Neal v. Treglia

• Citation: 2019 Ohio 3609,144 N.E.3d 1045
• Decision Date: 09 September 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 1-18-70,1-18-70
• Parties: Jack L. NEAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Matthew B. TREGLIA, Sheriff, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)

144 N.E.3d 1045

2019 Ohio 3609

Jack L. NEAL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Matthew B. TREGLIA, Sheriff, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

NO. 1-18-70

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Allen County.

Date of Decision: September 9, 2019

William J. O'Malley, Columbus, for Appellant

Angelica M. Jarmusz, Columbus, for Appellee, Matthew B. Treglia

ZIMMERMAN, P.J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Jack L. Neal ("Neal"), appeals the November 28, 2018 judgment entry of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his complaint against defendant-appellee, Matthew B. Treglia ("Treglia"), Allen County Sheriff, and Dean McCombs ("McCombs"), special deputy for the Allen County Sheriff's Office ("ACSO") and Lima Memorial Hospital's ("LMH") security supervisor. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} This case stems from the March 20, 2017 termination of Neal's special-deputy appointment from the ACSO. Neal was appointed as a special deputy for the ACSO in 1987, where he volunteered with the Allen County Sheriff's Office's Mounted Posse Unit ("ACSOMPU").

{¶3} Under an agreement between the ACSO and LMH, the ACSO provided special deputies to serve as security officers at LMH's facility. Pertinent to the appeal, under that agreement Neal was employed at LMH as a security officer. However, on March 20, 2018, Treglia terminated Neal's special-deputy appointment (by letter) after Treglia discovered that Neal had violated an ACSO's policy relating to his appointment. After terminating Neal's appointment, Treglia sent notice to Neal's security supervisor at LMH (McCombs).¹

Neal was terminated later from his employment at LMH on March 23, 2017.

{¶4} On July 10, 2017, Neal filed a complaint in the trial court against Treglia and McCombs, in their personal and professional capacities.² (Doc No. 1). Neal's complaint alleged claims for tortious interference with a business relationship and for deprivation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (the "1983 claim") against both Treglia and McCombs. (Id. ) Neal alleged an additional claim against McCombs for defamation. (Id. )

{¶5} Treglia filed an answer on August 10, 2017. (Doc. No. 4). On September 13, 2017, McCombs filed an answer, a cross-claim against Treglia, and a third-party complaint against the Allen County Board of Commissioners ("Commissioners"), Allen County Prosecutor, Juergen A. Waldick ("Waldick"), and the County Risk Sharing Authority ("CORSA"). (Doc. Nos. 8, 9).

{¶6} On September 29, 2017, CORSA filed an answer and counterclaim against McCombs. (Doc. No. 14). Treglia filed an answer on October 10, 2017 to McCombs's cross-claim, and the Commissioners and Waldick filed their answer to McCombs's third-party complaint. (Doc. Nos. 15, 16). McCombs filed an answer to CORSA's counterclaim on October 19, 2017. (Doc. No. 17).

{¶7} On May 11, 2018, CORSA filed a motion for summary judgment as to McCombs's third-party complaint. (Doc. No. 39). McCombs filed a memorandum in opposition to CORSA's motion for summary judgment on June 4, 2018. (Doc. No. 48). CORSA filed a response to McCombs's memorandum in opposition to its motion for summary judgment on June 18, 2018. (Doc. No. 50). On June 26, 2018, the trial court denied CORSA's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 53). CORSA, then, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying summary judgment on July 26, 2018. (Doc. No. 62). McCombs filed a memorandum in opposition to CORSA's reply motion for reconsideration. (Doc. Nos. 63, 64, 65). The trial court on August 28, 2018 denied CORSA's motion for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 66).

{¶8} McCombs filed a motion for summary judgment as to Neal's 1983, tortious-interference-with-a-business-relationship, and defamation claims. (Doc. No. 44). On May 14, 2018, the Commissioners, Treglia, and Waldick filed a motion for summary judgment as to Neal's claims and McCombs's cross-claims. (Doc. No. 45). On June 5, 2018, McCombs filed a memorandum in opposition to the summary-judgment motion filed by the Commissioners, Treglia, and Waldick. (Doc. No. 49). On June 19, 2018, the Commissioners, Treglia, and Waldick filed their response to McCombs's memorandum in opposition to their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 52). Neal filed a memorandum in opposition to Treglia's and McCombs's motion for summary judgment on June 28, 2018. (Doc. No. 54). McCombs and Treglia filed their responses on July 11, 2018 to Neal's memorandum in opposition to their motions for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 56, 57). On July 17, 2018, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of McCombs as to Neal's 1983 claim, but denied McCombs's motion for summary judgment as to Neal's defamation and tortious-interference-with-a-business-relationship claims. (Doc. No. 58). The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of Treglia as to Neal's 1983 and tortious-interference-with-a-business-relationship claims. (Doc. No. 59). Further, the trial court granted summary judgment as to McCombs's cross-claims against the Commissioners, Treglia, and Waldick. (Id. ). On October 29, 2018, McCombs voluntarily dismissed his third-party complaint against CORSA. (See Doc. No. 68). On November 28, 2018, Neal and McCombs reached a settlement as to Neal's remaining claims against McCombs, and Neal dismissed his claims against McCombs. (Doc. No. 87).

{¶9}Neal filed his notice of appeal on December 19, 2018. (Doc. No. 88). He raises two assignments of error for our review, which we will address together, out of order.

Assignment of Error No. II

The Trial Court erred when it granted Summary Judgment to Defendant Treglia on the Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Assignment of Error No. I

The Trial Court erred when it granted Summary Judgment to Defendant Treglia on the Plaintiff's claim of tortious interference with a business relationship.

{¶10} In his assignments of error, Neal argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Treglia. Specifically, and as it relates to his second assignment of error, Neal argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to his 1983 claim regarding whether Neal has a property interest or protected-liberty interest in his special-deputy appointment under the Due Process Clause as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment. In his first assignment of error, Neal argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Treglia as to his tortious-interference-with-a-business-relationship claim because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Neal and LMH had a business relationship and whether Treglia intentionally interfered with that relationship by notifying LMH of the termination of Neal's special-deputy appointment.

Standard of Review

{¶11} We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Doe v. Shaffer , 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 738 N.E.2d 1243 (2000). "De novo review is independent and without deference to the trial court's determination." ISHA, Inc. v. Risser , 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-12-47, 2013-Ohio-2149, 2013 WL 2316248, ¶ 25, citing Costner Consulting Co. v. U.S. Bancorp , 195 Ohio App.3d 477, 2011-Ohio-3822, 960 N.E.2d 1005, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion when viewing the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, and the conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party. Civ.R. 56(C) ; State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 631 N.E.2d 150 (1994).

{¶12} "The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of producing some evidence which demonstrates the lack of a genuine issue of material fact." Carnes v. Siferd , 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-88, 2011-Ohio-4467, 2011 WL 3890520, ¶ 13, citing Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). "In doing so, the moving party is not required to produce any affirmative evidence, but must identify those portions of the record which affirmatively support his argument." Id. , citing Dresher at 292, 662 N.E.2d 264. "The nonmoving party must then rebut with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine triable issue; he may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings." Id. , citing Dresher at 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 and Civ.R. 56(E).

{¶13} Material facts are those facts "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Turner v. Turner , 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340, 617 N.E.2d 1123 (1993) citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Whether a genuine issue exists is answered by the following inquiry: Does the evidence present ‘a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury’ or is it ‘so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law[?]’ " Id. , citing Anderson at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

{¶14} Summary judgment should be granted with caution, resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Perez v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. , 35 Ohio St.3d 215, 217, 520 N.E.2d 198 (1988). "The purpose of summary judgment is not to try issues of fact, but is rather to determine whether triable issues of fact exist." Lakota Loc. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Brickner , 108 Ohio App.3d 637, 643, 671 N.E.2d 578 (6th Dist.1996). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court is not permitted to weigh evidence or chose among reasonable inferences; rather, the court must evaluate evidence, taking all permissible inferences and resolving questions of credibility in favor of the nonmoving party. Buck v. Melco., Inc. , 3d Dist. Paulding, 185 Ohio App.3d 281, 2009-Ohio-6872, 923 N.E.2d 1191, ¶ 10, citing Jacobs v. Racevskis , 105 Ohio App.3d 1, 7, 663 N.E.2d 653 (2d Dist.1995).

The 1983 Claim

{¶15} First, we address Neal's argument that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Treglia as to Neal's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Neal argues that there...