Gladysz v. Planning & Zoning Commission

• Decision Date: 22 May 2001
• Docket Number: (SC 16346)
• Citation: 773 A.2d 300,256 Conn. 249
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHN GLADYSZ ET AL. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF PLAINVILLE ET AL.

256 Conn. 249

773 A.2d 300

JOHN GLADYSZ ET AL. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF PLAINVILLE ET AL.

(SC 16346)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 12, 2001.

Officially released May 22, 2001.

Norcott, Palmer, Vertefeuille, Corradino and Gordon, Js. Hugh I. Manke, for the appellant (defendant Plainville NWD Limited Partnership).

Lawrence J. Golden, for the appellees (plaintiff Carol Salyards et al.).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

This case requires us to determine whether the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the defendant from establishing standing to apply for site plan approval. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs'¹ appeal, which claimed that the named defendant, the planning and zoning commission of the town of Plainville (commission), improperly had granted site plan approval to the defendant, Plainville NWD Limited Partnership (partnership), for construction of a retail development on certain real property on which a related entity held an option. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that collateral estoppel prevented the partnership from establishing standing to apply. Gladysz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 57 Conn. App. 797, 798, 750 A.2d 507 (2000). We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following relevant facts are aptly set forth in the Appellate Court opinion. "The property that was the subject of the application was owned by the Tyler Farms Group. The owners entered into an option agreement and purchase and sale agreement (option) for the subject property with Plainville NWD Real Estate Trust (trust). The site plan application was made by the partnership, which paid all of the option costs and application expenses. The trust and the partnership had an oral agreement that the trust would assign the option to the partnership upon the issuance of the permits necessary for the development. The partnership is made up of the beneficiaries of the trust, with Charter House Development Corporation as general partner.

"In November, 1994, the partnership applied for site plan approval for construction of a retail development of more than 135,000 square feet. This application was denied by the commission and by the inland wetlands and watercourses commission. The partnership appealed from those denials, and the trial court, Handy, J., dismissed both appeals. The partnership's aggrievement was not contested in those appeals, and the court found, in part on the basis of testimony that the owners had entered into an agreement with the partnership for an option to purchase the property, that the partnership was aggrieved.

"On April 13, 1995, the partnership filed an application for site plan approval for a 102,000 square foot development.² The commission approved that application with conditions on November 30, 1995. The partnership appealed, contesting the permit conditions,³ and the plaintiffs appealed from the decision to approve the site plan application.

"The commission moved to dismiss the partnership's appeal, claiming that the partnership had no legally cognizable interest in the subject real estate and, thus, was not aggrieved, and that the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court, Handy, J., after a hearing, granted the motion in a memorandum of decision dated January 21, 1997, stating that there was no evidence before the court that the partnership possessed an interest in the property and therefore it was not aggrieved, that the option existed between the trust and the owners, and that the trust and the partnership were separate legal entities. The partnership did not appeal.

"In their appeal from the decision approving the site plan application, the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the partnership lacked standing to apply for site plan approval. Under Connecticut law, a party applying to a planning and zoning commission must have a sufficient interest in the subject property to have standing to apply; Richards v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 170 Conn. 318, 321-22, 365 A.2d 1130 (1976); and, here, the plaintiffs claimed that the partnership lacked such an interest. The trial court, McWeeny, J., dismissed the appeal, deciding that the partnership was a real party in interest and had standing to apply. The court found that the partnership had an equitable interest in the property by virtue of its agreement with the trust, and the payment of the option costs and expenses incurred in pursuing the application. The court recognized that in a related case involving the partnership's appeal from the decision of the commission imposing conditions on site plan approval, the commission had successfully contested the aggrievement of the partnership and that the appeal was dismissed because the partnership had no interest in the property and, thus, was not aggrieved. The court noted, however, that standing and aggrievement may constitute separate issues and that it was not `persuaded by such decision.'

"The plaintiffs filed a motion to reargue, claiming that Judge Handy's decision that the partnership lacked an interest in the property precluded the partnership from litigating that issue in the plaintiffs' appeal under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The motion to reargue was denied on the ground that standing was not an issue in the previous case involving the partnership's appeal of the conditions of site plan approval, and the reference in Judge Handy's memorandum of decision to the partnership's lack of interest in the property was dicta." Gladysz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 57 Conn. App. 798-801.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment rendered by Judge McWeeny and rejected the partnership's claim that different standards exist for determining aggrievement and standing to apply. Id., 805. The Appellate Court applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of the issue. Id., 806. The court reasoned that "[w]hile the earlier case [before Judge Handy] involved aggrievement and the present case involves standing, the underlying question common to both cases is whether the partnership has an interest in the subject property. Thus, in the context of this zoning case involving a site plan application by a nonowner, the issue to be decided is essentially the same one decided by the earlier trial court. The determination by Judge Handy that there was no evidence that the partnership possessed an interest in the property necessarily precludes any claim that the partnership possessed a substantial interest in that property." Id., 805.

The partnership petitioned for certification, which we granted on July 13, 1999. The certified question in this appeal is "[d]id the Appellate Court properly conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the defendant Plainville NWD Limited Partnership from establishing its standing to apply for site plan approval?" Gladysz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 254 Conn. 904, 755 A.2d 880 (2000). In order properly to address this issue, we must first address whether different standards exist for determining aggrievement and standing to apply. The partnership argues that collateral estoppel is not applicable to the present case because the issue sought to be litigated is not the same as the one previously decided, namely, the question of whether the partnership has standing to apply is different from the question of whether the partnership is properly aggrieved. The partnership also claims that because the issue of standing to apply was not actually litigated or necessarily determined in the trial court decision issued by Judge Handy,⁴ collateral estoppel does not bar litigation of that specific issue. Conversely, the plaintiffs argue that collateral estoppel precludes the partnership from litigating the issue of whether it had an interest in the subject property sufficient to give it standing to apply for site plan approval because that issue had been litigated and decided by Judge Handy. We agree with the partnership that the Appellate Court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

I

The terms "aggrievement" and "standing" have been used interchangeably throughout most of Connecticut jurisprudence. We previously have stated that "[t]he question of aggrievement is essentially one of standing...." Beckish v. Manafort, 175 Conn. 415, 419, 399 A.2d 1274 (1978). Although these two legal concepts are similar, they are not, however, identical.⁵ "Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest ... has been adversely affected." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 530, 525 A.2d 940 (1987), quoting O'Leary v. McGuinness, 140 Conn. 80, 83, 98 A.2d 660 (1953); see also Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43, 47, 478 A.2d 601 (1984); Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 65, 475 A.2d 283 (1984). We traditionally have applied the following two part test to determine whether aggrievement exists: (1) does the allegedly aggrieved party have a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of a decision; and (2) has this interest been specially and injuriously affected by the decision. Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493, 400 A.2d 726 (1978); see, e.g., Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn. 43, 51-53, 347 A.2d 89 (1974); New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, 165 Conn. 687, 700, 345 A.2d 563 (1974); Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 156 Conn. 622, 623, 238 A.2d 413 (1968); Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 507-508, 242 A.2d 705 (1968); Gregorio v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 425-26, 232 A.2d 330 (1967). Proof of aggrievement is, therefore, "an essential prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction of the subject...