Weber Showcase & Fixture Co. v. Waugh, 6817.
| Court | United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Western District of Washington) |
| Citation | 42 F.2d 515 |
| Decision Date | 16 June 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 6817.,6817. |
| Parties | WEBER SHOWCASE & FIXTURE CO., Inc., v. WAUGH. |
42 F.2d 515 (1930)
WEBER SHOWCASE & FIXTURE CO., Inc.,
v.
WAUGH.
No. 6817.
District Court, W. D. Washington, S. D.
June 16, 1930
John C. Hogan, of Aberdeen, Wash., Roberts, Skeel & Holman, of Seattle, Wash., and Elwood Hutcheson, of Yakima, Wash., for defendant.
NETERER, District Judge (after stating the facts as above).
The plaintiff claims:
A. That the order of the District Court for the Northern District of California adjudging that the plaintiff retain title to the fixtures and have the right of possession, and defendant having refused to comply with the order of the court, the terms of the conditional sales contract are enforceable, such order not being reversed or annulled, is binding on the defendant (34 C. J. 511), and which he may not collaterally attack (34 C. J. 514). The court had neither jurisdiction of the parties in interest or the subject-matter, the fixtures in Washington. Its jurisdiction is limited and is coextensive with the boundaries of the respective districts. No extraterritorial jurisdiction exists and cannot affect title to property in other jurisdictions. Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322-328, 15 L. Ed. 164; Great Western v. Harris, 198 U. S. 561, 25 S. Ct. 770, 49 L. Ed. 1163; Sterrett v. Second Nat. Bank, 248 U. S. 73, 39 S. Ct. 27, 63 L. Ed. 135; Standard Bonded Warehouse Co. v. Cooper & Griffin (D. C.) 30 F.(2d) 842. Such act may operate only in personam to parties related to the court in the proceeding as parties. It is brutum fulmen. The California court had no jurisdiction over, or its receiver any interest in or title to, or possession of the Washington fixtures, and could not by stipulation bind the defendant or the fixtures before the special master or the court. The receiver in that proceeding could only represent the unsold California fixtures.
B. That the contract was executed in California and "must be construed according to the California law." It is fundamental that a contract is to be interpreted according to the lex loci contractus, but the status of the res is governed by the lex loci situs. If the lex loci situs requires a certain formality of acknowledgment and registry, the omission is not cured by attestation and registration of the lex loci contractus. Story on Conflict of Laws, § 262. See, also, Beggs v. Bartels, 73 Conn. 132, 26 A. 874, 84 Am. St. Rep. 152; National Cash Register Co. v. Paulson, 16 Okl. 204, 83 P. 793; Phœnix Packing Co. v. Humphrey-Ball Co., 58 Wash. 396, 108 P. 952.
Section 3790, Rem. Comp. Stat. Wash, provides that "all conditional sales of personal property * * * where the property is placed in the possession of the vendee, shall be absolute as to all bona fide purchasers * * * and subsequent creditors * * * unless within ten days after the taking of possession by the vendee, a memorandum of such sale * * * shall be filed in the auditor's office of the county, wherein, at the date of the vendee's taking possession of the property, the vendee resides."
In Chilberg v. Smith, 174 F. 805, 806, Judge Gilbert for the Court of Appeals, this circuit, said: "But the statute of Washington, in regard to the registration of conditional sales, declares the policy of the state in regard to agreements, whereby a vendee of personal property so sold is placed in the possession thereof with all the apparent indicia of ownership, and it clearly provides that, unless the instrument be recorded within 10 days from the delivery of the property to the vendee, the sale shall be absolute as to subsequent creditors in good faith."
The fixtures being shipped by the plaintiff to the Pilcher Company, vendee, at Aberdeen, Tacoma, Everett, and Monroe, and installed in the several stores of the vendee, under the plaintiff's supervision, the conditional sales contracts were void as to subsequent creditors of the vendee. First Nat. Bank v. Wilcox, 72 Wash. 473, 130 P. 756,
The receiver, appointed at the suit of general creditors, succeeded to the rights of the subsequent creditors as well as the stockholders of the corporation, and free of unrecorded conditional sales contracts. Bayne et al. v. Brewer Pottery Co. et al. (C. C.) 90 F. 754. See, also, Corbett v. Riddle (C. C. A.) 209 F. 811; Cincinnati Equipment Co. v. Degnan (C. C. A.) 184 F. 834, certiorari denied, 220 U. S. 623, 31 S. Ct. 724, 55 L. Ed. 614.
The sale was concededly regular, and the title of the defendant, being deraigned through the receivership proceedings, is such as the receiver was competent to convey. North Coast Dry Kiln Co. v. Montecoma Investment Co., 82 Wash. 247, 144 P. 58. And the receiver had no right or power to waive any of the rights of the subsequent creditors (Keyes v. Sabin, 101 Wash. 618, 172 P. 835), and there is no evidence that any waiver was attempted by the receiver of this court, or any court, prior to sale of the property, November 3, 1926. See, also, Grunbaum Bros. Furniture Co. v. Humphrey Investment Co., 141 Wash. 329, 251 P. 567; Lundquist v. Olympia National Bank, 133 Wash. 600, 234 P. 453; Monotype Co. v. Guie, 134 Wash. 81, 234 P. 1046.
The fixtures came within the public policy of the state of Washington (Sound Industrial Loan Co. v. Allyn, 149 Wash. 123, 270 P. 295), and the public policy of the state of Washington may not be subordinated to the laws of California, under the established facts (Farley v. Fair, 144 Wash. 101, 256 P. 1031). See Barbour v. Campbell, 101 Kan. 616, 168 P. 879. See, also, Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 P. 887, 25 A. L. R. 1149. The public policy declared by the state of Washington as to personal property cannot be rightfully separated from the title, except in the manner pointed out by the Washington statute. Hervey v. Rhode Island...
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