fact are actually in dispute. Kelley v. Carr, 567 F.Supp. 831 835 (W.D.Mich.1983). It does not permit a court to resolve disputed factual issues. Id. Moreover:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.... The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case....

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (emphasis added).

Chilingirian contends that summary judgment was inappropriate and premature because no discovery occurred prior to the judgment and because his allegations of conspiracy involved questions of motive and intent. We, like the district court, however, are persuaded that the facts here are largely undisputed. Hence, although no discovery had occurred by the time of the district court ruling, there is no evidence that discovery would have disclosed disputed material facts in support of Chilingirian's claim. ⁵ Moreover, it was Chilingirian, himself, who initiated the summary judgment proceedings. Accordingly, the district court did not err in ruling on the parties' motions for summary judgment before discovery was complete. Chilingirian's conspiracy claim is addressed below.

II.

A federal cause of action is created by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for the deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests. Ramsey v. Board of Educ., 844 F.2d 1268, 1271 (6th Cir.1988). Chilingirian first claims that the district court erred in concluding that he lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment as the city attorney. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the Supreme Court indicated that procedural due process requirements apply to deprivation of liberty and property interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment and that, when those interests are implicated, "the right to some kind of hearing is paramount." Id. at 569-70, 92 S.Ct. at 2705 (footnote omitted). Here, the district court correctly recognized that property interests are created and defined by sources independent of the Constitution such as state law. Id. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709; see also Ramsey, 844 F.2d at 1271. Moreover, a public employee does not have a property interest in continued employment when his position is held at the will and pleasure of his superiors and when he has not been promised that he will only be terminated for good cause. See generally Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341...