Enriquez v. B&D Development, Inc., 2008 NY Slip Op 32287(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 7/21/2008), 0008019/2006

Decision Date21 July 2008
Docket Number0008019/2006,Motion Seq. No: 1,Motion Cal. No: 11
PartiesJUAN-CARLO ENRIQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. B&D DEVELOPMENT, INC., G&I DEVELOPMENT CORP., AUTUMN EQUITIES, LLC, GDY PROPERTIES, INC. and UNITED PROPERTY GROUP, LLC., Defendants.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

PATRICIA P. SATTERFIELD, Judge.

This is a Labor Law action to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained on July 13, 2005, by plaintiff Juan-Carlo Enriquez ("plaintiff'), an employee of nonparty Bedrock Concrete, that occurred while Bedrock, which was hired to perform excavation and foundation work, was pouring concrete foundation at premises owned by the defendants B & D Development, Inc., G & I Development Corp., Autumn Equities, LLC, GDY Properties, Inc. and United Property Group, LLC. ("defendants") located at 392 Essex Street, Brooklyn, New York. Plaintiff, while cutting wood to build cement forms, was hit and cut on his knee by the saw. Plaintiff alleges violations of sections 200, 240 and 241 of the Labor Law. Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing each of the causes of action set forth in the complaint on the grounds that defendant did not direct supervise or control plaintiff's work, which is required to impose liability pursuant to section 200 of the Labor Law; the accident did not involve an elevation-related risk within the meaning of section 240(1) of the Labor Law; and defendants did not violate any Industrial Code provisions that would create liability within the meaning of section 246(1) of the Labor Law.1

It is well established that summary judgment should be granted when there is no doubt as to the absence of triable issues. See, Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 231 (1978); Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361, 364 (1974); Taft v. New York City Tr. Auth., 193 A.D.2d 503, 505 (1st Dept. 1993). As such, the function of the court on the instant motion is issue finding and not issue determination. See, D.B.D. Nominee, Inc., v. 814 10th Ave. Corp., 109 A.D.2d 668, 669 (2d Dept. 1985). The proponent of a summary judgment motion must tender evidentiary proof in admissible form eliminating any material issues of fact from the case. See, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562 (1980). If the proponent succeeds, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion, who then must show the existence of material issues of fact by producing evidentiary proof in admissible form, in support of his position. See, Zuckerman v. City of New York, supra.

"Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to provide a safe workplace [see, Comes v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876, 609 N.Y.S.2d 168, 631 N.E.2d 110 (1993)]. To be held liable under Labor Law § 200, the owner or general contractor must have the authority to control the activity which brings about the injury... (citations omitted)." Mas v. Kohen, 283 A.D.2d 616 (2001); see, Kwang Ho Kim v. D & W Shin Realty Corp., 47 A.D.3d 616 (2nd Dept. 2008); Ragone v. Spring Scaffolding, Inc., 46 A.D.3d 652 (2nd Dept. 2007); Ferrero v. Best Modular Homes, Inc., 33 A.D.3d 847, 850 (2nd Dept. 2006); Cun-En Lin v. Holy Family Monuments, 18 A.D.3d 800 (2nd Dept. 2005); Quintavalle v. Mitchell Backhoe Service, Inc., 306 A.D.2d 454 (2003). Further, liability attaches where the owner or contractor created the hazard, or had actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition, and exercised sufficient control over the work being performed to correct or avoid the unsafe condition. See, Giambalvo v. Chemical Bank. 260 A.D.2d 432 (2nd Dept. 1999); Leon v J & M Peppe Realty Corp., 190 A.D.2d 400 (1st Dept. 1993). Where the dangerous condition is the result of the contractor's methods and the owner exercises no supervisory control over the construction, liability will not attach to the owner. See, Young Ju Kim v. Herbert Const. Co., Inc., 275 A.D.2d 709 (2nd Dept. 2000); Comes v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876, 877 (1993). Likewise, "where the alleged defect or dangerous condition arises from the subcontractor's methods and the owner or general contractor exercise no supervisory control over the operation, no liability attaches to the owner or general contractor under the common law or under Labor Law § 200 (citations omitted)." Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290 (1992); Peay v. New York City School Const. Authority, 35 A.D.3d 566 (2nd Dept. 2006); Ferrero v. Best Modular Homes, Inc., 33 A.D.3d 847, 850 (2nd Dept. 2006). Moreover, the common-law duty to provide employees with a safe place to work does not extend to hazards that are part of, or inherent in, the very work the employee is to perform or defects the employee is hired to repair. Hansen v. Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church of Glen Cove, 51 A.D.3d 725 (2nd Dept. 2008). See, Gasper v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N.Y.2d 104 (1963).

In the case at bar, defendants demonstrated their entitlement to dismissal of the common law and Labor Law § 200 claims by proffering the depositions of plaintiff, who testified that he was supervised only by his boss from Bedrock Concrete. Plaintiff, in response to defendants' prima facie showing, failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact with regard to whether defendants maintained the requisite supervision or control over the activity which caused the injury to plaintiff, in order to avoid its occurrence or correct an unsafe condition under Labor Law § 200. See, Locicero v. Princeton Restoration, Inc., 25 A.D.3d 664 (2nd Dept. 2006); Braun v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 280 A.D.2d 506 (2001). That defendants' may have possessed overall supervisory authority over the entire project is insufficient. " Mere `monitoring and oversight of the timing and quality of the work is not enough to impose liability under section 200' (Dalanna v. City of New York, 308 A.D.2d 400, 764 N.Y.S.2d 429 [2003])." Carty v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 32 A.D.3d 732 (1st Dept. 2006). "[F]or liability to be imposed, the owner must direct and control the manner in which the work is performed, not merely possess general supervisory authority (citations omitted)." Parisi v. Loewen Development of Wappinger Falls, 5 A.D.3d 648 (2nd Dept. 2004); Cuartas v. Kourkoumelis, 265 A.D.2d 293, 294 (2nd Dept. 1999); see, also, McLeod v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 41 A.D.3d 796 (2nd Dept. 2007)["General supervisory authority for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose liability"]; Pensabene v. San Francisco Const. Management, Inc., 27 A.D.3d 709 (2nd Dept. 2006)["The fact that the . . . defendants exercised some general supervisory duties at the work site was insufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether it exercised the type of supervision or control over the injured plaintiff's activities necessary to hold them liable for his injuries]. Since there is no issue of fact as to whether defendants exercised control over the injured plaintiffs work or had knowledge of any unsafe condition that caused the accident, plaintiff's claims alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 must be dismissed. See, Mercado v. TPT Brooklyn Associates, LLC, 38 A.D.3d 732 (2nd Dept. 2007). His section 241(6) claim suffers the same result.

Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty of reasonable care upon owners and contractors "to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to all persons employed in areas in which construction, excavation, or demolition work is being performed." Reinoso v. Ornstein Layton Management, Inc., 19 A.D.3d 678 (2nd Dept. 2005); see, Rizzuto v. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 N.Y.2d 343, 347 (1998); Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501-502 (1993); Meng Sing Chang v. Homewell Owner's Corp., 38 A.D.3d 625 (2nd Dept. 2007). It is well settled that to support a § 241(6) claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of the New York State Industrial Code, the implementing regulations promulgated by the State Commissioner of Labor, which sets forth a "specific" standard of conduct, and that such violation was the proximate cause of his injuries. See, Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., supra at 501-502 (1993); Furino v. P & O Ports, 24 A.D.3d 502, (2nd Dept. 2005); Cun-En Lin v. Holy Family Monuments, 18 A.D.3d 800 (2nd Dept. 2005); Vernieri v Empire Realty Co., 219 A.D.2d 593, 597 (1995). In order for a contractor or an owner to be liable under Labor Law § 241(6), the plaintiff must prove that his injuries where proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that sets forth specific requirements of conduct. See, Mercado v. TPT Brooklyn Associates, LLC, 38 A.D.3d 732 (2nd Dept. 2007); Rivera v Santos, 35 A.D.3d 700 (2nd Dept. 2006); Jicheng, Liu v Sanford Tower Condominium, 35 A.D.3d 378 (2nd Dept. 2006); Portillo v Roby Anne Dev., LLC, 32 A.D.3d 421 [(2nd Dept. 2006). In addition, even if the alleged breach is of a specific Industrial Code rule, that rule must be applicable to the facts of the case. See, Locicero v. Princeton Restoration, Inc., 25 A.D.3d 664 (2nd Dept. 2006); Vernieri v Empire Realty Co., supra.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated sections 23-1.7(d) and (e) of the Industrial Code, which provide:

(d) Slipping hazards. Employers shall not suffer or permit any employee to use a floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface which is in a slippery condition. Ice, snow, water, grease and any other foreign substance which may cause slippery footing shall be removed, sanded or covered to provide safe footing.

(e) Tripping and other hazards.

(1) Passageways. All passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which...

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